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ABSTRACT
To what extent are hiring incentives targeting a specific group of vulnerable
unemployed people more eective with respect to generalized incentives without
a definite target? Do targeted policies have negative side eects on the labor mar-
ket that are too important to accept them? Which are the channels guaranteeing a
long-lasting eect of European Structural Funds? Even though there is vast liter-
ature on hiring subsidies and European Structural Funds, these questions remained
unanswered. To answer them, it is necessary to go beyond the simple treatment
eect estimation. We did it following two dierent paths.
To answer the first two questions we compared the impact of two similar hir-
ing policies, one oriented towards a target group of long-term unemployed people
and one generalized, implemented on the Italian labor market. We considered ad-
ministrative data on job contracts and workers, and applied counterfactual analysis
methods. The results show that only the targeted policy has a positive and significant
impact, while the eects of the generalized policy on the vulnerable group are neg-
ligible. Moreover, we did not detect any indirect negative side eect of the targeted
policy on the local labor market.
To answer the third question we introduced a new methodology, namely the
Mediation Analysis Synthetic Control (MASC) and applied it to investigate on the
impact of European Structural Funds reduction in Abruzzi region. MASC is a gener-
alization of the Synthetic Control Method (SCM) that allows decomposing the total
eect of the intervention into its indirect eects and its direct eect when data on
only one treated and few control units are available. The results show that the neg-
ative impact of European Structural Funds reduction on economic growth is mainly
driven by the indirect eect passing through employment reduction. Instead, only
a small portion of the negative impact is due to the indirect eect passing through
investments reduction.
i
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Skinner box is a cage where there are two levers. Pushing the first ones,
its floor is electrified. Pushing the second ones, its occupant receives food. In 1948
american psychologist Burrhus Frederic Skinner, inventor of the cage, discovered
that a rat placed into it would start soon pushing only the food lever. Somehow,
and unconsciously, that rat would learn the cause-eect relation between pushing
the lever and getting food. Nonetheless, not all cause-eect relations are so easy to
establish that even a rat can understand them. Getting outside of the laboratory, the
number of possible causes increase and there can be misleading correlations.
An enlightening example is the history of ergotism’s name. This illness was
also called “Saint Anthony’s fire”. This name was originated from the fact that most
pilgrims going to Saint Anthony sanctuaries, in Italy, fromNorthern Europe, would
heal. Even though it was interpreted in the past as a holy cause-eect relation, the
healing hid a correlation between the location of the sanctuaries and a nutrition free
of rye (plant infected by ergotim’s fungus).
The philosopher David Hume, in his work “Enquiry Concerning Human Un-
derstanding” from 1748, underlined the diculty of finding a cause-eect relation.
He stated: “When we look around us at external objects, and think about the op-
eration of causes, we are never able to discover any power or necessary connection,
any quality that ties the eect to the cause and makes it an infallible consequence of
it. All we find is that one event does in fact follow the other.” To solve this issue, the
author proposed the following definitions of cause:
“We may define a ‘cause’ to be
• an event followed by another, where all events similar to the first are followed
by events similar to the second.
Or in other words
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• where if the first event hadn’t occurred the second wouldn’t have occurred
either.”
Centuries later, twomain approaches were developed in statistics to find quantitative
proofs of cause-eect relations. Both of them have their roots in these definitions.
The first, older, statistical approach follows the first definition of “cause” given by
the philosopher. Indeed, in the first approach statisticians try to find the relation
between cause and eect looking to the correlation between what is supposed to
be the cause and what is supposed to be the eect. Looking for a correlation means
checking wheter the event cause is always linked with the event eect. To overcome
the risk of interpreting simple correlations as a cause-eect relation, in this approach,
researchers try to take into account of all variables that may induce the same eect
and being correlated with the cause (in the example of the Saint Anthony’s fire
a good researcher would have considered nutrition when examining the relation
between the illness and the pilgrimage).
The second approach follows the second definition, where causality is described
in terms of a counterfactual relation. The idea is that there is a causal eect if the
absence of the cause would have implied the absence of the eect. The concept
of counterfactual relation is the root of modern causal inference. In this approach,
rather than trying to study the correlation between two variables, the statisticians
try to determine what would have happened in absence of cause.
Around 200 years afterHume, the concept of counterfactual relation started to be
used in scientific research by the polish mathematician Jerzy Neyman. In his work,
themathematician proposed amethod for the study of agricoltural field experiments¹
(Neyman 1990). Goal of the study was to compare dierent crop varieties. In a
period when the idea of counterfactual relation was spreading among researchers
(see Rubin 1990), Neyman gave the basis for a formal approach to the problem,
introducing the concept of potential outcomes. He noticed as, in a field experiment,
there are multiple potential yields depending on the type of crop and the plot where
it is set. Nonetheless, only some of these yields are observed. Task of the researcher
¹The last were implemented ever since the twenties.
3is to inference on all potential yields using only the observed.
The idea was generalized in Rubin (1974) with the introduction of Rubin’s (or
Neyman-Rubin) Model. Using modern definitions and notations the idea of the
author can be described as follow. There is a group of units of interest, indexed by
i = 1, ..,N . Some of these units are exposed to a treatment (the equivalent of what I
have called cause so far) and some of them are not. A dummy variable Di takes value
one if the i unit is treated and zero otherwise. The problem of interest is the impact
of the treatment on a specific outcome Y . For each unit i it is possible to define two
values of the potential outcome. The first one is the outcome unit i would have when
exposed to treatment: Y 1i . The second is the outcome unit i would have in absence
of treatment: Y 0i . Following the definition of Hume, it is easy to see that the impact
of the treatment (or eect of the cause) for unit i is given by:
τi = Y
1
i − Y 0i (1.1)
Here it comes what P. W. Holland called the “Fundamental Problem of Causal In-
ference” (Holland 1986): it is impossible to observe both Y 1i and Y
0
i . Indeed, a unit
is either treated or untreated. More formally, the data will obey to the following
observational rule:
Yi = DiY
1
i + (1 − Di)Y 0i (1.2)
where Yi is the observed outcome of unit i. Therefore, individual treatment eect is
never observed. Nonetheless, in most cases, the purpose of the study is to determine
the average eect of the treatment. To reach this goal it would be straightforward
to compare the group of treated units with the group of untreated units:
E(Yi |Di = 1) − E(Yi |Di = 0) =
E((Y 1i − Y 0i )Di + Y 0i |Di = 1) − E((Y 1i − Y 0i )Di + Y 0i |Di = 0) =
E(Y 1i − Y 0i |Di = 1) + [E(Y 0i |Di = 1) − E(Y 0i |Di = 0)]
Nevertheless, as it is clear from the equation, the comparison between the treated
units and the untreated units is equal to the sum between the average treatment eect
on the group of treated (i.e. on the group of units with Di = 1) and the dierence
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between the potential outcomes of the two groups in absence of treatment (i.e. the
term in the square brackets). The second value is commonly called “selection bias”
referring to the fact that the two groups’ potential outcomes in absence of treatment
dier because of a “selection” into treatment of units with determined characteristics.
As an example, if we think of a policy targeting long-term unemployed it is easy to
see that the group of treated, even in absence of treatment, will be very dierent
from the group of untreated.
The first, intuitive, solution used in that years was to select a group of untreated as
similar as possible to the treated group. This method was used even before the intro-
duction of potential outcome concept, and dierent methods to select the untreated
and match between the two groups were proposed (some examples are Cochran
1953 and Cochran and Rubin 1973). Nevertheless, it did not rely on a solid theo-
retical justification. Therefore, the choice of the characteristics to match the units
on, depended mainly on the available covariates. A first step towards a theoretical
justification was done by Rubin (1977) who imagined a framework where treatment
assignment probability depended on a variable X. He stated that, in that case, the
eect of the treatment was given by:
τ =
1
N
∑
x∈X
[E(Yi |Di = 1,X = x) − E(Yi |Di = 0,X = x)]
The basic idea behind this statement is that, once taken into account of the charac-
teristics determining selection into treatment, there is no reason for the other deter-
minants of the outcome to dier between treated and control groups. This intuition
was formalized by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). They introduced the strong ig-
norability assumption (also called the unconfoundness or the conditional indepen-
dence assumption). They demonstrated that, under this assumption, the dierence
between the conditioned average outcome of the treated and those of the control
groups is an unbiased estimation of the average treatment eect (on treated). The
conditional independent assumption is the following:
Assumption 1 (Conditional Independence Assumption).
(Y 1,Y 0) ⊥ D |X
5It requires the potential outcomes to be independent from treatment assignment
once conditioning on the proper covariates X. As an example, lets consider a policy
targenting long-term unemployed and selecting, for a training course, the group
of long-term unemployed living on the west side of a small city. The outcome is
the level of wage the individuals have after 10 years. The covariate X satisfying
assumption 1 is the time in unemployment. Indeed, once taken into account of the
time in unemployment, the additional, non-random, selection “being on the west
side of a small city” (small enough that time and energy necessary to go from one
side of the city to the other is not determinant in job choice) is independent from
future wage. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) demonstrated that, if the assumption is
satisfied, then:
τ =
1
N
∑
x∈X
[E(Yi |Di = 1,X = x) − E(Yi |Di = 0,X = x)]
is an unbiased estimator of the average treatment eect on treated.
When all the covariates in X necessary to satisfy CIA are observed, we talk of
selection on observables (Lechner 2015). Nevertheless, in many policy evaluation
frameworks the set of observables is not rich enough for this requirement to be sat-
isfied. In those cases, we talk of selection on unobservables (Lechner 2015) and the
approaches based on CIA can’t be applied. Many other methods have been proposed
to deal with selection on unobservables.
Among others, the Regression Discontinuity Design. This methodology relies
on the existence of an observed variable (called “forcing variable”) whose value de-
termines selection into treatment with respect to a given threshold. In other words,
a variable such that, all units having a value of it higher than a determined threshold
are treated. All units having a value of it lower than the threshold are not treated.
In such a framework, CIA can be violated if there are unobserved variables influ-
encing both the forcing variable (and, consequently, treatment assignment) and the
outcome. The idea is then to take an interval of the forcing variable around the
threshold small enough to reasonably assume that treatment assignment is locally
randomized (for additional details see 2.3.3.2). This design, can be employed only
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in frameworks where treatment is defined with respect to a threshold on a forcing
variable, and there is no manipulation of the latter.
Regression Discontinuity Design belongs to a set of methods which exploit the
availability of cross-sectional data, where many dierent units are observed in a sin-
gle time period. Other methods relies on the use of panel data, where the same units
are observed inmultiple time periods. Some of these methods can be used evenwhen
the number of units is particularly low. Therefore, they are useful also when there
is selection on observables but the number of units is too low for the estimation to
be satisfying. Among them, there is Syntethic Control Method. This methodology
has been used for the first time in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and more formally
introduced in Abadie, Diamond, et al. (2010) and Abadie, Diamond, et al. (2015).
The idea behind SCM method is to use information on pre-intervention period to
build a “synthetic control”, i.e. a linear combination of control units which mimic
what would have happened to the treated unit in post-intervention period in the
absence of the intervention. This is done by re-weighting the post-treatment out-
comes of control units (whose set is often called donor pool in this framework) by
using weights that are chosen to minimize the distance between pre-intervention
observable characteristics (including pre-intervention outcomes) of treated and con-
trol units (for additional details see 4.1).
All the afore-mentioned methods allow to estimate the average treatment eect,
the individual treatment eect or the local average treatment eect. Nonetheless, in
many empirical frameworks, it may be policy relevant to have additional informa-
tion on how the programme works, the mechanism behind it or other of its con-
sequences. As an example, we can imagine to detect a positive eect of a training
on long-term unemployed hiring. It could be useful to understand whether (or in
which portion) the positive eect is due to an improvement in soft-skills, in technical
skills, or in self-confidence. Similarly, it could be useful to understand if the policy
had some negative side eects, as a negative impact on short-term unemployed hir-
ing. In this dissertation we show how, starting from two methods that can be used
7under selection on unobservables (namely, the regression discontinuity design and
the synthetic control method), it is possible to go beyond the simple treatment eect
estimation following two dierent paths. The first path is empirical. Depending
on the empirical application and the characteristics of the policies under study, it
may be possible to extrapolate additional policy relevant information. The second
path is methodological. Innovative methods may be developed to estimate additional
parameters.
In Part I of the dissertation, the application following the first path is presented.
The work starts from Law 407/90, a policy implemented in Italy between 1990 and
2014 and incentivizing firms to create (permanent) employment for long-term un-
employed people. In the first chapter, we introduce policy setting and characteristics,
some of the existing literature on hiring incentives, the data and empirical strategy
we have used to evaluate it, and the results we obtained.
To evaluate the policy, we exploited an administrative micro-database, namely
CICO database, provided by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies. We had ac-
cess to these data thanks to an agreement between the Dipartimento di Scienze So-
ciali ed Economiche of Sapienza University of Rome and INAPP (Istituto Nazionale
per l’Analisi delle Politiche Pubbliche). The database contains reliable information
on contracts stipulated from 2008 to 2016 for a sample of individuals. Following
Schünemann et al. (2013), we applied a regression discontinuity design to estimate
the policy impact. We used the days of unemployment as a forcing variable and
added daily fixed eects to the standard model. In order to select the bandwidth, we
applied themethod proposed by Cattaneo et al. (2015), modified in order to take into
account of daily fixed eects. Bandwidth choice was conditioned by some consider-
ations on the consequences of using a time-varying forcing variable. Even though
other authors had to deal with this issue before (as an example, see Schünemann
et al. (2013) and Anastasia, Giraldo, et al. (2012)), to the best of our knowledge, no
one explicitly considered its implications. Giving general considerations, our hope
is to provide guidelines to authors who will have to deal with this issue in the future.
From the analysis, it emerged Law 407/90 had a strong, positive and significant ef-
fect on LTU hiring. The estimated impact was meaningfully higher than in previous
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studies using eligibility as treatment. This may be due to the high take-up rate and
to country characteristics.
In the second chapter, we went beyond the simple treatment eect estimation.
First of all, we investigated on its negative side eects. Two side eects are possible in
this framework. In presence of the subsidy, firms may hire subsidized unemployed
people instead of unsubsidized ones with similar characteristics (and, consequently,
a similar vulnerability level), penalizing the latter. This side eect is called displace-
ment eect. When eligibility is defined by determined conditions (as in targeted
policies), the presence of asymmetric information on the government’s side may in-
duce agents to cheat in order to appear eligible when they are not. This side eect
is called asymmetric information eect. Among the studies estimating the impact
of hiring subsidies, few of them took into account of the possible negative side ef-
fects of the policies (Schünemann et al. 2013, Blundell et al. 2004, Calmfors et al.
2002, Bucher 2010, Boockmann et al. 2007). To check for the presence of these
side eects, we exploited the characteristics of the policy. We compared the dier-
ences in hiring before and after policy ending, for values of the forcing variable far
from and close to the threshold. We did not detect any displacement or asymmetric
information eects.
In spite of the huge amount of international literature on hiring and wage subsi-
dies, targeting a vulnerable category of unemployed people (i.e. long-term-unemployed),
little is known about the dierence between the latter and generalized subsidies
without a definite target. Additional information on the dierence between the two
type of policies would, nonetheless, be extremely useful. Indeed, it is important to
knowwhich of the two policies would be more eective and whether the vulnerable
groupwould be penalized by a switch from the targeted to the untargeted one. With
the second part of the second chapter we wish to overcome this lack of information.
To do it, we exploited the similarities and the dierences between Law 407/90 and
a second policy, implemented immediatly after its ending. In this second part of the
chapter we start comparing the two policies qualitatively, we introduce some of the
literature on this topic, the empirical strategy we used to answer our question and
9the results we have obtained. The second policy is 2015 Legge Stabilità (or Law 190).
It consisted, among others, of incentives to create permanent employment without
a particular targeted group. It lasted one year and implied the permanent end of
Law 407/90. We started checking whether the dierence in policy targets was the
only relevant ones. Once verified that, we used an interrupted time series analysis, to
estimate the impact of the generalized incentives provided by Law 190. In order to
parcel out the impact of the generalized incentives from the impact of Law 407/90
ending, we did the estimation on a control group. From the analysis, it emerged
Law 190 had no significant eect on hiring of long-term unemployed.
In Part II an application of the second path is presented. This part is composed
by two chapter, in the first chapter (the third of this dissertation) we introduce a
new methodology allowing to do mediation analysis in frameworks where there is
selection unobservables and/or the number of treated units is low. In the second
chapter (the fourth of this dissertation), an application for this method is provided.
In the third chapter, the first part is dedicated to the literature and a more detailed
introduction to the synthetic control method, while the second part is dedicated to
our new methodology, namely the Mediation Analysis Synthetic Control (MASC).
Among the methods dealing with selection on unobservables, Synthetic Control
Method (SCM) is particularly popular. Even though this method is very well suited
to estimate the total eect of the interventions, in many policy evaluation frame-
works it may be highly relevant to have additional information on the mechanism
behind this eect. In particular, it may be interesting to investigate on the presence
of some intermediate variables (called mediators) that lie on the causal pathway be-
tween the treatment and the outcome of interest. Mediation Analysis is a standard
approach that allows to investigate on the presence of the mediators and to decom-
pose the total eect into a direct (or net) eect of the treatment on the outcome of
interest and some indirect eects, generated through the mediators. A large part
of Mediation Analysis literature focus on the identification and estimation of direct
and indirect eects under sequential conditional independence (see Pearl 2001, Imai,
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Keele, and Yamamoto 2010, Imai and Yamamoto 2013, Vansteelandt and Vander-
Weele 2012, Huber 2014, Huber 2016, Huber et al. 2017), a sort of CIA, extended
to take into account of the mediator. Few of them can be used when the sequen-
tial conditional independence assumption is violated (see Zheng and Zhou 2017,
Frölich and Huber 2017, Deuchert et al. 2018). Nonetheless, the applicability of
these methods is limited in empirical analysis. This motivates the introduction of
Mediation Analysis Synthetic Control (MASC), a generalization of SCM that allows
decomposing the total eect of an intervention into its indirect component, which
goes through observed mediators, and its direct component, in frameworks where
both the sequential conditional independence assumption and the CIA are violated
and/or the number of treated units is low. The main intuition behind this method is
that the same idea used in SCM can be applied to identify these parameters. To do it,
it is sucient to add, to the pre-treatment outcome information usually considered
during weights choice, pre- and post- treatment mediator information.
In the fourth chapter, we start from Barone et al. (2016) work, where the SCM
was applied, and apply the MASC to the same framework. The authors studied the
impact of European Structural Funds (SF) reduction on the GDP of Abruzzi region.
This analysis was highly relevant to take conclusion on the longevity of European SF
eect. Given that this policy’s transfers can be used for many dierent programmes,
their impact can travel through dierent causal channels. In the framework of pol-
icy longevity investigation, it is arguably policy relevant to understand what are the
channels guaranteeing more longevity and what are those by which transfers have a
temporary eect. Consequently, we extended Barone et al. (2016) analysis using in-
vestments and employment as mediators to disentagle the portion of the eect due to
these particular intermediate variables from the rest. In the first part of the chapter,
European Structural Funds and the literature on the topic are introduced. Later on,
we describe how MASC was implemented and the results we have obtained. From
the analysis it emerged that the end of European SF had a negative and significant
impact on indexed GDP per capita (in line with Barone et al. (2016) results). None
of this eect was mediated by a reduction in investments while a big portion of it
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was mediated by a reduction in employment share.
The study presented in the first part of the dissertation was conduced in collabo-
ration with Prof. Marco Centra from INAPP (National Institute for Public Policies
Evaluations) and Prof. Guido Pellegrini. The study presented in the second part
was conduced in collaboration with Prof. Giovanni Mellace from Southern Den-
mark University. The whole work was supervisioned by Prof. Guido Pellegrini.
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2. LAW 407/90 EVALUATION
The aim of this Chapter is twofold. To explore the literature on active labour
market policies and to present our evaluation of Law 407/90. We will introduce Law
407/90, the existing literature on hiring incentives, the empirical strategy we’ve used
to evaluate it and the results we have obtained.
2.1. Long-Term Unemployment and Law 407/90
The study of active policies whose goal is to reduce long-term unemployment
and increase the incidence of permanent contracts, is crucial in today’s Europe. In-
deed, one of the consequences of 2008 global crises was a steep increase in the rate
of LTU¹. The following austerity policies, worstened the situation from a LTU per-
spective. Their implementation contributed to slower the recover of labour market
(Duell et al. 2016, Junankar 2011). According to Eurostat data, the rate of LTU
(calculated with respect to the total labour force) reached 6% in the Euro Area and
7.7% in Italy in 2014². In Italy, according to ISTAT (Italian National Institute of
Statistics) data, the incidence of LTU on total unemployment was 57.3% in 2016³.
The increase of LTU rate was particularly sharp among youths.
A reduction in LTU rate is necessary to guarantee the social inclusion of all indi-
viduals. To reach it, the implementation of a proper policy is fundamental. Indeed,
it is hard for the LTU rate to lower naturally. LTU condition is characterized by a
strong duration dependence. Meaning that, the longer an individual is in the unem-
ployment condition, the harder will be for him/her to exit from it (Mussida 2010,
Obermeier and Meier 2016, Heckman and Borjas 1980, Farooq and Kugler 2015,
Duell et al. 2016). There are three main causes of the duration dependence (Farooq
and Kugler 2015, Brown and Koettl 2012, Brown 2015):
¹In Italy it happened especially in the southern regions (Anastasia, Giraldo, et al. 2012).
²Source: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database
³Source: ISTAT, Noi Italia 2017
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1. The loss of human capital and lack of recent working experience due to the
absence from employment. Its consequence is a lower desiderability of the
long term unemployed worker.
2. The reduction of connections between the unemployed individual and the
labour market. This reason is particularly eective during recession periods
since using informal channels to recruit allows employers to reduce recruit-
ment costs.
3. Scarring eect aecting LTU. In real labour market there is imperfect infor-
mation. Employers tend to exploit the limited tools they have to determine
whether a candidate will be productive or not. One of the tools they use is the
rejection of the candidate by previous employers. LTU are automatically clas-
sified as rejected several times (even though this is not necessary true). Many
authors tried to detect and quantify this last eect, parcelling it out from het-
erogeneities and the loss of human capital. All of them concluded there was
a scarring eect due to long-term unemployment (Biewen and Stees 2010,
Oberholzer-Gee 2008, Omori 1997, Kroft et al. 2013, Baert and Verhaest
2014, Ayllòn 2013).
ALMPs lowering the labour cost, such as Law 407/90, can be used to counteract
these eects even in the long term. Once a LTU has been hired thanks to the labour
cost reduction, he/she will have recent working experience. His/her contacts with
the labor market will increase. The hiring employer will have the possibility to
screen him/her and overcome imperfect information. Hence, an evaluation of such
a policy, in order to determine its eectiveness, can give a big contribution to the
fight against LTU.
Law 407/90 was an active labour market policy (ALMP) implemented in Italy
from January 1991 until December 2014. The policywas promulgated onDecember
29th 1990. According to it, any firm hiring, with a permanent contract, individuals
who had been either in unemployment status, or suspended from their job, or in
Cassa Integrazione (temporary layo ), for at least 24 months, had access to work
tax credits for a period of 36 months. In Italy, firms have to pay, for each employee,
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a rate of his/her wage to the social security service, and a much smaller rate of his/her
wage to the institution providing work insurance. The tax credits corresponded to
50% of the total amount of employee taxes, for regular firms. It corresponded to
100% of the same amount for artisans firms and firms located in the Mezzogiorno
area. The policy aimed at reducing the rate of long-term unemployment.
A firm, to be eligible, could not have experienced firings or workers’ suspending
or voluntary resignation or the end of a temporary contract in the last six months.
This requirement avoided the temptation, for the employers, to substitute workers
of the firm with individuals hired through Law 407/90. In June 28th 2012 rules
defining eligibility on firm side were relaxed and conditions in order to be classified
as unemployed slightly changed. The law ended on December 31st 2014 according
to 2015 Legge Stabilità, promulgated on December 23rd 2014.
This policy was widely exploited on italian labour market. According to INPS’
reports (INPS is the National Institute for Social Security) it has been the policy, for
the increase of permanent contracts, with the highest number of recipients between
2011 and 2014⁴. In particular, the number of individuals who benefitted by this Law
went from a minimum of 295’417 to a maximum of 305’327 among the years 2011-
2014. We focused on the impact of this policy only on LTU hirings, not considering
the other categories it targeted. According to the data we’ve used (see section 2.3.1),
28.5% of the LTU hired with a permanent contract in 2014 were benefitting from
this policy.
In figure 2.1, it is represented the share of hired unemployed, for the period from
2011 to 2014, with respect to unemployment duration.
⁴Source: Statistiche in breve, Politiche Occupazionali e del Lavoro,
http://servizi.inps.it/banchedatistatistiche/menu/index.html
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Figure 2.1: The figure represents the share of hired unemployed workers, with respect
to unemployment duration, for the period from 2011 to 2014. The variable was based on
CICO database.
It is possible to see a clear upward jump at the 729 threshold defining eligibil-
ity (evidenced by the black line). This gives a first suggestion on policy eectiveness.
2.2. Literature Review
Tax credits can be considered a particular type of wage subsidies given that the
basic idea behind both of them is to lower labour cost. Literature on wage subsidies’
evaluation is huge. Most of the studies agree on the fact that they have a positive and
significant eect (Cockx et al. 1998, Forslund et al. 2004, M. et al. 2005, Bucher 2010,
Sianesi 2008, Bernhard et al. 2008, Hamersma 2008, Neubaumer 2010, Jaenichen
and Stephan 2011, Anastasia, Giraldo, et al. 2012, Eppel andMahringer 2013, Farooq
18 LAW 407/90 EVALUATION
and Kugler 2015, Mortensen and Pissarides 2001), few of them concluded they have
a null eect (Schünemann et al. 2013⁵, Boockmann et al. 20075, Boone and Ours
2004) and, to the best of our knowledge, only one of them concluded they have a
negative eect (Kluve et al. 2008). Finally, all the literature reviews suggest they
have a positive impact (Martin and Grubb 2001, Martin 2015, Brown 2015, Calm-
fors et al. 2002). To evaluate them, dierent methodologies have been used. They
can be grouped in the following categories: theoretical models, matching, di-in-
di (or variations of it), duration models, models relying on instrumental variables
approach, regression discontinuity design.
Analysis relying on theoretical models can have bigger or smaller empirical com-
ponents. As an example, Mortensen and Pissarides (2001) used a model almost com-
pletely theoretical. Its only empirical element was model calibration. The authors
studied the impact of dierent hiring subsidies and firing taxes on wages and unem-
ployment, using a search and matching model: Mortensen-Pissarides ones. They
used a matching function to describe search and recruiting process, assumed the
firm had to face hiring and firing costs and allowed for the presence of idiosyncratic
productivity shock causing resource reallocation and job destruction. Hiring costs
were assumed to be higher the higher were the required skills. Obviously, hiring
subsidies lowered hiring costs and firing taxes increased job destruction costs. From
the analysis, it emerged that wage and employment subsidies increase employment,
especially among low skilled workers. Job creation and hiring subsidies, instead, de-
crease unemployment duration but increase its incidence. The authors concluded
job creation and hiring subsidies have an ambigous eect on labour market con-
ditions. Nevertheless, in a framework where long-term unemployment has to be
reduced, a decrease in unemployment duration should be more meaningful than an
increase in unemployment incidence.
Bucher (2010) did a similar use of empirical data still in theoretical model frame-
work. She used real french data to calibrate her model. She studied the impact of
⁵ Nevertheless the authors estimated the intention-to-treatment eect rather than the treatment
eect.
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hiring wage subsidies (under the form of a tax credit), targeting long-term unem-
ployed, in low-skilled labor market. The author used a partial equilibrium model
in a continuous time setting allowing for two types of labour force (workers spe-
cialized in production and unemployed specialized in job search) and two types of
jobs (dierening in terms of firm’s technology). She modeled the probability to be
in unemployment status using a Poisson process. She concluded the program, if im-
plemented on a large scale, would stimulate labor demand of the targeted group,
reduce long-term unemployment and increase total welfare. Nevertheless, it would
lower the probability of short-term unemployed to find a job.
Neubaumer (2010) went further in the use of empirical data, verifying the re-
sults of his theoretical model with a totally empirical matching method. The model
described firms’ hiring and investment decisions in case of quasi-fixed cost per em-
ployee. It allowed for the presence of wage subsidies and training programs. It was
based on dierent assumptions:
• The probability of reaching the intended duration of employment decrease
with the increase of unemployment duration.
• Unemployment raise setting-in costs and lower productivity.
• Given a setting-in cost, wage subsidies have an impact only if they are higher
than the sum of all the costs of productivity reduction and the costs of firing
an employee.
• Training program decrease worker setting-in costs and raise his/her marginal
productivity and the probability to reach the intended employment duration.
From the theoretical model the author concluded that firms which needmostly short
jobs exploit mainly subsidized workers. Firms which need mostly permanent and
highly qualified jobs, instead, choose workers who followed training programs. He
concluded in the short run wage subsidies give better results, from an unemployed
perspective, while in the long run training programs do. To verify the validity of his
conclusions, the author used a matching method. He used German administrative
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data coming from the German Public Employment Service. The database included
all entries, in the evaluated programs, duringMarch 2003, and a random 10% sample
of unemployment stock during the same month. He used data aboutWest Germany
and individuals aged 25-54 only. As outcome variables, he used the cumulated days
spent in regular employment and the share of individuals in regular employment
3.5 years after the program start. To match the units, the author used a propensity
score estimated with a probit model. He compared individuals taking a subsidized
job, separately, with both the whole group of individuals joining a training program
and the subset of this group taking up a job afterwards. The choice to make one of
the comparison using only individuals who took a job afterwards is common in this
literature. It comes from the fact that, since the subsidy requires the individual to be
hired, there may be a selection even once controlled for all eligibility determinants.
Indeed, only a restricted group of eligibles, able to find a job under the subsidy, is
treated. If selection is not taken into account properly, the comparison between the
two programs can be biased. From the analysis, it emerged that there was no signif-
icant dierence between employment perspectives of wage subsidy beneficiars and
those of participants to the training scheme. Wage subsidies beneficiars at first have a
better performance, but they’re catched up after a while. Nevertheless, wage subsi-
dies were significantly better than training programs in general (hence including in
the training program the group of individuals who were not hired after its ending).
The author concluded that most of subsidized employment survive after the end of
the subsidy. It emerged as well that in medium-long run individuals participating
to the programs (both wage subsidies and training programs) have a bigger prob-
ability to have a stable job with respect to unemployed who did not participate to
any program. Nevertheless, in the short term, the opposite is true, due to a lock-in
eect.
The biggest issue about the use of theoretical models in this framework is that
often strong assumptions are required to obtain a precise result. Not all of these as-
sumptions are satisfied in real world and they are hard to check.
The empirical method applied by Neubaumer (2010) is one of the most used
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to study this type of policies. Probably one of the most important work using this
method is Sianesi (2008). The author evaluated six dierent ALMPs implemented
in Sweden. Among others, there was a program providing job subsidies and target-
ing long-term unemployed. She used a database combining two administrative data
sources: the program database (Handel) and the unemployment benefits database
(Akstat). She included in the analysis only individuals older than 25, who became
unemployed for the first time in 1994 andwhowere recipients of unemployment in-
surance. Sianesi used a propensity score matching method, estimating the probabil-
ity to enter in each program with several multinomial models, one for each monthly
spell. The matching was based on some observable characteristics as time-varying
employment oce and local conditions, demographic variables, human capital and
labour characteristics, caseworker subjective and time-evolving judgments of client’s
character, overall prospects and needs of service. Moreover, she included character-
istics that could aect individual’s past employment history, current employment
prospects and self-assessment of the strength of his own chances of re-employment
and others variables. She used, as outcome of interest, individual employment and
benefit collection probabilities over time. From the analysis, it emerged that enter-
ing a job subsidy program, rather than being unemployed, has a positive eect on
employment rates soon after the end of the program (35%) and up to five years on
(20-25%). From the comparison of dierent benefit programs, it emerged that job
subsidies are the most eective.
A similar empirical strategy has been used by Eppel andMahringer (2013). They
evaluated dierent ALMPs, including wage subsidies targeting long-term unem-
ployed or individuals at risk. The authors used a database combining two dierent
administrative data sources, the Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD) and the
Public Employment Service (PES) database. Their sample included all adults aged
15-54 years old registered as unemployed between January 2003 and December
2006. The authors used a binary logistic regression model to estimate the propen-
sity score. They used four dierent matching algorithms and two dierent con-
trol groups. The first including unemployed non-participants. The second includ-
ing non-participants starting non-subsidised employment. It emerged that treated
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individuals have a higher probability to be in employment after programme end-
ing compared to those who remains unemployed both in the short and in the long
term. Nevertheless, there is no significant dierence in the short term and there is a
slightly significant dierence in the long term, when the treated are compared with
employed non-participants. The authors concluded taking up a job have a positive
impact indipendently from the type of job. The impact was stronger for long-term
unemployed.
Jaenichen and Stephan (2011) as well used a matching method. They studied the
eect of a wage subsidies program implemented in Germany from 1998 to 2003.
They focused on the part of the program targeting hard-to-place workers (i.e. dis-
abled and long-term unemployed). The group of treated included individuals taking
a subsidized job during the second quarter of 2002. The control group included, in-
stead, individuals who either didn’t participate to the program or participated later
in time. The control group was disaggregated to make three dierent compar-
isons. One with the unemployed workers. One with the individuals hired during
the afore-mentioned period. One with the participants to on-the-job training pro-
gram. The authors used administrative data coming from the database Integrated
Employed Biographies of the German Federal Employment Agency. They used a
propensity score nearest-neighbor matching with replacement. Their outcome was
whether an individual was in unsubsidized employment at the beginning of a month
and whether a person had successfully avoided unemployment at the beginning of
a month. To build the propensity score they used as covariates: socio-demographic
characteristics, variables on the five-year-history prior to the considered unemploy-
ment spell, timing of unemployment entry and informations on regional labour
market situation. From the analysis, the authors concluded that three years after
the start of the program participants had 25-42% higher probability to be in regu-
lar employment than people in the control group who was unemployed three years
before. Nevertheless, there was no significant dierence between treated and indi-
viduals taking an unsubsidized job in the control group.
Bernhard et al. (2008) as well, used a matching model to study the impact of a
wage subsidies policy implemented in Germany. They employed the same database
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exploited by Jaenichen and Stephan (2011) conducing the analysis on individuals
who received the UI and were not older than 57 years old. They considered as
treated individuals who received the subsidy between February and April 2005.
They used as outcomes the percentage of participants in unsubsidized employment,
the percentage of non-employed individuals and the percentage of individuals not
receiving the UI in subsequent months. As covariates, instead, socio-demographic
characteristics, individual’s and partner’s labour market history during the last five
years, household characteristics, local labour market characteristics and some inter-
actions eects. Treated and control units were matched using a propensity score
matching, exploiting six dierent matching algorithms. In line with other results
on German wage subsidies programs they concluded there was a positive and sig-
nificant eect, higher for older and higher skilled individuals and for long-term
unemployed.
Kluve et al. (2008) used a methodology that exploited the availability of panel
data. The authors, matched the units both according to their socio-demographic
characteristics and according to pre-treatment outcomes. The high number of units
allowed them to use an exact matching. They calculated treatment eect for each
treated unit separately. Subsequently, they averaged the calculated values weight-
ing them according to the frequency, in the sample, of the corresponding unit past
labour history. They analysed the impact of a program of subsidized employment
and a program of job training implemented in Poland between 1992 and 1996 using
data coming from the Polish Labour Force Survey. In contrast with all other analy-
sis, they found a negative eect. The authors concluded that individuals participating
to the program may be labeled as less productive.
Hamersma (2008) as well used panel data, to examine the impact of Work Op-
portunity Tax Credit and Welfare-to-Work Tax Credit on employment outcomes
of disadvantaged workers. She applied a propensity score matching combined with
a DID model. The author matched with respect to socio-demographic characteris-
tics, Country unemployment rate and months of UI receipt. To avoid the selection
problem mentioned before (only unemployed individuals that are able to find a sub-
sidized job can be treated) she defined eligibility for the program as the treatment.
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The data she used came from three dierent administrative sources. The control
group included all individuals who received 6 to 8 months of receipt, given that 9
months were needed in order to be eligible for the policy. The author concluded
the policy has a positive impact in the short run, but it does not in the long run.
Nevertheless, she hypothesized this is due to its low participation rate.
The use of matchingmodel in this framework is a valid choice if the data available
allows to do it. Indeed, the database has to contain enough informations to satisfy
CIA.
Another approach used to determine the impact of a wage subsidies’ policy relies
on duration dependence analysis. Even though duration dependence wasn’t born as
a counterfactual method it can be used as one in this framework. Indeed, it can be
used to estimate two dierent hazard functions, one for treated and one for control
groups. Duration dependence models allow to obtain the so-called baseline hazard
function which describes the probability to exit from unemployment parceled out
by all the influence of individuals’ characteristics. This means, in this framework, it
can be used to obtain the distributions of the outcome for the two groups, cleaned
by group’s characteristics. To obtain it, the researchers control for observable het-
erogeneity and integrate out the unobservable ones. The use of duration models
give the possibility to better reflect the continuous nature of the problem. Fur-
thermore, it gives an immediate estimation of the probability to reach employment
state for dierent unemployment spell lengths. Cockx et al. (1998) used a duration
dependence model to study the impact of three dierent policies implemented in
Belgium on the probability of leaving unemployment. The studied policies were
subsidized on-the-job training, classroom training for unemployed and pure wage
subsidies to employers. They used a sample period covering the years 1991-1993
and collected data through a survey proposed to a sample of recruiters chosen by
the HR manager of the hiring firm. The authors assumed the hazard function to be
given by the product between the baseline hazard and the exponential of the linear
combination of observable characteristics plus unobserved individual specific eect.
To modelize the baseline hazard they used a flexible piece-wise constant specifica-
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tion. They allowed unobservable characteristics to be correlated with the decision
to participate to the program. To control for it, the authors used a nested logit
specification to model the participation probability as dependent on time-invariant
individual characteristics and unobserved individual specific variables. To take into
account of sampling probability, instead, they assumed it to be independent from
individual characteristics, once conditioned on the hiring firm and the probability
to be eligible. Moreover they assumed the probability to work for the hiring firm
to have a beta distribution. To model unobservable characteristics they used two
dierent distributions. It emerged that all the policies have a positive a significant
eect on job duration.
Carling and Richardson (2004) used a duration dependence model to compare
the impact of dierent ALMPs implemented in Sweden between 1995 and 1997.
Among them, there was API, a wage/employment subsidy. The authors used ad-
ministrative data from the Public Employment Oce, reducing the analysis to in-
dividuals registered since August 1991, aged between 25 and 54 years old, who
became unemployed for the first time between January 1995 and December 1997.
Since according to previous studies, there was no self-selection, into dierent poli-
cies, on workers side, they took into account of observable heterogeneity only. The
authors used, to modelize the functional form of the hazard function, a piece-wise
linear hazard where the spells defining linearity were 30 days long. They concluded
that programs implying practice in a firm gave better results with respect to the ones
characterized by vocational training.
Notwithstanding all the positive aspects linked with the use of duration depen-
dence models in this framework, they should be employed with caution. Indeed,
Heckman and Borjas (1980) and Berg (2001) warned on the strong assumptions
needed to use them. In particular, the firsts underlined as strong distributional as-
sumptions about the nature of heterogeneity and the nature of baseline duration
dependence were needed to separate the true duration dependence from the spu-
rious ones. The second underlined as the assumption about multiplicative relation
between the components of the hazard function in the Mixed Proportional Haz-
ard Model didn’t have any justification in economic theory. Heckman and Borjas
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criticism have been in part overcame thanks to the use of the flexible piecewise mod-
elization for the baseline hazard function and thanks to some theoretical economic
justification of the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. Nevertheless, the issue
presented by Berg (2001) is still relevant.
Forslund et al. (2004) studied the impact of a Swedish wage subsidy policy tar-
geting long-term unemployed. The authors applied IV approach exploiting the fact
that the sources of the budget used to pay the programme were dierent across re-
gions and that there were some budget cutbacks in the studied years. They used
administrative data coming from the Handel database of the National Labour Mar-
ket Board. The authors concluded there is a positive treatment eect of participating
in the general employment subsidy programme.
Finally, regression discontinuity design has been used by Schünemann et al.
(2013) and Anastasia, Giraldo, et al. (2012). Schünemann et al. (2013) studied a
policy targeting long-term unemployed. The policy was implemented in Germany
from 1989 until 2002 and it consisted in a wage subsidy given to employers hiring an
individual belonging to the targeted group. The authors estimated the intention-to-
treat eect (see section 2.3.3.1). Hence, they defined eligibles as the treated group.
This allowed them to consider as treated all individuals crossing the threshold of un-
employment length, defining long-term-unemployment condition. Since multiple
programs targeted LTU they combined the RDD with a DID approach exploiting
law’s ending in 2003. The authors used a random sample of administrative data com-
bining social insurance and program participation records, benefit payment files and
job seekers registers. They reduced the analysis to individuals entering in unem-
ployment between April 2000 and December 2002. From the analysis, it emerged
the intention-to-treatment eect was close to zero and non-statistically significant.
This may be due to the low take-up rate of the policy.
Anastasia, Giraldo, et al. (2012) used a dierent type of discontinuity. They stud-
ied a policy targeting women and under 30 youths and exploited the age threshold.
Such policy, was implemented in Italy from 2012 and consisted in tax credits to
DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 27
firms hiring individuals in the targeted group with a permanent contract or turning
their contract from temporary to permanent. The study focused on Veneto region
and used as outcome the number of contracts turned from temporary to permanent
every day. The authors concluded the policy had a positive and significant eect.
As mentioned before, from this literature review, we can conclude most of re-
cent studies detected a positive and significant eect of wage subsidies policies. This
result is robust to the use of dierent methodologies and dierent data.
2.3. Data and Empirical Strategy
2.3.1. Starting Data
Thanks to an agreement betweenDipartimento di Scienze Sociali ed Economiche
of Sapienza University of Rome and INAPP (Istituto Nazionale per l’Analisi delle
Politiche Pubbliche) we had access to all the databases we have used. Wemainly used
an administrative micro-database, called CICO. It was provided by the Italian Min-
istry of Labour and Social Policies (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali).
It contains all recorded employment and parasubordinate contracts⁶ and some self-
employment events (coming from INPS’ data) for a random sample of individuals.
Each record corresponds to a dierent contract and reports the worker ID, the firm
ID, contract’s and job’s characteristics and starting and ending dates, and some basic
socio-demographic characteristic of the individual, such as age, income and region
of residence. The data are collected by the Ministry directly from the employers,
who must register the contract and provide all the information. After the collection
of records, the last are submitted, by the Ministry, to a validation procedures. The
data started to be collected from 2008. Nevertheless, previous observations were
re-built by the Ministry to provide additional information. These data have some
great advantages. From 2008 on, they are precise and valid from the point of view
⁶The last is a type of contract, present on italian labor market, having some of the characteristics
of employment and some of the characteristics of self-employment
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of records of contracts’ start and end. They report detailed individuals working his-
tory in the continuous across nine years. Nevertheless, they have some limits. Given
that the data report only employment experiences, there is a lack of informations on
individual’s status in the period between the end of a contract and the start of the
subsequent ones. Hence, we can’t determine with certainty whether the individual
was actually unemployed in the missing spell. Nevertheless, we took into account
of this issue in the analysis (see section 2.3.4 and 2.4.1).
2.3.2. Data Elaboration
Using CICO database records, we built a new database where each unit iden-
tifies, rather than a recorded contract, a group of individuals having a determined
number of days in a non-CICO-recorded status, at a determined day. To be more
precise, in the new database, unit ij identifies the group of individuals with i days
in a non-CICO-recorded status⁷, at day j. This means unit ij identifies the group
having the last registered contract ending i days before day j and the next registered
contract starting after, or on, day j. Consequently, each unit starts to be counted
from the end of its first contract registered on CICO database. This re-elaboration
of the data has a great advantage. Indeed, it allows to exploit the continuus nature
of the data, analysing the phenomenon each day of the period under study. At the
same time, it maintains a number of observations and variables low enough for the
analysis to be computationally feasible. Indeed, without data aggregation, in order
to do the analysis across all days, we would have had to register 1825 variables on the
employment status of 3’138’373 units. Finally, there is no loss of useful informations
due to the aggregation.
Given that the records are not reliable if recorded before 2008, we re-elaborated
the data using only records subsequent to December 31st 2007. Since we mostly
focused on long-term unemployed this means we have useful informations starting
from 2010. Indeed, it is from 2010 that we start having units far enough from the
last recorded contract to be possibly considered LTU. Obviously, this re-elaboration
⁷With a non-CICO-recorded status we mean an employment status not recorded in CICO
database (from now on, for simplicity, we will call it “non-occupation” since most of the occupa-
tional statuses are recorded).
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of the data reduces the number of disposable units. Nevertheless, the database is still
substantial. Excluding contracts ending before 2008, CICO original database had
11’016’916 observations, corresponding to 3’138’373 dierent individuals. Once the
data were aggregated, and once selected only the units we used in the analysis (for
further details on units selection see section 2.3.3), we had 45’291 observations. The
variables recorded in the new database, for each unit ij, are the share of individuals
hired in day j, the total number of individuals belonging to that unit and the share
of individuals with given socio-demographic characteristics.
In the re-elaboration we excluded from enumeration all individuals starting a
contract thanks to other benefits and individuals whose last ended contract started
thanks to other benefits. We excluded the second group believing that hiring under
a determined benefit may have a dierent eect on the following hiring with re-
spect to the standard ones. As an example, there could be a stigma linked to benefit’s
reception.
2.3.3. Empirical Strategy
To identify treatment eect using counterfactual analysis, we have to make three
fundamental choices: the outcome we want to study, the definition of the treated
group and the method to use. We used as outcome of a unit ij the share of individ-
uals belonging to ij group that has been hired in day j.
2.3.3.1. ELIGIBLE VS SUBSIDISED
In our framework, treated group can be defined in two dierent ways: either
as the group of individuals who actually benefitted from the policy, or as the group
of individuals who were eligible for it. We followed Schünemann et al. (2013),
Anastasia, Giraldo, et al. (2012), Boockmann et al. (2007), Huttunen et al. (2013),
Hamersma (2008) and Forslund et al. (2004) and defined it as the group of eligible
people. In their work, Schünemann et al. (2013) justified this choice with dierent
motivations. I will now report only the most relevant ones in this framework. First
of all, using the actual beneficiary as treated and comparing workers with similair
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probability to be treated, don’t assure the absence of selection bias. This is because
the tax credit has to be required by the employer, hence there may be employers
selection. Employers who know about the tax credit, and decide to require it, may
be dierent (and consequently have dierent hiring behaviours) from the employers
who don’t (i.e. a big firm that have labor consultants will more likely know about
the policy than a small ones). Hence, controlling for employees characteristics only,
may not take into account of all the selection bias problem. The use of eligibility
as treatment solve this problem. Secondly, using eligibility gives the possibility to
apply a Regression Discontinuity Design exploiting the eligibility threshold of the
policy. As we will explain in the following section, this method is ideal to use in our
framework. The last and most important motivation is that, using eligibles as treated
group, we estimate the intention-to-treatment eect. The latter is the most policy
relevant in this framework. This is because tax credits can’t be mandatory. Policies
based on them give the possibility to take up them, not the tax credit itself. Hence,
policy makers only have control on the intention-to-treatment, they have no power
on tax credit use. It is of biggest interest the impact of policies that policy makers
can control, and the last have control on eligibility rules only.
2.3.3.2. METHODOLOGY: REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY DESIGN
As visible from the literature review, many dierent methodologies can be used
in this framework. Nevertheless, some of them can be used under particular condi-
tions only (see section 2.2). To reduce as much as possible the needed assumptions,
we excluded from the available methodologies those based on theoretical and du-
ration dependence models. The available dataset does not allow to use a matching
method properly. Indeed, we do not have exact information on the actual status of
individuals during non-occupation spells. Hence, we could match a housekeeper
with someone who is studying in order to get back on labour market with a higher
human capital. Other methods appliable to this framework are the di-in-dimodel
and the Regression Discontinuity Design. The last is preferable to the first for two
reasons. First of all, if some assumptions are satisfied, when units at the threshold
are considered, the results are as reliable as the gold standard of policy evaluation:
randomized experiments (Lee 2008). Secondly, it is possible to check the validity of
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its assumptions.
The main conditions to apply the regression discontinuity design are the presence of
a threshold, on a continuous variable, defining treatment assignment, and the ran-
dom distribution of individuals around the threshold. In the context of Law 407/90,
eligibility (hence our treatment) is defined with respect to the 24 months threshold
on a continuous variable reporting unemployment days. Moreover, the assumption
of randomness in the distribution of unemployed workers around the threshold and
the requirement of absence of sorting are likely to be satisfied (see section 2.3.4).
Hence, we used a regression discontinuity design to estimate the impact of Law
407/90. As mentioned before, Lee (2008) demonstrated that, if units can’t manipu-
late their forcing variable, at the threshold, a regression discontinuity design works
similar to a randomized experiment. Nevertheless, when a regression discontinuity
design is implemented, there aren’t simultaneously treated and untreated units pre-
cisely at the threshold, to calculate the average treatment eect on. In past literature,
two dierent approaches were developed in order to extend the area where the av-
erage treatment eect could be calculated. In the first approach, a local polynomial
regression (either parametric or non-parametric) is used. The idea is that, once con-
trolling for the forcing variable (hence once it is included in the regression model),
the notion of local can be extended and a wider bandwidth can be used. Following
this approach, it is fundamental the choice of a bandwidth. The last has to guarantee
a low MSE and, simultaneously, consistent inference parameters. The units inside
the chosen bandwidth can have slightly dierent characteristics, the presence of the
forcing variable (and, sometimes, of other covariates) in the model, allows to take
it into account. The second approach has been developed more recently by a new
strand of the literature. Its basic idea is to include in the estimation units around the
threshold close enough to it, to still consider the model as a local randomized exper-
iment. The literature on this method mostly focused on the conditions necessary to
define the regression discontinuity design as a local randomized experiment (Catta-
neo et al. 2015, Li et al. 2015). We followed the second approach, and in particular
Cattaneo et al. (2015) ones, because of the nature of our forcing variable (see the
section 2.3.3.3).
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Hence, we used the following linear regression model:
yij = α + βDij + θj + ϵij (2.1)
Where the dependent variable is the share (with respect to the number of individ-
uals in the entire group) of individuals of group (ij) hired in day j. Variable Dij is
a dummy taking value 1 if individuals in group (ij) are eligibles. The θj are the
daily fixed eects. The presence of daily fixed eects allow us to consider each daily
comparison as independent from the others. Moreover, it allows us to overcome
seasonality issues. Contracts’ starting and ending dates are characterised by a strong
seasonality. Not taking into account of it could bias the estimation of treatment ef-
fect. To be more clear, there are months of the year, as December, characterized
by a high number of contracts’ endings and a low number of hiring. Since individ-
uals become eligible in the month their last contract ended, there is a particularly
big group of individuals becoming eligible in a month characterized by low hiring
and this can bias the estimation. Controlling for the hiring day we overcome this
issue. The error term is ϵij . It is easy to see that the eect of Law 407/90 is given by
parameter β .
The re-elaboration of data we did (see paragraph 2.3.2) has some consequences
on the type of regression we have to use. Since we aggregated the data, a single unit
ij can represent both a huge and a low number of individuals. Hence, some values
of the outcome may be underepresented with respect to their presence in the real
population. When this is the case an OLS estimation gives biased and unconsistent
results and WOLS has to be used (Winship and Radbill 1994). To reproduce the
distribution of the individuals in the real population we used, as weights, the total
number of individuals represented by each unit. This means we weighted unit ij
according to the total number of individuals with i days of non-occupation at day j.
When using standard linear regression model, in order to build confidence in-
tervals, and estimate coecients’ standard error, some assumptions are needed. I.e.
to build confidence intervals the normality assumption is needed. To estimate the
standard error, instead, it is necessary to assume the residuals not to be clustered.
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Nevertheless, there are methods to estimate the confidence intervals and the stan-
dard error that are robust to the violation of these assumptions, as bootstrap method.
To verify whether the assumptions were violated we estimated the confidence in-
tervals in a first regression without weights, both using a standard and using a boot-
strap method. The results were similar enough to conclude the previous assumptions
were not violated. Nevertheless, the inclusion of weights in a simple homoskedastic
OLS estimation, can cause a heteroskedasticy problem (Winship and Radbill 1994).
We tested for heteroskedasticity using a Breusch-Pagan test and concluded it was
present. Hence, we used a White estimation to determine standard deviation and
confidence intervals.
2.3.3.3. TIME-VARYING FORCING VARIABLE AND BANDWIDTH CHOICE
As mentioned above, when Regression Discontinuity Design is applied there are
two possibilities for bandwidth selection. The first one is to widen the bandwidth
and include, among the covariates of the regression model, a linear polynomial of
the forcing variable. The second is to select the bandwidth such that, inside it, a
randomized experiment is reproduced. The idea behind the first approach is that,
through the forcing variable, we can control for all the characteristics determining
selection into treatment, and this allows to widen the bandwidth. If the forcing vari-
able is time varying, this approach can’t be used. When the forcing variable is not
time varying there is a single event where it is defined. The individual characteris-
tics determining this forcing variable are those determining selection into treatment.
Therefore, under the assumption that the potential outcomes are continuous at the
threshold, controlling for the forcing variable allows to control for all the charac-
teristics determining selection into treatment and aecting the outcome. When the
forcing variable has the particularity of changing over time, in dierent time period,
a dierent value of the forcing variable is observed for the same unit. Consequenlty,
all units have, in a determined time period, a forcing variable taking low values, in-
dependently from their characteristics. I.e. imagine a firm going bankrupt has to
fire two employees. The two have similar competences but one of them is older and
he/she is less familiar with technology. Potentially, the older worker will remain
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unemployed for longer time. Nonetheless, when the firm had just fired them we
observe, for the two employees, the same value of the forcing variable. Controlling
for that forcing variable we are not able to control for the potential length of their
unemployment spells, which determines selection into treatment. This is why, in
time-varying forcing variable frameworks, as ours, the first approach for bandwidth
selection can’t be used.
In this context it may be useful to distinguish between the observable forcing
variable and the potential forcing variable. The first is the forcing variable re-
searchers are able to observe directly. The second is a resume of all the charac-
teristics determining selection into treatment. In the example above, the two em-
ployees have the same observable forcing variables but the older worker has a bigger
potential forcing variable. Obviously, what we are interested in, when applying a
regression discontinuity design, is the potential forcing variable. When the vari-
able is time fixed, the observed forcing variable and the potential forcing variable
coincides. Hence, it is enough to control for the observed forcing variable to be
sure to control for all the characteristics determining selection into treatment. In
time-varying forcing variable frameworks, instead, the observed forcing variable
takes multiple values and it does not necessary coincide with the potential forcing
variable. If we follow the local randomized experiment approach, there is no need
to control for the characteristics determining selection into treatment. Indeed, it
allows us to choose a bandwidth small enough to be able to assume that all those
determinants are equally distributed between treated and control units. Hence, the
local randomized experiment is the only possible approach in frameworks where the
forcing variable is time-varying. Our opinion is that, even though the literature is
full of regression discontinuity designs applied in frameworks with a time-varying
forcing variable, this issue was never considered adequately.
Cattaneo et al. (2015)method follows the local randomized experiment approach.
Nonetheless, we did not apply their method as it is. Cattaneo et al. (2015) developed
a method that allow to do inference even when the number of observations around
the threshold is particularly low (as it is often the case in RDD frameworks). This
method requires an assumption on the distribution of treatment assignment inside
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the chosen bandwidth. Nevertheless, in our database, even when the smallest band-
width is chosen, we have a huge number of observations. Hence, we can avoid to
make any assumption on treatment assignment distribution and use standard tests.
Moreover, Cattaneo et al. (2015) propose to select the bandwidth according to the
results of a balance test on dierent covariates. In our framework, we want to do
the balance test taking into account of the inclusion of daily common eects in the
model. Indeed, we compare treated and control groups each day, consequently, we
want the two groups to be balanced at daily level. One of the test they used to com-
pare treated and untreated groups and select the bandwidth is the unpaired t-test.
This test consists in a comparison between the two means of the two groups. We
used a paired t-test rather than a regular one, pairing units belonging to the same
day. Using this approach we check whether the dierence between the treated and
the control groups each day is null on average. Hence, we obtain a treated and a
control groups balanced and comparable each single day.
In bandwidth selection process, we used the following covariates: the share of
women, of individuals with dierent educational qualification, of individuals who
started their first job at dierent age class, of foreign citizens, of individuals working
in dierent working sectors or geographical areas during the last contract.
2.3.4. Needed Assumptions
To have a valid result applying the regression discontinuity design, some assump-
tions have to be satisfied. In the following paragraph we will introduce them and
discuss their plausibility.
Since we decided to follow Cattaneo et al. (2015) approach, the model we used
required all their assumptions to be satisfied. We adapted them to our framework,
in order to take into account of the presence of daily dummies:
Assumption 1 (Local Randomization). There exists a neighborhoodW0 = [ψ ,ψ ] with
ψ < ψ0 < ψ such that, for all units with i ∈W0:
(i) Fψi j |ψi j∈W0(ψ |j) = F (ψ |j), and
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(ii) yij(ψ |j) = yij(DW0 |j) for all ψ .
Where the symbolψ defines a given value of the forcing variable,ψ0 is the thresh-
old of interest and ψij is the value of the forcing variable of unit (ij) and F is a prob-
ability distribution. The first part of the assumption requires the distribution of the
forcing variable to be the same for all units inside the interval for a given day. The
second part requires the potential outcomes of units inside the interval to depend,
each single day, on the forcing variable only through treatment assignment. If this
assumption is satisfied, we can ignore the value of the forcing variable inside the in-
terval. From here, the formulation of the regression model only with the treatment
dummy (Cattaneo et al. 2015). To be more intuitive, assumption 1 requires the units
to be distributed randomly inside the selected bandwidth. Apparently, this assump-
tion is likely to be satisfied. Indeed, being, at a determined day, unemployed from 23
months and 28 days or 24 months, is not under control of the unemployed. There
is a random component on the day the previous contract ended. There is another
random component in the employers the unemployed got in contact with and the
time it happened (to be unemployed since 24 months when hired, the unemployed
has to find the right match at the right moment).
Nonetheless, the assumption may be violated in presence of sorting. Sorting
may come from dierent sources. First of all, the unemployed may have been able
to control their recorded number of days in unemployment. This is unlikely to be.
Indeed, the recorded number of days in unemployment was determined according
to the registration of the unemployed worker at an employment agency. Hence,
the forcing variable value was completely under control of the employment agency.
The unemployed had no control on it. Sorting could come as well from a caseworker
who thinks that determined types of unemployed individuals are particularly suitable
for this wage subsidy program and it is worth to modify his/her intervention to be
sure that they stay in unemployment long enough to become eligible. Nonetheless,
this is unlikely to be the case for dierent reasons. First of all, the value added of
the subsidy program is the hiring. Hence, if the unemployed worker can be hired
without it, there would be no value added to program participation. Secondly, the
number of italian caseworkers is lowwith respect to unemployment level, suggesting
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it is unlikely for the LTU to receive a tailored service. I.e. in 2012 there were
on average 254.2 individuals per caseworker who made a declaration of immediate
availability for work at the employment oce⁸.
Sorting may derive as well from employers that decide to hire an unemployed
person close and under the threshold and wait until the last became eligible to get
the subsidy. We checked for this possibility in the following chapter (see paragraph
3.1).
Assumption 2 (Local stable unit treatment value assumption). For all units with i ∈
W0: if Dij = D′ij then yij(DW0 |j) = yij(D′W0 |j).
With this assumption, we are requiring nothing more than the SUTVA to be
valid locally (inside the interval). We are requiring that locally, how the treatment is
enacted is irrelevant to each unit’s potential outcome. We are requiring as well that
there is not interference among units. Therefore treatment assignment of one unit
has no influence on the potential outcome of another unit. This assumption may
be violated in presence of negative side eects. This issue will be discussed more in
detail in the next chapter (see section 3.1).
Assumption 3 (Zero treatment eect for covariate). For all units with i ∈ W0: the
covariate xij(ψ ) satisfies xij(ψ ; j) = xij(DW0 ; j) = xij(j) for all ψ .
This assumption requires the treatment eect on the covariates to be zero in the
interval where assumption 1 holds.
Assumption 4 (Association outsideW0 between covariate and score). For all units
with i ∈ W˜ and for all ψ ∈ W˜ :
(i) Fi |i∈W˜ (ψ |j) = F (ψ ;xij(ψ )|j), and
(ii) For all couples of units (ij), (pq) with i , p and

j = q
or
j , q
either
xij > xpq ⇒ F (ψ ;xij |Zj) < F (ψ ;xpq |Zq)
⁸Source: “Indagine sui servizi per l’impiego 2013”, Cliclavoro
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or
xij > xpq ⇒ F (ψ ;xij |Zj) > F (ψ ;xpq |Zq)
where W˜ = [ρ,ψ ) ∪ (ψ , ρ] for a pair (rho, rho) satisfying ρ < ψ < ψ < ρ. This as-
sumption requires the score to be correlated with the covariates outside the interval
where assumption 1 holds. The last two assumptions justify the use of balance tests
between covariates to select the desired intervalW0. Indeed, if there is correlation
between the score and the covariates outside the interval and there is no correlation
inside the interval the last can be easily identified as the largest interval without cor-
relation. Hence, it corresponds to the largest interval for which the group of treated
and the group of untreated units are balanced. Both these assumptions are likely to
hold in our framework. Indeed, the selected covariates (such as the geographical area
of belonging) are likely to be correlated with unemployment length. On the other
hand, the same random components that guarantee us randomization insideW0 also
guarantee uncorrelation between covariates value and treatment assignment. I.e.
the previous contract ending five days before or five days later is unlikely to depend
on unit’s gender.
In addition to the previous assumptions we have to add the following ones:
Assumption 5. There are no other policies aecting eligibles and non-aecting non-eligibles.
This assumption maybe violated if other policies use Law 407/90 threshold and
we are not able to control for them. Nonetheless, we had the possibility to control
for the reception of other benefits. The exclusion of all individuals benefitting from
other policies (see section 2.3.2) guarantee us this assumption is not violated.
2.4. Results
As mentioned before (see paragraph 2.3.3), to select the bandwidth we used a
modified version of Cattaneo et al. (2015) methodology. In table 2.1 the results of
the t-test are presented. As Cattaneo et al. (2015) we report dierent possible win-
dowsW0, on the left column, and the lowest p-value among those obtained from the
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t-test on each covariate, on the right column. Following Cattaneo et al. (2015), we
chose the bandwidthW0 corresponding to the biggest value of ω having its and all
previous p-values higher than 0.15.
ω p-value
[728:730] 0.6926049
[727:731] 0.6757796
[726:732] 0.7891312
[725:733] 0.7899194
[724:734] 0.7362718
[723:735] 0.6159053
[722:736] 0.5451728
[721:737] 0.5195819
[720:738] 0.4540012
[719:739] 0.4291586
[718:740] 0.3764177
[717:741] 0.2899919
[716:742] 0.2251229
[715:743] 0.1876122
[714:744] 0.149704
[713:745] 0.1151946
[712:746] 0.0905614
Table 2.1: Paired t-tests to select the proper bandwidth: on the left column the
bandwidth, on the right column the corresponding lowest p-value
In figure 2.2, it is possible to see a graph of the minimum p-values corresponding
to dierent bandwidth values. The selected bandwidth is highlighted in red.
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Figure 2.2: The minimum p-values obtained by the paired t-test did on the covariates to
select the proper bandwidth is represented with respect to dierent bandwidth values. The
selected bandwidth is highlighted in red. Paired t-tests at a daily level were used.
The selected bandwidth went from 714 to 744 days of unemployment (where
729 is our threshold). Hence, we included all units becoming eligibles in two weeks
or less and all units who became eligibles since two weeks or less.
The results of the regression are reported in table 2.2 (obviously, we excluded
the daily parameters). As common, we use, as significativity level, a 0.05 ones. The
results suggest Law 407/90 had a positive and significant impact. Comparing the
estimated impact with the average weighted outcome of the control group, we can
conclude the treatment increased the last by 36%. This value is bigger than the
results obtained in previous literature. Most of the studies estimating intention-to-
treatment eect concluded there wasn’t a significant eect (see Boockmann et al.
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Table 2.2: ESTIMATION OF THE INTENTION TO TREATMENT EFFECT OF
LAW 407/90, REGRESSIONWITH DAILY FIXED EFFECTS
VARIABLES Coecients
Treat 3.01***
(0.462)
Constant 9.38***
(0.282)
Observations 45,291
R-squared 0.094
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
NOTE: We implemented a weighted regression, using the total number of individuals cor-
responding to each unit as weights. The standard errors in the unweighted regression were
robust to bootstrap estimation. ITT of Law 407/90 is given by “Treat”. For easier reading,
coecients and standard errors were multiplied by 100,000.
2007, Huttunen et al. 2013, Schünemann et al. 2013) and one of them found a pos-
itive and significant eect of 10% in the short run (Hamersma 2008). Nevertheless,
this dierence can be explained by three elements. The first one is that we studied a
widely used policy. The second is that it was implemented across a very long period
(i.e. 24 years). Hence, it was probably well known by both employers and unem-
ployed individuals. The third is that almost all of the afore-mentioned authors (with
the exception of Schünemann et al. 2013) used a methodology which estimated the
impact of the policy on the whole population of eligibles. Using a RDDwe obtained
only local results. This means our estimation describes the eect of the policy only
for the group of eligibles included in the bandwidth. This is one of the most aected
groups. Indeed, of the hirings under Law 407/90, around 38% involved individuals
with 24 to 27 months of unemployment.
In terms of national employment, inside the bandwidth, the policy increase it by
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45 individuals per year. If the impact of the policy was the same outside the band-
width, the policy would have increased the hiring of individuals between 24 and
28 months of unemployment by 1662 per year. The average yearly hiring of indi-
viduals in unemployment since 24 to 28 months, hired with a permanent contract,
between 2011 and 2014 is 21318.
2.4.1. Model Assumptions and Robustness Checks
We checked whether the results were robust with respect to a seasonal adjust-
ment method dierent from the inclusion of daily dummies in themodel. In particu-
lar, we repeated the estimation using data seasonally adjusted with a moving average
method. In table 2.3 the result of this estimation (Model 2) is compared with the re-
sults obtained using the daily dummies alone (Model 1). The estimated eect do
not dier much. We can conclude they are robust to another seasonal adjustment
methods.
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Table 2.3: ROBUSTNESS CHECK WITH RESPECT TO SEASONAL AD-
JUSTMENT
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2
Treatment 3.01*** 2.95***
(0.462) (0.466)
Constant 9.38*** 9.40***
(0.282) (0.291)
Observations 45,291 45,291
R-squared 0.094 0.084
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
NOTE:We used amoving averagemethod to seasonal adjust the data. InModel 1 raw datawere used.
InModel 2 seasonally adjusted datawere used. We implemented aweighted regression, using the total
number of individuals corresponding to each unit as weights. The standard errors in the unweighted
regression were robust to bootstrap estimation. ITT of Law 407/90 is given by “Treatment”. For
easier reading, coecients and standard errors were multiplied by 100,000.
We also did the robustness checks standardly used when a regression disconti-
nuity design is applied. In particular, in table 2.4, it is represented the sensitivity of
the estimated eect with respect to bandwidth choice. The estimation of treatment
eect is not very sensitive to bandwidth selection, once assumption 1 is satisfied.
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Table 2.4: ROBUSTNESS CHECK OF LAW 407/90 ITT ESTIMATION WITH RE-
SPECT TO BANDWIDTH CHANGES
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES [714:744] [720:740] [724:734]
Treat 3.01*** 2.43*** 2.21***
(0.462) (0.575) (0.822)
Observations 45,291 30,681 16,071
R-squared 0.094 0.124 0.204
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
NOTE: We implemented a weighted regression, using the total number of individuals cor-
responding to each unit as weights. For easier reading, all coecients and standard errors
were multiplied by 100,000.
Note that the dierent bandwidths we tested for, are all smaller than the cho-
sen bandwidth. Indeed, given the method we used in bandwidth selection, in a
bandwidth bigger than the chosen ones there could be a violation of assumption 1.
Hence, treated and control groups may be unbalanced.
Given that in CICO database it is not possible to identify exactly the unem-
ployed individuals we checked as well if treated and non-treated individuals had
similar distributions between non-CICO-detected status. To do it, we used RTFL
data. The last are survey quarterly data from ISTAT (Italian National Institute of
Statistics). It is one of the most important database providing these informations and
it is used to build ocial estimations of labor force status. Data are collected every
week interviewing more than 250’000 families living in 1’100 dierent municipal-
ities (Anastasia, Bertazzon, et al. 2016). We checked whether the rate of individ-
uals in each non-CICO-detected category is equal, each year, between uneligibles
with 23 months (from 698 to 728 days) of non-occupation and eligibles with 24
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months (from 729 to 760 days) of non-occupation. Given that the more we tight
the bandwidth the more the two groups are likely to be equal, this can be consid-
ered a conservative check. In the following graph are represented the distributions,
among dierent non-CICO-detected categories, of individuals with 23 and indi-
viduals with 24 months of unemployment.
The two distributions are fairly similar.
In table 3.5 the results of an estimation including covariates are presented. The
estimated intention-to-treatment eect does not dier from the main estimation.
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Table 2.5: ROBUSTNESS CHECK OF LAW 407/90 ITT ESTIMATION WITH RE-
SPECT TO COVARIATES ADDITION
VARIABLES Coecients Std Error
Treatment (β1) 3*** (0.459)
Women % 8.64 (8.27)
Low Secondary -5.48 (9.44)
Up Secondary 13.29 (118)
Tertiary no Univ -109.9* (64.36)
Tertiary Univ -4.33 (12.15)
Degree+ -125.2** (55.14)
20-24 -3.26 (14.16)
25-29 6.86 (12.79)
30-44 11.89 (12.14)
45+ -9.32 (17.01)
Foreigners -7.47 (12.28)
Industry 16.6 (10.97)
Constructions 31.28*** (7.71)
Services 4.8 (6.52)
NE -11.04 (10.85)
Center 1.6 (11.48)
South and Islands 7.26 (8.55)
NOTE: We added several covariates. The share of women (“Women”). The share of indi-
viduals who completed the following educational stages (where elementary education was
used as baseline): lower (“Low Secondary”) or upper (“Up Secondary”) secondary education,
non-university tertiary level (“Tertiary noUniv”), university tertiary level (“Tertiary Univ”),
postgraduate education (“Degree+”). The share of individuals in dierent age ranges (where
the age range from 15 to 19was used as baseline): from 20 to 24, from 25 to 29, from 30 to 44,
older than 45. The share of non-italian citizens. The share of individuals working in the in-
dustrial (“Industry”) or the construction (“Constructions”) or the services (“Services”) sectors
(where the share in agricoltural sector was used as baseline). The share of individuals whose
last job was located in the following areas of Italy (where the NW area was used as baseline):
North-East (“NE”), center (“Center”) or South and Islands (“South and Islands”). We imple-
mented a weighted regression, using the total number of individuals corresponding to each
unit as weights. For easier reading, all coecients and standard errors were multiplied by
100,000. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Obs: 45,291.
R-sq. 0.096.
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In table 2.6 three dierent placebo tests are presented. In the first two we use,
respectively, 22 and 26 months of unemployment as a threshold (mantaining the
same bandwidth of the main estimation). In the third we use Law 407/90 threshold
but apply the model to data from 2015.
Table 2.6: PLACEBO TESTS FOR LAW 407/90 ITT ESTIMATION
(1) (2) (3)
THRESHOLD 2011-2014 2011-2014 2015
22 Months 0.00987
(0.486)
26 Months -0.788
(0.504)
24 Months -0.960
(1.28)
Observations 42,369 42,369 11,315
R-squared 0.077 0.109 0.189
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
NOTE: We implemented all weighted regressions, using the total number of individuals
corresponding to each unit as weights. For easier reading, all coecients and standard errors
were multiplied by 100,000.
All the estimated intention-to-treatment eect are non-significant, suggesting
those estimated for Law 407/90 is eectively due to the policy. An additional confir-
mation comes from the last check. It consists in the study of the correlation between
the share of subsidized individuals and the estimated intention-to-treatment eect
across dierent years. In table 2.7, the coecients of the treatment, the share of sub-
sidized individuals among LTU hired with a permanent contract and the correlation
among the two are reported each year.
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Table 2.7: LAW407/90, CORRELATIONBETWEEN SHAREOF SUBSIDISED
INDIVIDUALS AND ITT ACROSS YEARS
Correlation 0.79294
Year Treatment Eect Subsidized Individuals
2011 4.21e-05 0.398
2012 2.74e-05 0.405
2013 1.46e-05 0.361
2014 3.65e-05 0.41
The share of subsidized individuals and estimated treatment eect present a high
correlation. This suggests our regression model eectively detected the impact of
the studied policy.

3. TARGETED POLICIES: BEYOND TREATMENT EFFECT ESTIMATION
In the following chapter we will show how we went beyond the simple estima-
tion of treatment eect exploiting laws characteristics and the context it was set in.
The chapter starts with an introduction on the possible negative side eects and on
how they were investigated in past literature. Later on, we introduce our investi-
gation approach and present the results. The second part of the chapter regards a
comparison between targeted and untargeted policies from the perspective of the
long-term unemployed workers.
3.1. Law 407/90 Negative Side Eect
3.1.1. Which are the possible negative side eects?
Brown and Koettl (2012) and Calmfors et al. (2002) identified several possible
negative side eects following targeted ALMPs implementation. In this analysis we
focused only on those side eects that can be generated by Law 407/90 (as an exam-
ple we excluded the locking-in eect which is typical of training programs). Those
are the asymmetric information eect, which in our context take the shape of post-
poned hiring, and the displacement eect.
3.1.1.1. POST-PONED HIRING EFFECT
Due to asymmetric information, the Government may not have perfect knowl-
edge on what is happening on labor market. This means firms and unemployed can
cheat in order to get subsidies even when they’re not eligibles. In particular, in our
context, an employer who decides to hire an uneligible individual close to eligibility
threshold may wait to hire him/her until he/she is eligible in order to get the sub-
sidy. We call this eect post-poned hiring eect.
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Literature investigating on post-poned hiring eect is quite contained. One
work focusing on this issue is Boockmann et al. (2007). The authors used adminis-
trative data coming from the Integrated Employment Biographies database to deter-
mine the impact of a policy of wage subsidies implemented in Germany since 1998.
To check for the presence of post-poned hiring eect the author verified whether
the estimation changed when excluding individuals that were, according to their
beliefs, far enough from the threshold not to be aected by it. They concluded
there was not post-poned hiring eect. Nevertheless, this can be linked to the fact
that, according to their analysis, the policy had no significant eect.
Schünemann et al. (2013) found a similar result. As mentioned before (see 2.2),
they studied a policy implemented in Germany consisting in a wage subsidy given to
employers hiring unemployed workers from at least 12 months. To check for post-
poned hiring eect the authors verified whether there was an unusual behaviour in
hiring immediately before the threshold. The authors concluded there was no post-
poned hiring eect. Nonetheless, they found no significant impact of the policy
either.
3.1.1.2. DISPLACEMENT EFFECT
The second possible negative side eect is displacement eect. Non-targeted
individuals having similar characteristics to the targeted ones, may be penalised by
policy implementation. Indeed, thanks to the policy, they have similar characteris-
tics but a higher labor cost, than targeted individuals. This means the policy lower
their relative desirability. In Law 407/90 framework, the implementation of the
policy may penalize individuals who are uneligible for it, but close to the threshold.
Indeed, workers unemployed from 23 months and workers unemployed from 24
months are similar in terms of lack of recent working experience, scarring eect,
etc. Nonetheless, the workers unemployed from 24 months have a lower labor cost.
It is likely that an employer prefers to hire an individual with 24 months of unem-
ployment benefitting from the policy. This means that hiring of individuals with,
g.e. 23 months of unemployment may decrease when the policy is implemented.
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Among the studies testing for the displacement eects of hiring subsidies there
is Blundell et al. (2004). The authors evaluated the New Deal for the Young Em-
ployed, a policy designed in the UK to move young unemployed back into work.
The policy combined job search assistance with subsidized job placement and it was
compulsory to have access to unemployment benefits. The program targeted indi-
viduals aged 18 to 24 receiving unemployment insurance for at least six months. The
authors used as outcome the rate of individuals exiting unemployment within four
months since program entrance. They applied a matching dierence-in-dierences
estimator, exploiting the fact that only youths were eligibles and only some areas
were treated. They compared treated and untreated areas with similair trends. They
found a positive and significant eect on outflows to employment for men. There
was an increase of the probability of finding a job of about 5%. Moreover, the au-
thors could not reject the null hypothesis of no displacement and equilibrium wage
eect.
Moving towards policies closer to Law 407/90, there is Ham et al. (2011). The
authors evaluated the Enterprise Zone Program, a policy providing tax benefits to
firms increasing employment in local labor markets of areas lagging behind in terms
of economic development. They estimated the impact of the policies using three dif-
ferent dierence-in-dierence-in-dierences estimators. They found a positive and
significant eect. To verify the presence of spillover eects, instead, they estimated
the impact of being close to ENTZ on the nearest non-ENTZ area using as control
the second nearest non-ENTZ. The authors did not find any significant displace-
ment eect. A dierent result was found in Hanson and Rohlin (2013). The authors
used the same method as Ham et al. (2011) to estimate the impact of the federal
equivalent of ENTZ programs only and found a significant and positive spillover
eect.
In their literature review, Calmfors et al. (2002) included studies on the displace-
ment eect of ALMPs. Among the studies they inspected only one regards general
and targeted subsidized employment and it relies on a survey submitted to employ-
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ers. It was asked to employment ocers whether they would prefer to hire a subsi-
dized or an unsubsidized unemployed worker. A strong displacement eect of 84%
was found for targeted employment subsidies. Nevertheless, the literature reviewer
themselves were sceptical about the results of these studies since qualitative studies
have several limits (i.e. the answers may be influenced by the interests of the respon-
dent). They concluded the displacement eect was higher for job creation programs
more similar to regular employment.
From this literature review and the ones in paragraph 2.2, it is not possible to
take clear conclusions on the existence of negative side eects. Indeed, the studies
checking for post-poned hiring eects (Boockmann et al. 2007, Schünemann et al.
2013) analyzed policies having non-significant eects. Hence, it is impossible to de-
termine whether the detection of no post-poned hiring is due to their absence or to
the uneectiveness (or low take-up rate) of the policy. The studies checking for dis-
placement eets, instead, reach contradictory conclusions. Some of them concluded
there is no displacement eect (Blundell et al. 2004). Others concluded the oppo-
site (Calmfors et al. 2002, Bucher 2010). Even though they aord the problem of
spillovers in the case of hiring tax credits, Ham et al. (2011) and Hanson and Rohlin
(2013) results can’t be taken into account. Indeed, the two authors investigate on
the presence of spillovers eect between regions rather than on the presence of dis-
placement eect between unemployed. In addition, to the best of our knowledge,
there are no studies deepening inside the studies of negative side eects for Italian
tax credit hiring policies. Our analysis gives therefore an important contribution to
the literature on subsidized employment.
Testing for the presence of negative side eects not only gives additional infor-
mation on the policies consequences, it is also crucial for a proper estimation of policy
impact. Indeed, if the control group is aected by displacement or post-poned hir-
ing eects it will not be a good counterfactual for the treated (and SUTVA will be
violated). Truly, the control group contains exactly the units most aected by these
negative side eects.
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To check for negative side eects, approaches exploiting the fact that an area is
untreated can’t be used in Law 407/90 framework. Even though the fiscal benefit are
higher in Mezzogiorno, this area is widely dierent from the rest of Italy. Hence,
a simple comparison is likely to show these dierences rather than spillover eects.
At the same time, a comparison between Mezzogiorno and the rest of Italy based
on a dierence-in-dierences model can’t be used. Indeed, reliable data start from
2010 and the policy began in 1990. Equally, it is not possible to use a DID exploiting
policy ending, given that its ending in 2015 coincided with Law 190 start and labor
market reaction to the latter could be dierent in Mezzogiorno area than in the
rest of Italy, making the parallel trend assumption hard to believe. Nonetheless, it
is possible to follow Schünemann et al. (2013) idea. In the next paragraph we will
show how we started from their idea and strengthen it to check for both post-poned
hiring and displacement eect.
3.1.2. How we checked for Negative Side Eects
The method we have used to test for the presence of negative side eects, exploit
the fact that both of them would imply a reduction in the hiring of uneligible indi-
viduals whose value of the forcing variable is close (and obviously under) the thresh-
old. Indeed, individuals close and under the threshold are in competition with the
eligibles on the labour market. Consequently, in presence of a displacement eect,
their hiring should be lowered by the policy. We can’t say the same for individ-
uals far and under the threshold. I.e., it is unlikely that displacement eect aects
individuals with 13 months of unemployment. This group is completely dierent
from the group of eligibles. Consequently, there is not competition between them.
Similarly, in presence of post-poned hiring eect some of the hiring that should ap-
pear close and under the threshold would appear over it. Nonetheless, the same do
not happen for hiring far and under the threshold. It is unlikely that an employer
would accept to wait 11 months, until the 13 months unemployed individual be-
comes eligible, to hire him/her, just to get the subsidy. Hence, post-poned hiring
eect as well is likely to lower only the rate of hiring of individuals with a value
of the forcing variable close to the threshold. The fact that displacement and post-
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poned hiring eects only aect the units close to the threshold is the only observable
element we can use to determine whether the two eects are present (and, even-
tually, correct the counterfactual estimation for them). To exploit it, we proceeded
with two checks. First of all, we did a graphical analysis plotting the average value
of the outcome with respect to dierent values of the forcing variable. The idea is
to check whether, getting closer to the threshold, the outcome has an unusual be-
haviour that can be attributed to the negative side eects of the policy (i.e. it has
a sudden decrease). A second check could be to compare the outcomes of groups
of units close and far¹ from the threshold. If there are displacement and post-poned
hiring eects the outcome of the two groups will be dierent. Indeed, the units close
to the threshold will suer by the two negative side eects, while it is reasonable to
assume, as explained above, that the group of units far from it will not be aected by
these eects. Nonetheless, a dierence in the outcomes of units far and close to the
threshold may be as well a consequence of the dierent characteristics of the two
groups. It would be impossible to determine whether the dierence in outcomes is
due to the presence of negative side eects or to the dierent characteristics of the
two groups. To solve this issue we assumed that, in absence of negative side eects,
the dierence between units far from the threshold and units close to the threshold
would be constant across time. If this is the case the dierence between the two
groups after 2014 (i.e. after policy ending) is representative of the same dierence
before 2014 in absence of displacement and post-poned hiring eects. Indeed, when
the policy was not implemented there were no negative side eects. Therefore, in
absence of negative side eects, the dierence in outcome of the group close to the
threshold during policy implementation and after policy ending should be equal to
the same dierence for the group far from the threshold. For us, it will be enough to
compare the two dierences far and close to the threshold to verify the presence of
post-poned hiring eects. We can think of this analysis as the application of a DID
model. To check for the equality between the dierences of the two groups we used
dierent statistical tests that allow to compare groups of units. To be more clear, in
¹When we say units “far” we mean they are far enough to reasonably assume they are not aected
by displacement and post-poned hiring eects.
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order to determine the presence of the displacement and post-poned hiring eects
we followed these steps:
(i) We chose a group of units having values of the forcing variable far enough
from the threshold to reasonably assume they’re not aected by the two ef-
fects². I.e. with a number of months of unemployment going from 12 to 12
and half.
(ii) We selected the group of units used as control in the estimation.
(iii) We calculated weighted outcome average, by month and day, for each year
l from 2011 to 2014 separately, and for 2015 and 2016 together, for both the
groups:
AVGF ,l =
1
(380−365)∗365
∑380
i=365
∑
j∈l yij ∗ totij
AVGC,l =
1
(729−714)∗365
∑729
i=714
∑
j∈l yij ∗ totij
AVGF ,>2015 =
1
2∗(365)∗(380−365)
∑380
i=365
∑
j∈(2015⋃ 2016)yij ∗ totij
AVGC,>2015 =
1
2∗(365)∗(729−714)
∑729
i=714
∑
j∈(2015⋃ 2016)yij ∗ totij
(3.1)
Where F define the far from the threshold group andC the close to the thresh-
old ones.
(iv) We calculated the dierence between the outcome average of each year l and
the outcome average of 2015-2016 for both groups:
Di f fF ,l = AVGF ,l −AVGF ,>2015
Di f fC,l = AVGC,l −AVGC,>2015
(3.2)
(v) We led a statistical test to compare the two dierences each year.
²Unfortunatly, this choice was arbitrary, indeed we do not have any data-driven way to determine
whether the group is actually far enough. Nonetheless, repeating the analysis with dierent groups
of units we were able to obtain more robust results.
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If the two eects we are testing for are present, we expect to have Di f fF ,l >> Di f fC,l
(where the direction of the inequality comes from the fact that the average before
2015 is generally higher than the average after 2014). To compare the two dier-
ences we used multiple test whose purpose is to verify whether two populations are
equal. In particular, we started with a Student’s t-test. The last checks whether the
dierence between the means of the two populations is equal to a hypothesized value
(0 in our framework). This method requires two assumptions: the populations to
be normally distributed and the populations’ variances to be equal. It is unlikely for
the two populations to be normally distributed. Nevertheless, the test is still useful
if the sample sizes of the populations are equal, the size is moderate and the distri-
butions have similar shapes. We tested for these hypothesis. In light of the results
of hypothesis testing, we used a second test, the Welch t-test, which allows to relax
the assumption that the populations’ variances are equal. The results reported in the
following section refer to the Welch t-tests.
3.1.3. Results
In figure 3.1, is it possible to see a plot of the outcome with respect to the forcing
variable. This first graphical analysis suggests there are no post-poned hiring and
displacement eects. Indeed, there is no peculiar behaviour of the outcome getting
closer to the threshold.
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Figure 3.1: The figure shows the outcome with respect to the forcing variable. Data from
CICO were used.
Indeed, even though the dierence decrease getting closer to the threshold (where
the threshold corresponds to a forcing variable value of 729), it does it far from the
threshold as well. There is no unusual behaviour getting closer to it.
This conclusion is consistent with the results of the Welch t-test comparing the av-
erage dierence between two dierent groups of units far from the threshold and
one group of units close to it. Such results are presented in tables 3.1 and 3.2.
From the tests’ results it is possible to see that displacement and post-poned hiring
eects are not detected in any year.
The fact that these eects aren’t present may look surprising. Nevertheless, two el-
ements have to be considered. The first one is that often employers prefer to hire
individuals as soon as possible. As an example, from a study by Oberholzer-Gee
(2008), it emerged that they often prefer to hire short term unemployed rather than
employed individuals, because the first are immediately available to work. Similarly,
they may prefer to hire uneligibles close to the threshold immediately, rather than
wait for them to become eligibles. In other words, they may prefer a worker imme-
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Table 3.1: CHECKING FOR THE PRESENCEOF INDIRECT EFFECTS, COMPAR-
ISONWITH THE FIRST GROUP
Year Di Mean Std. Err. CI 95% Lower CI 95% Upper
2011 -0.219 5.91 -11.8 11.4
2012 12.88 7.23 -1.32 27.07
2013 -1.17 4-69 -10.39 8.04
2014 -0.0962 4.61 -9.15 8.96
NOTE:Welch t-tests were used to compare the average dierence (between the outcome in
each year and the outcome after 2015) of individuals with 365 to 380 days of unemployment
and those of individuals in the control group. For easier reading, all values were multiplied
by 100,000.
Table 3.2: CHECKING FOR THE PRESENCEOF INDIRECT EFFECTS, COMPAR-
ISONWITH THE SECOND GROUP
Year Di Mean Std. Err. CI 95% Lower CI 95% Upper
2011 -0.364 6.17 -12.47 11.75
2012 11.38 5.8 -0.000496 22.76
2013 8.91 6.04 -2.94 20.76
2014 10.33 5.52 -0.496 21.16
Welch t-tests were used to compare the average dierence (between the outcome in each
year and the outcome after 2015) of individuals with 545 to 560 days of unemployment and
those of individuals in the control group. For easier reading, all values were multiplied by
100,000.
diately available rather than get the subsidy. The second one, is that, in Italy, there
are mainly small and medium firms. A small firm probably will not receive a huge
amount of applications and curricula at a time. Hence, it is unlikely the firm receives
the curriculum of an individual close and under the threshold and the curriculum of
an individual close and over the threshold simultaneously. Just as it is unlikely, when
it receives a curriculum from an individual close and under the threshold, that the
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firm will decide not to hire him/her and wait for the curriculum of an eligible in-
dividual. Hence, the absence of displacement eect isn’t surprising as well. This last
result is in line with Blundell et al. (2004) results and in contrast with Bucher (2010)
study and Calmfors et al. (2002) literature review. Indeed, according to the second
there was a displacement eect damaging short term unemployed. Nevertheless,
her analysis was based on a theoretical model which strongly simplified reality. Ac-
cording to the third, the displacement eect of targeted employment subsidies had
an average eect of 84%. Nevertheless, the value was based on a single study con-
sisting in surveys to employers. If an employer answer “yes” when someone asked
him/her whether she would prefer to hire a subsidized individual with respect to
an unsubsidized individual with similar characteristics, this doesn’t mean if he/she
actually receive the curriculum of the unsubsidized he/she will reject it and wait for
another curriculum by an eligible with similar characteristics. The result on the ab-
sence of post-poned hiring eect, instead, is consistent with previous literature and,
in particular, with Boockmann et al. (2007) and Schünemann et al. (2013) conclu-
sions (even though in their applications policy eect was not significant either).
3.2. Should Targeted or Untargeted Policies be Preferred?
Little is known about the dierence between subsidies targeting a restricted
group of unemployed workers and generalized subsidies without a definite target.
To overcome this lack of information we compared the impact of Law 407/90 with
the impact of Law 190, a generalized policy, implemented immediately after the
first policy ending. In particular, we exploited the fact that the two laws following
one another have similar characteristics but only one of them targeted the restricted
group of LTU. The study of Law 190 from a LTU perspective can also give an
overview on the path Italy is following with respect to ALMPs aecting this cate-
gory of individuals (given that the last substituted Law 407/90).
SHOULD TARGETED OR UNTARGETED POLICIES BE PREFERRED? 61
3.2.1. Law 407/90 and Law 190: a qualitative comparison
On December 31st 2014, Law 407/90 ended, as a consequence of 2015 Legge
Stabilità, promulgated on December 23rd 2014. The generalized incentives pro-
vided by the latter, consisted in tax credits to firms hiring unemployed people with
a permanent contract or turning a temporary contract into a permanent ones. Tax
credits corresponded to 100% of the contributions the firm had to pay to the social
security service for each individual. To avoid the temptation, for the employers, to
fire and then hire their employees again, firms could not obtain the tax credit hir-
ing individuals who had been fired from a permanent contract less than six months
before. The policy, implemented from January 1st 2015, lasted one year³. The
adoption of this policy raised a huge debate on its eectiveness. Indeed, its imple-
mentation was used as a political weapon by all the political fronts. The policy was
widely used. According to INPS’ data, 1’078’885 were the new permanent contracts
stipulated taking advantage from it⁴. In figure 3.2, the share of individuals hiredwith
slightly less than 24 months of unemployment in the period from January 2010 to
December 2015 is represented.
³It was followed by an equivalent policy with tax credits corresponding to 50% of labour taxes.
⁴Source: Osservatorio Precariato, INPS
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Figure 3.2: The figure represents the share of hired unemployed workers, with respect
to time, over the period from January 2010 to December 2015. The variable was based on
CICO database. Only individuals with slightly less than 24 months of unemployment were
included.
It is possible to see that average hiring in 2015, hence under Law 190 incentives,
are higher than in 2014. Nevertheless, year 2015 is characterized by a high variabil-
ity (as is visible from the wider confidence interval), hence there is not a significant
jump from December 2014 to January 2015. Moreover, the biggest increase in hir-
ing is centered in the last months of the year. It is crucial to consider this aspect in
the analysis for two dierent reasons. First of all, the further we get from the thresh-
old, the less reliable the comparison is. Second, it suggests that the biggest eect is
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due to the fact that the policy was implemented for a limited and short period of
time and its duration was communicated in advance. To compare the two types of
incentives in a more general way, we estimated the impact of the untargeted incen-
tives excluding the observation about December 2015. Indeed, we are interested in
the eect of an untargeted policy, not on the eect of an untargeted policy whose
adoption was limited in time. Another important information that can be derived
from this graph is that the outcome is linear with respect to time before 2015, while
it is quadratic in 2015. We will use this information during the model choice.
The main dierence between this policy and Law 407/90 is that the latter tar-
geted LTU, while the former was extended to all unemployed people. This element,
and the proximity of the two policies in time, allow us to make general conclusions
on the dierence between targeted and untargeted incentives from the comparison
between their impacts.
Qualitatively, the main dierence between targeted and untargeted incentives is
that the first lower labor costs in relative terms, while the second lower them only in
absolute terms. If targeted incentives are implemented the LTU become econom-
ically more convenient than STU. This is not the case with untargeted incentives.
The idea behind targeted incentives is that the lower labor costs of the targeted
group is enough to counteract its lower desirability. Empirical evidence suggests
the hiring behavior of employers in presence and in absence of incentives is hetero-
geneous. According to it, we can imagine to divide employers into three dierent
groups. In the first group there will be employers for whom the incentive is not
enough to counteract the lower desirability of LTU. Their existence is proved by
the fact that, under the policy, LTU hiring is still lower than STU. This group of
employers, will not react dierently to the two dierent types of incentives. The
second group of employers includes those who do not consider LTU as less desir-
able. The existence of this group is proved by the fact that LTU hiring is higher than
zero even in absence of incentives. Like the first group, the employers will not react
dierently to the two policies. In both cases, the first category of employers will not
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hire LTU and the second category will hire LTU considering only their lower labor
cost. The eventual presence of a third group of employers will make the dierence
between the two incentive types. There may be a group of employers for whom the
LTU have a lower desirability and the relatively lower labor cost under Law 407/90
is enough to counteract it. If this group exists, its hiring will be higher under Law
407/90 than under 2015 Legge Stabilità incentives. Indeed, under the first policy the
lower desirability of LTU is counteracted by the relatively lower labor cost. Under
the second policy, instead, the labor cost of STU is also lowered, hence in relative
terms the labor cost of LTU does not change.
3.2.2. Literature Review
Being the incentives of Law 190 a highly debated policy, there is a significant
amount of literature estimating their impact. Among them, Centra and Gualtieri
(2016) used a dierence-in-dierences model to determine the impact of the policy
on the incidence of permanent contracts among the total. The authors exploited
the fact that, individuals whose previous permanent contract ended less than six
months before, were not eligible for the incentive. They added some covariates
to the model to make the parallelism assumption more plausible. Moreover, they
estimated the outcome of the control group in 2015 using interrupted time series
analysis to clean the estimation from a possible displacement eect of the policy.
They found a positive and significant eect. Similar results were found by Sestito
and Viviano (2016). The authors estimated the impact of the same policy on dier-
ent outcomes, amongwhich the probability (both for employed and for unemployed
workers) to find a permanent job. They used a dierence-in-dierences model with
individual, monthly and annual fixed eects. None of these studies considered 2015
Legge Stabilità from an LTU perspective.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no empirical studies comparing targeted
and generalized subsidies. Nevertheless, Brown (2015) did a meta-analysis trying
to identify the positive and negative consequences of both types of policies. The
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author underlined how targeted hiring subsidies have lower deadweight costs⁵ with
respect to untargeted ones. Nevertheless, he stated that targeted subsidies may have
negative consequences at a macroeconomic level, namely, the negative side eects
we checked for. Once verified that those eects do not exist (or are negligible) in
this context, it remains to check whether the generalized hiring subsidies are more
ecient from a long-term unemployed perspective.
3.2.3. Data and Empirical Strategy
We employed the same database used in chapter 2 (see 2.3.1 and 2.3.2). Nonethe-
less, data were seasonally adjusted using a moving average approach (the results do
not change if other seasonal adjustment methods, such as monthly dummies, are
applied).
3.2.3.1. INTERRUPTED TIME SERIES ANALYSIS
What we said before about the impossibility to use some of the methods usually
applied in wage subsidies impact estimation is still valid (see section 2.3.3). Moreover,
the fact that we want to estimate the impact of the policy from a LTU perspective,
means we can’t use a regression discontinuity design. Indeed, the last has a low ex-
ternal validity. We have two possible choices left. The first is to use a DID model.
This arises two issues: the control group (individuals whose last permanent contract
ended less than six months before) is significantly dierent from our target group.
Moreover, the control group may be penalized by displacement and post-poned
hiring eects. Hence, its value of the outcome could be a bad representation of
what would have happened to them in absence of the policy. Following Centra and
Gualtieri (2016), we could solve this issue using an interrupted time-series analysis
to estimate the value of the outcome for the control group. Nevertheless, the second
methodological choice is to directly use an interrupted time-series analysis. The sec-
ond choice would save us many steps and it would allow us to use a simpler model.
⁵With this term the author identifies the costs of subsidies benefitting individuals who would have
been hired indipendently from policy implementation.
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Hence, we decided to use an interrupted time-series analysis. We exploited the Jan-
uary 1st 2015 threshold defining policy start. We could not estimate the impact
of the policy on the exact same group targeted by Law 407/90. Indeed, we would
not be able to distinguish between the eect of Law 407/90 ending and the eect
of the generalized incentives start. Hence, we estimated the intention-to-treatment
eect on the control group selected according to the modified Cattaneo et al. (2015)
method (see 2.3.3) and assumed it not to dier significantly from our target group.
We required the treated and control groups to be balanced at amonthly level. Hence,
we used the paired t-test pairing units belonging to the same month and year (nev-
ertheless, the results do not change in a significant way if we do the same analysis
on the control group used in 2.3.3). The assumption that the two groups do not
dier significantly is necessary to compare the intention-to-treatment eects of the
two policies. As mentioned before, in order to estimate the impact of untargeted
incentives generally, rather than the impact of Law 190 incentives themselves, we
excluded observations about December 2015. Indeed, the peak corresponding to
those observations is probably due to a characteristic specifically of this policy: its
short duration. We want more general results, representing the impact of a generic
untargeted policy and being comparable with Law 407/90. As suggested by the
graphical analysis (see paragraph 3.2.1), we applied the following regression model:
yk = α + γ1Tk + γ2T
2
k + γ3Pk + γ4Pk ∗Tk + γ5Pk ∗T 2k + ϵk (3.3)
We aggregated the units, with values of the forcing variable inside the selected band-
width, at a daily level. In the models, Tk is the time variable and Pk is a dummy
variable for the period after December 2014. The rest of the notation is as before.
The intention-to-treatment eect of the policy is given by coecient γ3.
3.2.3.2. NEEDED ASSUMPTIONS
The use of models based on time discontinuity requires the following assumption
to be satisfied:
Assumption 6. There is no anticipation eect.
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If policy eect is anticipated with respect to policy implementation starting time,
the latter cannot be used as threshold in the discontinuity analysis. Luckily, the
policywas announced onDecember 23rd 2014, fewweeks before its implementation
starting time. It is therefore unlikely there was an anticipation eect.
Soumerai and Ross-Degnan (2002) suggested another assumption which have to be
satisfied when models based on time discontinuity are used:
Assumption 7. There are no shocks happening at the policy implementation time and
having a significant impact on the outcome, other than the policy itself.
Possible sources of violation for this condition are an exogenous change in over-
all economic conditions, the implementation, in the same period, of other policies,
or a possible change in the composition of the study population. Considering the
first source of violation, in our framework, an increase in hiring may follow, as an
example, an improvement in overall economic conditions. To verify whether this
is the case, we added separately to the regression three exogenous variables that can
proxy the economic conditions of the country and observed that the intention-to-
treatment eect estimation did not change (suggesting the assumption holds). The
first two were the annual final consumptions of non-resident families in Italy both
in current and one-year lagged values. The third was the one-year lagged quarterly
value of GDP. The use of the lagged value is required for the variable to be exoge-
nous and it is justified by the fact that the improvement in the economic conditions
usually have a delayed eect on hiring (Centra and Gualtieri 2016). We used ISTAT
data on GDP and consumptions⁶.
The second possible source of violation comes from the fact that in 2015 the Jobs Act
was implemented. Starting from March 2015 this law brought significant changes
to permanent contract rules, relaxing the constraints a permanent contract implied
on employers’ side. To verify whether this led to an overestimation of Law 190
intention-to-treatment eect, we re-estimated the model excluding observations
from March 2015 on.
A third possible source of violation could be a change in the composition of pop-
ulation study. To verify whether that was the case, we included in the regression
⁶Data Sources: http://dati.istat.it/
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model as covariates the shares of individuals with dierent educational qualification
and employment sector and observed that the ITT estimation did not change sig-
nificantly. Another possible source of bias is a change in the share of unemployed
inside non-occupied group happening at policy implementation time. To check
for it, we included in the regression model, a variable measuring the yearly rate of
unemployed among non-CICO-detected individuals and observed that ITT esti-
mation did not change. The variable was built using RTFL data.
The comparison of the two policies is a good representation of the dierences
between targeted and untargeted incentives only if the following assumption is sat-
isfied:
Assumption 8. There are no relevant dierences between the two policies, other than in
their target groups.
There are three possible sources of violation of this assumption. Law 407/90 gave
100% tax credit only to firms belonging to the Mezzogiorno area or to artisan firms,
while the 2015 Legge Stabilità gave it to all enterprises. To verify whether this dif-
ference was relevant, we repeated the analysis using only data on the Mezzogiorno
area (where both Law 407/90 and Law 190 gave 100% tax credits). Legge Stabilità
2015 incentives covered the contributions due to the social security service only,
while Law 407/90 covered both the contributions due to the social service and those
due to the institution providing work insurance (the latter are significantly smaller⁷).
Given that the rules for the determination of benefit amount are well known and that
we had information about employees’ wages, we were able to check whether this
dierence was relevant. In particular, we estimated approximatively⁸ the tax credit
amount for each individual hired under Law 407/90, under the two policies, and
compared the two values. Finally, the awareness of firms about the existence of the
policies may have induced a dierent take-up rate. Nevertheless, the wide use of
⁷The percentage of wage payed to the social security service is, on average, 29.8%. The percent-
age of wage payed to the insitution providing work insurance is, on average 2.9%
⁸Where it is approximatively because the rate of wage the taxes have to be payed on, depends on
the type of work and the sector. Hence, we used an average value.
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Law 407/90 and the attention given by the media to 2015 Legge Stabilità suggests
both policies were well known by Italian firms.
The results for assumptions checking are presented in section 3.2.4.1.
3.2.4. Results
Table 3.3 reports the results of the baseline estimations. It is possible to see that
the intention-to-treatment eect of the incentives is non-significant. The estimated
impact is higher than the ones estimated in the placebo tests (see section 3.2.4.1).
Nevertheless, the high variability of the outcome in 2015, the fact that the increase in
the share of hiring is centered far from the threshold (hence other events influencing
the outcome may have occurred biasing the results) and the fact that using other
seasonal adjustment methods this dierence disappears suggest the policy did not
have any relevant eect on the hiring of this particular group. We can conclude the
eect of these incentives is significantly smaller than those of Law 407/90. As said
before, this dierence is mainly attributable to the fact that Law 407/90 incentives
are targeted and Law 190 incentives are not. This result suggests the impact of
targeted incentives is entirely due to the lower labor cost of the targeted group,
which counteract its lower desirability. Consequently, when a generalized policy is
implemented, it should be accompanied by additional incentives tailored around the
vulnerable groups of unemployed workers in order for them to be aected by it.
To provide additional information on the mechanism behind the policy and on
Law 190 incentives impact, we repeated the analysis including observations about
December 2015 (the results are reported in appendix .1). The policy had a positive
and significant impact. This suggests a significant component of the impact of Law
190 incentives is probably due to the limited duration of the policy itself. In partic-
ular, the whole eect of the incentives can be attributed to the December peak in
hiring. A policy having a significative impact only when it starts or ends is not new
in this literature (Blundell et al. 2004).
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Table 3.3: ESTIMATION OF THE INTENTION TO TREATMENT EFFECT OF
GENERALIZED INCENTIVES ON THE OUTCOME OF THE LONG-TERM UN-
EMPLOYED GROUP
VARIABLES Coecients
Time -0.00498**
(0.00214)
Time2 0*
(0)
Treat 739
(618)
Treat*Time -0.783
(0.628)
Treat*Time2 0.000209
(0.000160)
Constant 12.2***
(0.930)
Observations 2160
R-squared 0.075
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
NOTE: Generalized incentives ITT on vulnerable group is given by the coecient of vari-
able “Treat”. Observations about December 2015 excluded. We implemented a weighted
regression, using the total number of individuals corresponding to each unit as weights. For
easier reading, coecients and standard errors were multiplied by 100,000
3.2.4.1. MODEL ASSUMPTIONS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
In the table 3.4, we present the results of the checks for the assumption of no
other exogenous shocks happening at policy implementation time and having a rel-
evant impact on the outcome. Model 1 presents the results of the standard model
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used in the analysis. In model 2, 3 and 4 respectively, lagged GDP, foreign con-
sumption and lagged foreign consumption levels are added as covariates to check
for improvements in overall economic conditions. The percentage of unemployed
among non-CICO detected units and the share of individuals in dierent educa-
tional level and in dierent sectors were added, respectively, in model 5 and 7 to
check for changements in the composition of population study. In model 6 the ob-
servations in correspondence with Jobs Act implementations months were excluded
to verify whether the detected eect was due to its implementation.
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The estimation is robust to addition of all the covariates in models 2-5 and in
model 7. Model 6 estimation of the intention-to-treatment eect, instead, is higher
than those obtained excludingDecember 2015 only (and it is still insignificant). This
suggests Jobs Act impact was too small to aect the estimation of Law 190 incentives
ITT. This result is in line with Sestito and Viviano (2016) study. From it, it emerged
that the eect of Jobs Act changes to permanent contracts rules was negligible with
respect to the eect of Law 190. All these results confirm that the assumption of no
other relevant exogenous shocks happening at policy implementation time is satis-
fied.
In table 3.5 we conduce some placebo tests standard in interrupted time series
analysis.
74 TARGETED POLICIES: BEYOND TREATMENT EFFECT ESTIMATION
Table 3.5: PLACEBO TESTS FOR GENERALIZED INCENTIVES ITT ESTIMA-
TION
VARIABLES 1/1/2014 31/12/2013 1/1/2013 31/12/2012 1/1/2012
Time -0.00401 -0.00406 -0.00176 -0.00172 -0.00324
(0.00306) (0.00306) (0.00477) (0.00478) (0.00944)
Time2 0 0 -0 -0 0
(0) (0) (0) (0) (1.18e-5)
Treat 40.7 32.3 -0.293 0.00329 4.71
(144) (143) (21.6) (21.5) (5.80)
Treat*Time -0.0474 -0.0374 -0.00245 -0.00287 -0.00887
(0.176) (0.175) (0.0300) (0.0299) (0.0130)
Treat*Time2 1.41e-5 1.11e-5 0 0 0
(5.34e-5) (5.31e-5) (1.08e-5) (1.08e-5) (1.23e-5)
Constant 12.1*** 12.1*** 11.7*** 11.7*** 11.9***
(1.06) (1.06) (1.24) (1.24) (1.59)
Observations 1,826 1,826 1,826 1,826 1,826
R-squared 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
NOTE Placebo tests. All monthly or daily variables were seasonally adjusted using a mov-
ing average method. We implemented a weighted regression, using the total number of
individuals corresponding to each unit as weights. For easier reading, all coecients and
standard errors were multiplied by 100,000.
With regard to the assumptions necessary for policies comparison, we start pre-
senting the results of the analysis reduced to the group of individuals having the last
working experience in a region of the Mezzogiorno Area. In table 3.6 and table
3.7, the results of the estimations of intention-to-treatment eect of, respectively,
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Law 407/90 and Law 190 in that area are reported together with their values under
dierent robustness checks.
Table 3.6: LAW 407/90 ITT ESTIMATION AND ROBUSTNESS CHECK FOR THE
MEZZOGIORNO AREA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
THRES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
24 4.72*** 4.30*** 2.73*** 1.99
(0.901) (0.912) (1.02) (1.55)
22 -0.464
(0.810)
26 -0.900
(0.891)
Obs 33,603 33,580 27,390 12,782 43,378 40,595
R-sq 0.068 0.071 0.093 0.192 0.059 0.078
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
NOTE Model 1: Standard. Model 2: Covariates addition. Model 3: Dierent bandwidth
[722:736]. Model 4: Dierent bandwidth [726:732]. Model 5 and 6: Placebo Tests. We im-
plemented all weighted regressions, using the total number of individuals corresponding to
each unit as weights. For easier reading, all coecients and standard errors were multiplied
by 100,000.
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Table 3.7: GENERALIZED INCENTIVES ITT ON VULNERABLE GROUP, ESTI-
MATION AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS FOR THEMEZZOGIORNO AREA
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Treat 991 929 988 993 248
(687) (688) (688) (688) (628)
Constant 13.7*** -714 -123 17.9*** 6.86*** 1.33***
(1.17) (576) (301) (6.30) (2.36) (1.32)
Observations 2,160 2,160 2,160 1,795 2,160 1,826
R-squared 0.076 0.077 0.076 0.088 0.090 0.003
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
NOTE Model 1: Standard. Model 2: Lagged National GDP addition. Model 3: Foreign
Consumption of National products addition. Model 4: Percentage, at national level, of un-
employed individuals among non-CICO detected addition. Model 5: Educational Level
and Sector variables addition. Model 6: Placebo test with January 1st 2014 as threshold. All
monthly or daily variables were seasonally adjusted using amoving averagemethod. We im-
plemented all weighted regressions, using the total number of individuals corresponding to
each unit as weights. For easier reading, all coecients and standard errors were multiplied
by 100,000.
Assumptions and robustness checks suggest themodels are valid. Both the intention-
to-treatment eects are slightly higher in the Mezzogiorno area than in Italy as a
whole. Nevertheless, the Mezzogiorno area estimations present a high volatility,
hence the coecients are not significantly dierent from those of our baseline es-
timations. Moreover, the results in terms of juxtaposition between targeted and
untargeted policies do not change.
The comparison between dierent benefit amounts under the two policies is
reported in table 3.8.
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Table 3.8: COMPARISON BETWEEN ESTIMATED AVERAGES OF SUBSI-
DIES AMOUNTS UNDER THE TWO POLICIES
Year Avg 407 Avg 190 Di /Avg 190
2010 7023 5726 0.227
2011 5816 5479 0.061
2012 5846 5502 0.063
2013 5722 5378 0.064
2014 6821 6366 0.071
As expected, the dierence between the average amount of subsidies given un-
der each policy is negligible in most years. Indeed, the dierence is lower than 7.2%
of the smallest average almost all years, with the exception of 2010. Consequently,
observations relative to that year have been excluded from the estimation of Law
407/90 intention-to-treatment eect.
Results of table 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8, suggest the assumption of no other relevant dif-
ferences between the two policies is satisfied.
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4. IDENTIFY MORE, OBSERVE LESS: MEDIATION ANALYSIS SYNTHETIC
CONTROL
The aim of this Chapter is twofold. To explore the literature on synthetic control
method and mediation analysis and to introduce a new methodology allowing to do
mediation analysis when there is selection on unobservables or the number of treated
units is low.
4.1. Synthetic Control Method
Synthetic Control Method introduction has been defined by Athey and Imbens
(2017) as “arguably the most important innovation in the policy evaluation litera-
ture in the last 15 years". This methodology can be used in frameworks were panel
data are available and the intervention is implemented from a determined time pe-
riod T . The idea behind SCM is to use information on pre-intervention period
to build a synthetic value of the potential outcome of the treated unit in absence
of treatment (Y 01t where 1 is the treated unit) in post-intervention period. This is
done by re-weighting the post-treatment outcomes of control units (whose set is
often called donor pool in this framework) by using weights that are chosen to min-
imize the distance between pre-intervention observable characteristics (including
pre-intervention outcomes) of treated and control units. The weights to use are
constrained such that Y 0it lies in the convex hull of non-treated outcomes. Namely,
it can be written as a linear combination of the latter. To introduce the method
more formally, and justify the use of a linear combination of control units to build
a synthetic control, we will report the same motivating example used in Abadie,
Diamond, et al. (2010). Assume to be interested in the eect of an intervention D,
implemented from timeT , on an outcomeY . To see this, let Dit be a binary indicator
which is equal to one if unit i was exposed to the intervention at time t . Assume that
we observe J units ordered such that units 1 to n are treated while units n + 1 to J
are not. Without loss of generality, we will first consider the first treated, unit 1 (in
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SCM the parameters of interest are normally defined with respect to a single unit).
The eect of interest for unit 1 is the total eect α1t in the post-intervention period
(t ≥ T ), defined as
α1t = Y
1
1t − Y 01t ,
where at time t > T only the outcome Y 11t is observed. Hence, to identify the total
eect α1t , the outcome Y 01t has to be estimated.
Assume the outcome of unit i at time t in absence of treatment can be modelized
as:
Y 0it = ζt + ηtXi + λtµi + ϵit (4.1)
where ζt is an unknown common factor with constant factor loadings across units,Xi
is a (r ×1) vector of observed covariates, ηt is a (1×r ) vector of unknown parameters,
λt is a (1×F ) vector of unobserved common factors, µi is an (F×1) vector of unknown
factor loadings, ϵit are unobserved transitory shocks.
Consider a (1 × (J − n)) vector of positive and adding up to 1 weights L =
(ln+1, ..., l J ). Dierent values are possible for L and to each of them it is associated
a potential synthetic control whose outcome is given by:
Yˆ 01t =
J∑
i=n+1
liY
0
it = ζt + ηt
J∑
i=n+1
liXi + λt
J∑
i=n+1
liµi +
J∑
i=n+1
liϵit . (4.2)
Now suppose it exists a vector L∗ = (l∗n+1, ..., l∗J ) such that ∀ t = 1, ...,T − 1, it satisfies
J∑
j=n+1
l∗j Yjt = Y1t ,
J∑
j=n+1
l∗j X j = X1.
Abadie, Diamond, et al. (2010) demonstrated that, under these and other proper
assumptions (we refer to that work for more details, even though the same assump-
tions are used in appendix .2 for our demonstration), the average of the outcome of
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the synthetic control is given by Y 01t plus a bias which goes to zero as the number of
pre-treatment periods goes to infinity. More formally:
E(Yˆ 0,11t ′ ) = Y 0,11t ′ + o(T ).
Consequently, estimating the total eect as αˆ1t = Y1t − Yˆ 01t is justified by the fact that
lim
T→∞E(αˆ1t ) = α1t ∀ t ≥ T (4.3)
This justifies choosing the weights that minimize the distance between the observ-
able characteristics of the treated and the one of the control units in pre-treatment
period. Notice that the assumption on the model underlying potential outcome in
(4.1) has been introduced to simplify the afore-mentioned demonstration and it is
more stringent than needed. For the method to give valid results the following as-
sumption (defined for the first time in this dissertation) would be enough:
Assumption 1. [Common Time-varying Shocks Assumption (CTSA)]
All relevant time-varying shocks influencing the outcome are common between treated
unit and donor pool.
If CTSA is satisfied, the outcomes of the units in the donor pool are determined
by the same observables and unobservables of the outcome of the treated unit. The
unobservables are given by the dierence between the outcome and the observables.
Hence, imposing constraints on the last two in pre-treatment period, indirectly con-
strains the former. Under CTSA, the equivalence of observable and unobservable
variables in pre-treatment period guarantees the equivalence of those variables in
post-treatment period as well. Indeed, if the assumption is satisfied, an eventual rel-
evant shock would be common to the two units. This assumption is “contained” in
model specification (4.1). Indeed, in this specification, the outcome depends on some
individuals characteristics constant in time, some characteristics varying in time but
common to all units and random errors which change both in time and among units
but are irrelevant and have zero mean. This is somehow the same concept behind
matching on pre-treatment outcomes (Lechner 2015).
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This identification strategy was widely used in empirical literature after its im-
plementation. Moreover, it was widely studied in theoretical literature. Several ex-
tensions have been proposed. Kreif et al. (2016) proposed a method to apply SCM to
frameworks with multiple treated units. Doudchenko and Imbens (2017) proposed
a method that allows the weights not to sum to one and to take negative values.
They propose to select weigths using a LASSO with an elastic-net type penalty to
substitute these two assumptions with the requirement of weights as smaller as pos-
sible, and with a small number of them which is non-zero. This method allows to
obtain the equality condition, and consequently the synthetic control, in a wider
number of cases. Nonetheless, it should be used with caution. Indeed, looking for
the synthetic control outside the convex hull of the donor pool allows for the use of
less similar control units, increasing the probability that CTSA is violated.
Looking to extensions that go further away from standard SCM, Xu (2017) in-
troduced the generalized synthetic control method. This method can be used in
frameworks with multiple treated units and it provides uncertainty estimates valid
under frequentist conception. Simulations showed this method to be more ecient
than SCM (when its assumptions are satisfied). Nonetheless it relies on stronger
functional form assumptions. Indeed, while the modelization of the outcome can be
relaxed in SCM application, the same can’t be done with the generalized synthetic
control method.
To extend SCM, Athey, Bayati, et al. (2017) proposed a general methodology,
which approximates methods based on unconfoundedness if there are few time peri-
ods and many units, and approximates methods based on synthetic control approach
if there are many time periods and few units. The method was developed starting
from interactive fixed eects literature.
Amethod very similar to the SCMhas been proposed in Hsiao et al. (2012). It re-
lies on model (4.2) and it can be used in the same frameworks where SCM is applied.
As in SCM a synthetic control is built to mimic treated unit potential outcome in
absence of treatment. The outcome of the treated unit is regressed on the outcomes
of the controls for all pre-treatment period to determine the weights to use. Using
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a standard regression the risk of extrapolating results and creating a conterfactual
units even when the treated unit is far from the convex hull of the donor pool is
higher (Abadie, Diamond, et al. 2015). Gardeazabal and Vega-Bayo (2017) com-
pared this method with the SCM and showed that the last is more robust to changes
in the donor pool and it performs better when the number of pre-treatment period
is high enough. From their simulations it also emerged that the SCM is severely
biased when the model constraints are not properly satisfied. The same results was
found in Gobillon and Magnac (2016), where the authors compared the SCM with
interactive fixed eects models and concluded the first performed very well only un-
der the satisfaction of model constraints.
Although synthetic control method (and its extensions) is very well suited for
estimating the total eect of an intervention, it does not take into account the fact
that it might exist some intermediate variables (namely, the mediators) that lie in the
causal path between the treatment and the outcome of interest, such that the knowl-
edge of the total eect might not be enough for policy conclusions. In the presence
of one or more mediators, the total eect can be generally decomposed into a direct
or net eect of the treatment on the outcome of interest and some indirect eects,
generated through the mediators. Policy conclusions that ignore the presence of
such intermediate outcomes, might be misleading. For example, one may find a
zero or even negative total eect of the intervention, even though its direct eect is
positive. Moreover, it is often important to quantify the indirect eects to better tar-
get the intervention. Consider the huge decrease in tobacco consumption after the
introduction of California’s anti-tobacco law, Proposition 99, estimated in Abadie,
Diamond, et al. 2010. Proposition 99 not only increased tobacco price but also intro-
duced several anti-tobacco informational campaigns. It would be extremely relevant
to know how much of the decrease in tobacco consumption triggered by Proposi-
tion 99 is due to the increase in prices and how much of it is due to investments in
informational campaigns. Both eects can be thought as indirect eects of Propo-
sition 99. In paragraph 4.3 we will show that the idea behind SCM can be applied
to identify the direct eect and the indirect eect. The approach we will present to
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extend SCM to do mediation analysis can be easily applied to extend the method-
ologies developed in Athey, Bayati, et al. (2017), Xu (2017), Kreif et al. (2016) and
Doudchenko and Imbens (2017).
4.2. Investigating the mechanism behind the eect: Mediation Analysis
In mediation analysis, there is a variable (namely, the mediator) mediating the
impact of a treatment on an outcome. The idea is that the treatment has an impact
on the mediator which, changing, has an impact on the outcome. The mediator
can be seen as an intermediate outcome. The choice of the two outcomes depends
on the case under study. Their classification as intermediate or final should be based
on researchers’ knowledge and beliefs and on the literature (for and example see the
next chapter). The path treatment-mediator-outcome is not the only causal pathway
that exist between the treatment and the outcome. Goal of mediation analysis is to
distinguish between the eect of the pathway of interest and those of the others. To
make this distinction, the total eect is split into the amount of eect going through
the mediator (indirect eect) and the residual eect (direct eect).
To the best of our knowledge, the concept of mediation was introduced for the
first time in scientific literature in 1928. The psychologist Robert S. Woodworth
developed the concept of stimulus-organism-response (SOR). More or less half a
century later, the need for a scientific method to investigate on SOR mechanism
was satisfied by Smith (1982). He proposed an experiment to investigate, in psycho-
logical frameworks, on the organism between the causal relation stimulus-response.
Some years later, Baron and Kenny (1986) proposed to do mediation analysis apply-
ing a structural equation model. In particular, they proposed to do three dierent
regressions. In the first, regressing the mediator on the treatment (we are adapting
authors’ terminology to our framework of interest). In the second, the outcome on
the treatment. In the third, the outcome on both the treatment and the mediator.
The authors claimed that if treatment eect is eectively mediated by the variable
of interest then:
• The treatment would aect the mediator in the first equation.
86 IDENTIFY MORE, OBSERVE LESS: MEDIATION ANALYSIS SYNTHETIC CONTROL
• The treatment would aect outcome in the second equation.
• The mediator would aect the outcome in the third equation.
• The eect of the treatment on the outcome would be smaller in the third
equation than in the second.
The direct eect should be given by treatment’s coecient in the third equation
while the indirect eect should be given by the product between the coecient of
the treatment in the first equation and the coecient of the mediator in the third.
Even though it is very simple to use, this method has been widely criticized (Imai,
Keele, and Yamamoto 2011, Pearl 2014, Imai, Keele, and Tingley 2010). The critics
are mostly on the strong parametric and distributional assumptions needed and the
ambiguity of direct and indirect eects interpretation in this framework.
From psychology, literature in other disciplines started to realize how useful me-
diation analysis could be. When other disciplines got interested in mediation anal-
ysis, the methodology improved significantly. To the best of our knowledge, the
first to use Rubin’s model was Holland (1988). In mediation analysis the main chal-
lenge using a counterfactual approach is to estimate the potential outcomes under
treatment and mediator combinations that are never observed for any unit. To be
more clear, we will now introduce formally the mediation analysis in counterfactual
framework. We will use the notation needed in the following sections rather than
authors’ notation, to make the following sections easier to understand. For the same
reason, we will add the time component even though none of the following authors
used it.
Define treatment as D, the outcome of interest as Y and the mediator of interest
as M . Then, the total eect of the intervention can be decomposed into an indirect
eect which goes throughM and the direct eect, which goes through other causal
pathways. For each unit i, we can define the potential mediator at time t as follow:
Mit (d) for d ∈ {0, 1}.
Mit (d) is the value that the mediator of unit i would take, at time t, if Dit was set to d.
Assuming that there are no anticipation eects on the mediator, in pre-intervention
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period, and that the standard Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA)
holds, the observed and the potential mediators are related through the following
observation rule:
Mit = Mit (0)(1 − Dit ) +Mit (1)Dit .
Note that Mit is always equal to Mit (0) for both treated and control units in pre-
intervention (t < T ) period and we can only observe one of the two potential me-
diators in each period. Similarly, for each unit i at time t , we define the potential
outcome as follow:
Yit (d,Mit (d′)) ≡ Yd,d ′it for d,d′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Yd,d
′
it is the value that the outcome of unit i would take at time t if we set Dit =
d and Mit = Mit (d′). The potential outcome is a function of both the treatment
and the potential mediator. Under SUTVA, and assuming no anticipation eects in
pre-intervention period, the observed and the potential outcomes are related by the
following observation rule:
Yit = Y
0,0
it (1 − Dit ) + Y 1,1it Dit .
The eects of interest in mediation analysis are the total eect αt , the direct eect
θt (d), and the indirect eect δt (d) in the post-intervention period (t ≥ T ) that are
defined as
αt = E(Y 1,1it − Y 0,0it ),
θt (d) = E(Y 1,dit − Y 0,dit ),
δt (d) = E(Yd,1it − Yd,0it ), t ≥ T .
It is possible to see that the direct eect is defined keeping fixed the treatment sta-
tus defining mediator value and changing the actual treatment status. The indirect
eect, instead, is defined keeping fixed the actual treatment status and changing
the treatment status defining the mediator. Notice that the indirect eect is writ-
ten as a function of the treatment status defining the mediator to simplify notation.
Nonetheless, its value depends on the potential value of the mediator depending on
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that treatment status. It is important to underline this aspect given that while the
treatment is typically binary, the potential mediator can take more than two values.
Dierently from the standard setting only Y 0,0it and Y
1,1
it are observed (and still only
one of them for each unit in each period), while Y 0,1it , Y
1,0
it are never observed. This
makes the identification of the direct and indirect eect more challenging.
Identification of the direct and indirect eects is particularly hard also because
there may be selection bias on the mediator as well. Suppose we decide to esti-
mate the indirect eect comparing a group of treated with another group of treated
having mediator’s value equals to the M(0) of the first group (hence equals to the
potential mediator of the first group in absence of treatment). The second group
may have a dierent mediator under treatment because of some characteristics cor-
related with the outcome. In that case the estimated indirect eect would be biased
because of selection on the mediator. Indeed, the comparison between groups with
dierent values of the mediator, incorporates both the indirect eect and the dif-
ferent characteristics that are the cause of mediator dierences. Mediator selection
bias was noticed for the first time in Robins and Greenland (1992). The authors
underlined as, treatment randomization was not enough to identify correctly all the
parameters of interest in mediation analysis. The first to formalize this intuition,
defining a set of assumptions needed to estimate the direct and indirect eects in
observational frameworks was Pearl (2001). The author defined the direct eect as
treatment eect holding all possible intermediates fixed. He said that the average
direct eect can be identified under the following assumptions:
Yd,d
′ ⊥ M(d′′)|X ,
P(Yd,d ′ = y |X = x) is identifiable,
P(M(d′′) =m |X = x) is identifiable
for all values of d,d′ and d′′. Where the notation is as before. He showed as, un-
der these conditions, the average direct eect under a value m of the mediator, is
given by the dierence between the average conditioned outcome for treated and
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the average conditioned outcome for the untreated times the conditional probability
of the mediator being equal tom averaged with respect to all covariates values. He
also showed that total eect can be written as the sum of the direct and the indirect
eects, with treatment set to proper values. In particular, using today’s notation, he
showed that:
αt = E(Y 1,1it − Y 0,0it ),
= E(Y 1,1it − Y 1,0it ) + E(Y 1,0it − Y 0,0it ),
= δt (1) + θt (0),
and
αt = E(Y 1,1it − Y 0,0it ),
= E(Y 1,1it − Y 0,1it ) + E(Y 0,1it − Y 0,0it ),
= θt (1) + δt (0).
Thus, if αt is identified, the identification of θt (1) and δt (1) automatically implies the
identification of θt (0) = αt−δt (1) and δt (0) = αt−θt (1). An additional contribution to
the literature was the introduction of the dierence between natural and controlled
direct eects. The former is the direct eect for a value of the mediator equal to
the actual potential mediator value. The latter, instead, is the direct eect under a
chosen, generic, value of the mediatorm.
Thus far, the literature focused on two sets of interconnections among the vari-
ables. The first set is represented in figure 4.1, where the causal eect is depicted as
an arrow going from the cause to the eect (notice that the direct eect is given by
the blue arrow while the indirect eect is given by the green arrow).
90 IDENTIFY MORE, OBSERVE LESS: MEDIATION ANALYSIS SYNTHETIC CONTROL
Figure 4.1: First set of interconnections: No Covariates, no Post-Treatment Confounders.
M is the mediator. Y is the outcome. D is treatment status. Direct eect is given by the blue
arrow. Indirect eect is given by the green arrow.
This structure of relations is unlikely to be found in non-experimental studies.
Indeed, it relies on the assumption that there are no covariates correlated with the
mediator and/or with treatment assignment and influencing outcome value. This is
mostly the case of randomized experiments where there is the possibility to control
both for treatment and for mediator values. The second set of interconnections,
more common in non-experimental studies, can be represented graphically as in
figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Second set of interconnections: Covariates, no Post-Treatment Confounders.
M is the mediator. Y is the outcome. D is treatment status. X are the covariates. Direct
eect is given by the blue arrow. Indirect eect is given by the green arrow.
Where X represents covariates influencing the outcome and correlated with ei-
ther treatment assignment or mediator values or both. In this framework the identi-
fication of the parameters of interest is more challenging. Vanderweele and Vanstee-
landt (2009) noticed as this set of interconnections as well can be restrictive. In par-
ticular, they warned on the possible presence of post-treatment confounders, i.e.
covariates influenced by the treatment and influencing the mediator and the out-
come. Interconnections allowing for the presence of post-treatment confounders
can be represented as in figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Third set of interconnections: Covariates and Post-Treatment Confounders.
M is the mediator. H is the post-treatment confounder. Y is the outcome. D is treatment
status. X are the covariates. Direct eect is given by the blue arrow. Indirect eect is given
by the green arrow.
Where H represents post-treatment confounders. In presence of post-treatment
confounders, the independence assumption can’t be reached conditioning only on
pre-treatment covariates influencing the outcome and the mediator. If their pres-
ence is not properly taken into account, the estimation will be biased. Dierent
methods have been proposed to deal with the three dierent frameworks. In this lit-
erature reviewwe will focus on observational methods only, therefore on the second
and the third frameworks only. Among the methods proposed, few of them showed
how to deal with the framework depicted in figure 4.3. All those methods exploited
the fact that post-treatment confounders can be considered as other mediators.
To deal with the framework depicted in image 4.2, Imai, Keele, and Yamamoto
(2010) proposed a “competitor” to the set of assumptions introduced by Pearl (2001).
The authors modified the sequential ignorability assumption (a version of the CIA
used with time-varying treatments) to use it for mediation analysis. They required
the following assumption:
INVESTIGATING THE MECHANISM BEHIND THE EFFECT: MEDIATION ANALYSIS 93
Assumption 2 (Sequential Ignorability (or Sequential Conditional Independence)).
{Yd ′,mit ,Mit (d)} ⊥ Dit |Xit = x ,
Yd
′,m
it ⊥ Mit (d)|Dit = d,Xit = x
for d,d′ = 0, 1, and all x ∈ X where it is also assumed that 0 < Pr (Dit |Xit = x) and
0 < Pr (Mit =m |Dit = d,Xit = x) for d = 0, 1 and all x ∈ X andm ∈ M.
The authors proved that under this assumption average natural direct and indirect
eects can be identified non-parametrically as follow:
δ t (d) =
∫ ∫
E(Yit |Mit =m,Dit = d,Xit = x){dFMit |Dit=1,Xit=x (m)
−dFMit |Dit=0,Xit=x (m)}dFXit (x),
θ t (d) =
∫ ∫
{E(Yit |Mit =m,Dit = 1,Xit = x) −
E(Yit |Mit =m,Dit = 0,Xit = x)}dFMit |Dit=d,Xit=x (m)dFXit (x),
where FZ (.) and FZ |Q (.) represent the distribution function of a random variable Z
and the conditional distribution function of Z given Q .
In mainstream mediation analysis, most of the approaches relies on SCIA¹.
Another identification strategy has been proposed in Huber et al. (2017). The
authors showed how to identify the direct and the indirect eects on treated, under
SCIA and common support assumption. Their identification strategy uses a radius
propensity score matching with bias adjustment. The propensity score is built con-
ditioning on the covariates and the mediator to identify the average direct eect on
treated. While it is built conditioning on covariates only to estimate the average total
eect on treated. The average indirect eect on treated is obtained by the dierence
¹SCIA is very similair to the assumptions set used in Pearl (2001). Nonetheless, the former is
less restrictive (Imai, Keele, and Yamamoto 2010, Shpitser and VanderWeele 2011). Hence, in the
following literature review we will focus on identification strategies that rely on SCIA even though
others relying on Pearl’s set exist.
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between the second and the first.
Huber (2014) proposed a similar identification strategy relying on the same set
of assumptions, based on inverse probability weighting. He proved that, under the
two assumptions, the average direct eect is identified by:
θt (d) = E
[(
Yit ∗ Dit
Pr (Dit = 1|Mit ,Xit )
)
∗ Pr (Dit = d |Mit ,Xit )
Pr (Dit = d |Xit )
]
Where Pr (Dit = 1|Mit ,Xit ) is a propensity score built on both M and the pre-
treatment covariates and Pr (Dit = 1|Xit ) is a propensity score matching built on
pre-treatment covariates only. The idea is that weighting the observed outcomes
with respect to propensity scores, the direct eect can be identified. The author
proved that, under the same assumptions, the average indirect eect can be identi-
fied by:
δt (d) = E
[
Yit ∗ I{Dit = d}
Pr (Dit = d |Mit ,Xit ) ∗
(
Pr (Dit = 1|Mit ,Xit )
Pr (Dit = 1|Xit ) −
1 − Pr (Dit = 1|Mit ,Xit )
1 − Pr (Dit = 1|Xit )
)]
where I is the indicator function taking value 1 if its argument is true. These esti-
mators depend on a propensity score which can be estimated either parametrically
or non-parametrically. No other functional form assumptions are required. While
this first identification strategy does not allow for the presence of post-treatment
confounders the author proposed another method to make the identification in the
framework depicted in figure 4.3. He considered each post-treatment confounder as
an additional mediator. He defined (using a dierent notation), for each unit i, a sec-
ond potential mediator Hit (d) with the same characteristics of Mit (d). He re-wrote
the outcome and the first mediator as functions of the post-treatment confounders.
Hence, they became Mit (d,Hit (d′)) and Yit (d,Hit (d′′′),Mit (d′,Hit (d′′))) ≡ Y (d,d
′′′,(d ′,d ′′))
it
where d,d′,d′′,d′′′ = 0, 1. The author defined, with respect to this new framework,
the total indirect eect as (we use our notation):
δTOTt (d) = E
[
Yd,d,(1,1)it − Yd,d,(0,0)it
]
The total indirect eect includes the impact of a variation of the mediator due a
variation of both first and second mediator treatment assignment. This value has
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to be distinguished from the partial indirect eect, which includes the eect of a
mediator variation due to a variation in its treatment assignment while keeping fixed
that of the second mediator. More formally, the partial indirect eect is defined by
the author as:
δPARt (d) = E
[
Yd,d,(1,d)it − Yd,d,(0,d)it
]
In accordance with the author, I believe in most empirical frameworks the total
indirect eect is more relevant.
Huber defined the direct eect as the impact of treatment assignment variation
keeping fixed all the mediators. This definition is not common to all authors dealing
with post-treatment confounders. As an example, in Imai and Yamamoto (2013) the
second covariate is allowed to vary. Huber direct eect is defined as:
θt (d)Hub = E
[
Y 1,d,(d,d)it − Y 0,d,(d,d)it
]
The author showed how to identify the average direct eect and the partial indirect
eect under the assumptions of conditional independence of the treatment, condi-
tional independence of themediator and common support (we refer to the author for
a complete and formal representation of the assumptions). These set of assumptions
can be considered a version of the SCIA adapted to the presence of post-treatment
confounders. To estimate the total indirect eect, instead, he did an additional as-
sumption on the functional form of average potential outcome-mediator relation.
This identification strategy model was extended in Hsu et al. (2017), where the au-
thors proposed a completely non-parametric method.
The challenge of direct and indirect eects estimation in presence of post-treatment
confounders, was taken up as well in Imai and Yamamoto (2013). As Huber, the au-
thors wrote the first mediator and the outcome as functions of the second mediator.
They defined the indirect eect as Huber’s total indirect eect while their definition
of the direct eect was:
θt (d)Ima = E
[
Y 1,1,(d,d)it − Y 0,0,(d,d)it
]
.
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The idea behind this definition is that the direct eect is defined as direct only with
respect to the mediator of interest, i.e. the first mediator. This is consistent with the
definition of direct eect normally used in mediation analysis. Moreover, this defini-
tion allows to write the total eect as a sum between the direct and the total indirect
eects (as the authors showed). The authors showed how to identify these eects
under a modified version of the sequential conditional ignorability assumption. The
new assumption is very similair to Huber’s. In order to estimate the indirect eect
non-parametrically, they made the assumption of no interaction between treatment
and mediator for any unit. This means the direct eect has to be constant with re-
spect to mediator value. Nonetheless, they propose a semi-parametric model to relax
this assumption.
Most of the models proposed to do mediation analysis relies on SCIA, or on
similar assumptions, requiring conditional unconfoundedness (i.e. Pearl’s set of as-
sumptions). Nonetheless, there are many frameworks where SCIA does not hold.
To deal with this possibility, dierent approaches have been suggested in past liter-
ature. Many of them consist in sensitivity tests to verify how biased the estimation
can become in presence of a SCIA violation (see, for example Imai, Keele, and Ya-
mamoto 2010, Imai, Keele, and Yamamoto 2011, Vanderweele and Chiba 2014).
Unless the analysis is robust enough to a SCIA violation this solution is not very sat-
isfying. Gallop et al. (2009) and Small (2012) proposed two dierent methodologies
that allows to make point identification under SCIA violation. Nonetheless, both of
them require the treatment to be randomized. Another method has been proposed
in Zheng and Zhou (2017) for survival models frameworks. The method is based on
a softer version of the sequential ignorability assumption. Nonetheless, it can only
be applied in survival analysis frameworks and it requires strong functional form as-
sumptions and the CIA to hold.
To the best of our knowledge, there are only two non-experimental methods for
mediation analysis that can be used in case of SCIA (or similar assumptions) violation
and allows a point identification of the parameters of interest. The first approach re-
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lies on the use of Instrumental Variables. Instrumental Variables approach has been
extended to do mediation analysis in Frölich and Huber (2017). This approach is
used when treatment and mediator are still endogenous after conditioning on ob-
servables. The method is based on the use of two dierent instruments. A first
instrument (which has to be binary) to solve treatment endogeneity and a second
(which can be either discrete or continuous) to solve mediator endogeneity.
The two authors imagined a structural model given by a system of non-separable
non-parametric equations where the outcome is a function of the treatment and
some observable (X ) and unobservable (U ) covariates. The mediator is a function
of the treatment, the second instrument and observable (X ) and unobservable (V )
covariates. Finally, treatment assignment depends on a function of the first instru-
ment and observable (X ) and unobservable (W ) covariates. In this framework, there
is endogeneity if there is correlation among the groups of unobservable variables
U ,V ,W . As in standard IVs framework, the total, direct and indirect natural eects
are estimated with respect to the group of treatment compliers. The authors show
how to estimate these parameters under two main assumptions:
• The two instruments have to be independent from unobservablesU ,V condi-
tioning on observables X and group of belonging.
• The first instrument has to be independent from unobservables U ,V and the
group of belonging conditioning on the second instrument and the observ-
ables.
For the identification of some of the parameters of interest, an additional assumption
is required: the independence between the two instruments given the observables.
As in standard IVs frameworks, the identification also requires the assumption of
absence of defiers and, in cases where the mediator and the second instrument are
continuous, the weak monotonicty assumption on the mediator. The intuitive idea
behind their identification method, is that the first instrument can be used to con-
trol for treatment assignment while the second instrument is simultaneously used
to counteract the impact of the first on the mediator. Using this approach, it is
possible to change treatment assignment while mediator value is kept fixed. The
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authors showed as well how to use this approach to identify the controlled direct ef-
fect. Moreover, they allowed for the presence of post-treatment confounders when
it does not violate the assumptions on the instruments. Even though this approach
is ideal in cases of SCIA violation it can be applied only in a restricted amount of
frameworks. Indeed, it is often hard, and sometimes impossible, to find proper in-
struments satisfying the independence assumptions.
The second approachwhich does not rely on SCIA has been proposed inDeuchert
et al. (2018) and it is an extension of a DID model to do mediation analysis. The
model has been proposed for frameworks where treatment is randomized (or the
CIA is plausible) and the mediator is a binary variable. The authors divided the
population of interest in groups of compliers, always takers, never takers and de-
fiers, defined with respect to the combination of treatment and mediator values as
in IVs approach. The intuition behind this method is that, imposing common trend
assumptions between two dierent groups, the outcome of the first can be used as
a counterfactual for the others. This approach allows to identify the direct eect
for the always and never takers and the direct and indirect eect for the compliers
under the afore-mentioned assumptions, the monotonicity of the mediator in the
treatment and some eect homogeneity restrictions. This method does not allow to
identify the parameters of interest when the CIA is violated.
4.3. Mediation Analysis Synthetic Control
The method we propose in this section, allows to estimate the natural direct and
indirect and controlled direct eects in frameworks where the number of treated
units is low and/or SCIA and CIA are violated and no valid instruments can be
found. Moreover, it can be easily extended to be used in the framework depicted in
figure 4.3.
4.3.1. The General Method
In this paragraph we will introduce the Mediation Analysis Synthetic Control
(MASC), a generalization of SCM that allows to do mediation analysis, i.e. to de-
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compose the total eect of an intervention into its indirect component, which goes
through observed mediators, and its direct component. Similarly to SCM, MASC
creates synthetic values of the non-observed potential outcomes of the treated units
using a linear combination of the donor pool. As we will discuss in more details,
MASC re-weights control unit post-intervention outcomes by choosing weights
that minimize the distance between treated and the linear combination of the con-
trols in pre-intervention observable characteristics (including pre-intervention val-
ues of the outcome and the mediator) as well as in post-intervention values of the
mediator. This allows us to mimic what would have happened to the treated in ab-
sence of the intervention if her mediator were set to her potential mediator under
treatment. Following Abadie, Diamond, et al. 2010 we illustrate MASC with a sim-
ple dynamic factor model with interactive fixed-eects and show that both the direct
and the indirect eects estimators are unbiased as the number of pre-intervention pe-
riods goes to infinity. Before, we have to better introduce the framework of interest.
As in standard synthetic control method, assume we are interested in the eect of
an intervention D, implemented from time T , on an outcome Y . Consider the same
notation and the definitions introduced in section 4.2. Notice that, in our framework
the mediatorM does not have to be binary but for each individual we define at most
2 potential values for the mediator at each timeMit (1) andMit (0) (we assume no an-
ticipation eects in the pre-intervention period such that if t < T then Mit = Mit (0)
for any unit). This implies that for each individual there exists at most 4 potential
outcomes at each time (under no anticipation eects in the pre-intervention period
such that if t < T then Yit = Y 0,0it for any unit).
Following the synthetic control literature, we will define the parameters of inter-
est with respect to a single treated unit. If more than one unit is exposed to the inter-
vention (see Gobillon andMagnac 2016, Adhikari 2015) our method can be be easily
extended to decompose the Average Treatment Eect on the Treated (Vansteelandt
and VanderWeele 2012, Huber et al. 2017).
Once again, assume that we observe J units ordered such that units 1 to n are
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treated while units n+1 to J are not. Without loss of generality, we will first consider
the first treated, unit 1. The eects of interest for unit 1 are the total eect α1t ,
the direct eect θ1t (d), and the indirect eect δ1t (d) in the post-intervention period
(t ≥ T ) that are defined as
α1t = Y
1,1
1t − Y 0,01t
θ1t (d) = Y 1,d1t − Y 0,d1t ,
δ1t (d) = Yd,11t − Yd,01t , t ≥ T .
As we have seen we can write α1t as the sum of the direct and the indirect eect.
Hence, if it is identified, identifying θ1t (1) and δ1t (1) automatically implies identifi-
cation of θ1t (0) = α1t − δ1t (1) and δit (0) = α1t − θ1t (1). For this reason, we will focus
only on those two parameters here-after. Intuitively, the total eect α1t can be iden-
tifiedwith the synthetic control method as described in Abadie, Diamond, et al. 2010
and briefly summarized before. We will now show that a similar idea can be applied
to identify the parameters of interest in mediation analysis framework. To this end
we need to show that Y 1,11t , Y
0,0
1t , Y
1,0
1t and Y
0,1
1t are identified in post-intervention pe-
riod. First notice that Y 1,11t is observed in post-intervention period and Y
0,0
1t can be
estimated using standard SCM. Our main challenge is the identification of Y 1,01t and
Y 0,11t , both of which are never observed for any individual at any time and cannot be
estimated through a standard SCM.
For Y 0,11t , we propose to re-weight the control unit post-intervention outcomes
by choosing weights that minimize the distance between treated and control pre-
intervention observable characteristics as well as post-intervention values of the me-
diator. The intuition is that, since M1t = M1t (1) in post-intervention period, min-
imizing the distance between treated and controls with respect to post-treatment
values of the mediator as well, when the weights are chosen, will mimic what would
have happened to the treated in absence of the intervention if her mediator was set to
her potential mediator under treatmentM1t (1). Similar to SCM, MASC only works
if the CTSA is satisfied both with respect to the outcome and with respect to the
mediator.
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Finding a “synthetic” value of Y 1,01t is more challenging and requires more than
1 treated unit. First, we need to estimate what value the mediator of unit 1 would
have taken in the absence of the intervention (M1t (0)). This could be done with a
standard SCM, using the mediator as an outcome. Second, we propose to treat the
remaining treated as controls in a SCM where we use also the distance between the
first step estimate ofM1t (0) and the other treated mediators in post-intervention pe-
riod, in computing the weights.
As mentioned before, in the spirit of Abadie, Diamond, et al. 2010, to further
illustrate our approach, we will introduce a factor model in which we assume that
potential mediators of unit i are given by
Mit (0) = γt + βtZi + ϑtϱi + νit , (4.4)
Mit (1) = γt + βtZi + ϑtϱi +ψtDit + νit , (4.5)
whereγt is an unknown common factorwith constant factor loadings across units. Zi
is a (p×1) vector of observed covariates, βt is a (1×p) vector of unknown parameters,
ϑt is a (1×v) vector of unobserved common factors, ϱi is an (v×1) vector of unknown
factor loadings,ψit is an unknown parameter describing the impact of the treatment
on the mediator, and νit are unobserved transitory shocks.
Similarly, we assume that the four potential outcomes are given by
Y 0,0it = ζt + ηtXi + λtµi + φt (0)Mit (0) + ϵit , (4.6)
Y 0,1it = ζt + ηtXi + λtµi + φt (0)Mit (1) + ϵit , (4.7)
Y 1,0it = ζt + ηtXi + λtµi + φt (1)Mit (0) + ρt (Mit (0))Dit + ϵit , (4.8)
Y 1,1it = ζt + ηtXi + λtµi + φt (1)Mit (1) + ρt (Mit (1))Dit + ϵit , (4.9)
where ζt is an unknown common factor with constant factor loadings across units,
Xi is a (r × 1) vector of observed covariates which includes all the variables included
in Zi but might also include other observable variables which aects the treatment
and the outcome but not the mediator, ηt is a (1 × r ) vector of unknown param-
eters, λt is a (1 × F ) vector of unobserved common factors, µi is an (F × 1) vector
of unknown factor loadings, ϵit are unobserved transitory shocks, and φit (d) and
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ρit (Mit (d)) capture the impact, on the potential outcomes, of the potential mediator
and the treatment, respectively. In this model the total, direct and indirect eects of
unit 1 are then given by
α1t = φt (1)Mit (1) − φt (0)Mit (0) + ρt (Mit (1)),
θ1t (1) = ρt (M1t (1)) + (φt (1) − φt (0))M1t (1),
θ1t (0) = ρt (M1t (0)) + (φt (1) − φt (0))M1t (0),
δ1t (1) = ρt (M1t (1)) − ρt (M1t (0)) + φt (1)(M1t (1) −M1t (0)),
δ1t (0) = φt (0)(M1t (1) −M1t (0)).
As mentioned above, for the total eect we can just use the standard SCM. In
particular, we assume that there exists a (1 × (J − n)) vector of positive and adding
up to 1 weights L∗ = (l∗n+1, ..., l∗J ) such that in the post intervention period
Y 0,01t =
J∑
i=n+1
l∗i Yit .
As in Abadie, Diamond, et al. 2015 we assume that ∀ t = 1, ...,T − 1, L∗ also satisfies
J∑
j=n+1
l∗j Yjt = Y1t ,
J∑
j=n+1
l∗j Mjt = M1t ,
J∑
j=n+1
l∗j X j = X1.
This justifies choosing the weights that minimize the distance between the ob-
servable characteristics of the treated and the one of the control units in pre-treatment
period. More formally, let Ωα1 = (X1,Y11, . . . ,Y1,T−1,M11, . . . ,M1,T−1) be a ((2(T −1)+
r )×1) vector, ωα0i = (Xi ,Yi1, . . . ,Yi,T−1,Mi1, . . . ,Mi,T−1) be a (1×(2(T −1)+r )) vector,
and Ωα0 = (ωα0,n+1, . . . ,ωα0J )′, then
L∗ = min
ln+1,...,l J
| |Ωα1 − LΩα0 | |
s .t . ln+1 ≤ 0, ..., l J ≤ 0,
J∑
i=n+1
li = 1,
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where | |Ωα1 − LΩα0 | | =
√(
Ωα1 − LΩα0
)′ (
Ωα1 − LΩα0
)
. It is also possible to give more
weight to specific observable characteristics, by using the alternative distance | |Ωα1 −
LΩα0 | |V =
√(
Ωα1 − LΩα0
)′
V
(
Ωα1 − LΩα0
)
(we refer to section 4.3.2 for the procedure
to choose V ).
The first step of MASC is the estimation of Y 0,11t . This requires additional con-
straints. Indeed, we want to construct a “synthetic” unit which is identical to the
treated, not aected by the intervention, and, at the same time, has the same value
of the mediator as the treated unit. Similar to standard SCM, we want to find a
(1× (J −n)) vector of positive and adding up to 1 weightsW ∗t = (w∗n+1,t , ...,w∗Jt ) such
that in post-intervention periods
Y 0,11t =
J∑
i=n+1
w∗itYit .
Notice that, in our simple factormodel,Y 0,11t depends on the value thatM takes at time
t only². Also notice that the weights need to be calculated at each post-intervention
period in this model. Let t ′ ≥ T be the time at which we want to estimate the direct
eect, similar to Abadie, Diamond, et al. 2010, we assume thatW ∗t ′ exists and it also
satisfies ∀ t = 1, ...,T − 1
J∑
j=n+1
w∗jt ′Yjt = Y1t ,
J∑
j=n+1
w∗jt ′X j = X1,
and ∀ t = 1, ...,T − 1, t ′,
J∑
j=n+1
w∗jt ′Mjt = M1t .
²It is easy to let Y 0,11t depend on all the values that the mediator takes be-
tween T and t . This is done by replacing Ωθt ′ (1)1 and ω
θt ′ (1)
0i defined further be-
low with Ωθt ′ (1)1 = (X1,Y11, . . . ,Y1,T−1,M11, . . . ,M1,T−1,M1,T , . . . ,M1,t ′) and ωθt ′ (1)0i =
(Xi ,Yi1, . . . ,Yi1,T−1,Mi1, . . . ,Mi,T−1,Mi,T , . . . ,Mi,t ′), respectively.
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The vector of weightsW ∗t ′ is estimated in a similar way as L
∗. The only dierence is
that we now need to include the post-treatment mediator in the distance. More for-
mally, letΩθt ′(1)1 = (X1,Y11, . . . ,Y1,T−1,M11, . . . ,M1,T−1,M1,t ′),ωθt ′(1)0i = (Xi ,Yi1, . . . ,Yi,T−1,Mi1,
. . . ,Mi,T−1,Mi,t ′), and Ωθt ′(1)0 = (ωθt ′(1)n+1 , . . . ,ωθt ′(1)J )′, then
W ∗t ′ = minwn+1,t ′ ,...,w J t ′
| |Ωθt ′(1)1 −Wt ′Ωθt ′(1)0 | |V
s .t . wn+1,t ′ ≤ 0, ...,w Jt ′ ≤ 0,
J∑
i=n+1
wit ′ = 1,
where | |Ωθt ′(1)1 −Wt ′Ωθt ′(1)0 | |V =
√(
Ω
θt ′(1)
1 −Wt ′Ωθt ′(1)0
)′
V
(
Ω
θt ′(1)
1 −Wt ′Ωθt ′(1)0
)
.
Let Yˆ 0,11t ′ =
∑J
i=n+1w
∗
it ′Yit ′, as we show in the appendix, ifW
∗
t ′ exists, under standard
conditions
E(Yˆ 0,11t ′ ) = Y 0,11t ′ + o(T )
Then, we can estimate the direct eect θ1t ′(1) and the indirect eect δit ′(0) as
θˆ1t ′(1) = Y1t ′ − Yˆ 0,11t ′ , δˆ1t ′(0) = αˆ1t ′ − θˆ1t ′(1),
respectively.
If the number of treated is big enough, we can also create a “synthetic” Y 1,0it ′ . This
is done in two steps. In a first step, we estimate M1t ′(0) by Mˆ1t ′(0) = ∑Ji=n+1 k∗it ′Mit ′
with K∗t ′ = (k∗n+1,t ′, . . . ,k∗Jt ′) chosen with a standard SCM. Note that those weights
need to be calculated for each t ′. In a second step, we need to find a vector of posi-
tive and adding up to 1 weights Q∗t ′ = (q∗2t ′, ...,q∗nt ′), such that Y 1,0it ′ =
∑n
i=2 q
∗
it ′Yit ′. Q
∗
t ′
is estimated with a SCM but using only the other treated units. More specifically, let
Ω
δt ′(1)
1 = (X1,Y11, . . . ,Y1,T−1,M11, . . . ,M1,T−1, Mˆ1t ′(0)),ωθt ′(1)0i = (Xi ,Y11, . . . ,Yi,T−1,M11,
. . . ,Mi,T−1,Mi,t ′), and Ωθt ′(1)0 = (ωθt ′(1)2 , . . . ,ωθt ′(1)n )′, then
Q∗t ′ = minqn+1,t ′ ,...,q J t ′
| |Ωθt ′(1)1 −Qt ′Ωθt ′(1)0 | |V
s .t . qn+1,t ′ ≤ 0, ...,q Jt ′ ≤ 0,
J∑
i=n+1
qit ′ = 1,
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Let Yˆ 1,01t ′ =
∑n
i=2 q
∗
it ′Yit ′, similar as before, we assume that Q
∗
t ′ exists and satisfies
∀ t = 1, ...,T − 1
n∑
j=2
q∗jt ′Yjt = Y1t ,
n∑
j=2
q∗jt ′X j = X1,
n∑
j=2
q∗jt ′Mjt = M1t ,
∀ t = 1, ...,T − 1
and
n∑
j=2
q∗jt ′Mjt ′ = Mˆ1t ′(0).
Under extra standard conditions and assuming that ρt ′(·) is a linear function, as we
show in the appendix
E(Yˆ 1,01t ′ ) = Y 1,01t ′ + o(T ).
The latter assumption can admittedly be restrictive in many applications. However,
it is substantially weaker than assuming a constant ρt ′. Then, we can estimate the
indirect eect δit ′(1) and the direct eect θ1t ′(0) as
δˆ1t ′(1) = Y1t ′ − Yˆ 1,01t ′ , θˆ1t ′(0) = αˆit ′ − δˆ1t ′(1),
respectively. Intuitively,Q∗t ′ exists under the same assumption discussed above. How-
ever, if the number of treated units is too small Yˆ 1,01t ′ may be a very poor approximation
of Y 1,01t ′ . Hence, in those settings is only possible to estimate δit ′(0) and θit ′(1).
If the number of treated units is big enough, the approach used in MASC can be
easily extended to estimate the controlled direct eect. In particular, if the parameter
of interest is the direct eect θ1t ′(m) = Y 1,m1t ′ − Y 0,m1t ′ , MASC has to be applied twice
(where in this framework the value m represents the chosen value of the potential
mediator instead than the treatment status determining the potential mediator). In
a first step, using untreated units as the donor pool, to estimate Y 0,m1t ′ . In a second
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step, using treated units as the donor pool, to estimate Y 1,m1t ′ . In both steps, it has to
be imposted a post-treatment constraint forcing the mediator of the synthetic unit
to be equal tom.
Furthermore, MASC can be easily extended to identify direct and indirect eects
in presence of post-treatment confounders, i.e. in the setting depicted in figure
4.3. To give an intuition, making some assumption on post-treatment confounder
structure, constraints in post-treatment period can be used to obtain a synthetic unit
with the required mediator and post-treatment confounder values. I.e. to estimate
Y 0,0,(1,1)1t (and identify θ
Ima
1t (d)) two constraints in post-treatment period should be
used. A first one requiring the synthetic unit mediator to be equal to the treated unit
mediator. A second one requiring the synthetic unit post-treatment confounder to
be equal to those of the treated unit in absence of treatment.
4.3.2. Implementation
To implement MASC it can be used the same implementation method proposed
in Abadie, Diamond, et al. (2010) and in Abadie, Diamond, et al. (2015). In particu-
lar, the weights to use to build the synthetic control can be selected minimizing the
following quantity³: | |Ω1 −Wt ′Ω0 | |V =
√
(Ω1 −Wt ′Ω0)′V (Ω1 −Wt ′Ω0). In SCM im-
plementation, even though the estimation is valid under any value of V , an optimal
choice of this matrix can reduce the mean squared error of the estimator (Abadie,
Diamond, et al. 2010). Abadie, Diamond, et al. (2015) proposed to search for the op-
timal matrixV using a cross-validation method, employing a subset of pre-treatment
data to choose the matrix V that minimizes the root mean squared prediction error
(RMSPE) in it. This approach was criticized in Klößner et al. (2018). The authors
underlined as using a cross-validation technique the matrixV is not uniquely identi-
fied and this can be a problem in the placebo tests and in the leave-one-out tests used
to make inference when SCM is applied (see section 4.3.3). To solve this problem,
M. Becker et al. (2018) proposed to impose an additional constraint during weights
³Where with this representation we are not referring to the estimation of a particular parameter
and what we will say in this section is valid generally for the estimation of both Y 0,01t , Y
1,0
1t and Y
0,1
1t
unless specified otherwise.
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choice, such that they are uniquely identified. The constraint implies that no co-
variates can be accidentally irrelevant.
In MASC framework, the choice of matrix V has to follow some additional
considerations. The first consideration is that, in the estimations requiring post-
treatment constraint (i.e. Y 1,01t and Y
0,1
1t ), there are only one (or few) constraint(s)
on post- and several constraints on pre-intervention period. If this is not taken into
account properly in V choice, the post-treatment constraint is unlikely to be sat-
isfied. Hence, we suggest to choose V such that an equal weight is given to pre-
and post- intervention information. The second consideration is that optimizing
weights V with respect to outcome’s RMSPE does not guarantee the equalities on
pre-treatment mediator values to be satisfied. This is true especially if the media-
tor has a low correlation with the outcome or with its determinants. In MASC the
equality between pre-treatment mediator of the treated and of the syntetic units
is important for a proper estimation of all the parameters of interest. The simplest
way to solve this issue is to repeat the estimation trying dierent weights partition
between outcome and mediator information and to choose the partition giving the
most satisfying results in terms of both pre-treatment outcome and mediator. A
more complicated (but more rigorous) solution is to do the same using an opti-
mization function. The latter can either minimize both the distances or minimize
those in pre-treatment mediator values under the constraint that the distance in pre-
treatment outcomes is smaller than a fixed value. Given all these considerations, and
the fact that V choice does not have an impact on estimation validity, we suggest to
follow Gobillon and Magnac (2016) and use fixedV . The weights should be divided
equally between pre- and post- treatment information and, among pre-treatment
information, between outcome and mediator information such that pre-treatment
constraints are satisfied for both of them. As an alternative, once the weights are
divided between pre- and post- treatment information and between outcome and
mediator pre-treatment information the method proposed in M. Becker et al. (2018)
can be easily applied, separately, to the subset of weights concerning pre-treatment
outcome, pre-treatment mediator and post-treatment mediator information.
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A strand of the literature on SCM implementation focused on covariates selec-
tion, i.e. the choice of pre-treatment outcomes functions and of the observables.
In particular, Botosaru and Ferman (2017) studied the relevance of covariates con-
straints in SCM. They demonstrated that, if the assumption of non-collinearity and
non-irrelevance of the unobservables is extended to the observables, the constraint
on pre-treatment outcomes is enough for the estimator bias to go to zero when the
number of pre-treatment periods goes to infinity. Moreover, they demonstrated
that, under these assumptions, the equality on pre-treament outcomes guarantees
the equality on observables and unobservables. Their demonstration is very simple,
they simply treated the observables as the unobservables in standard SCM. Hence,
their conclusions can be easily extended to MASC framework. The authors showed
as well that the first result is still valid when the two assumptions are relaxed. Kaul
et al. (2018) have a completely dierent opinion. The authors show as the use of
all available pre-treatment outcomes is equivalent to the exclusion of all covariates.
They claim that the exclusion of all covariates is in contrast with the idea behind
SCM, even though it still gives consistent results.
MASC implementation requires an additional choice: the time periods to include
in post-treatment constraints. Indeed, as mentioned above, if we are estimating the
eects at time t ′ we can either impose post-treatment constraints on all time periods
betweenT and t ′−ϕ (whereϕ value should be chosen according to the authors beliefs
on the timing of mediator eect) or on t ′ − ϕ only. The dierence between these
two approaches is that in the first case we ask the treated and the synthetic units to
share the same mediator trend in the whole post-treatment period. In the second
we ask them to share a single value of the mediator in a single time period. To the
end of the demonstration of estimators validity this choice does not change much.
Nonetheless, it can make a dierence in terms of assumptions plausibility. Indeed,
the constraint only on period t ′ is more likely to be satisfied. On the other hand,
under the constraint on the whole trend the synthetic unit will be more similar to
the treated ones, hence it will be a more valid counterfactual.
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An additional recommendation, duringMASC implementation, is to check graph-
ically the overlap between treated and synthetic units for both pre-treatment out-
come and pre-treatment and post-treatmentmediator values (rather than pre-treatment
outcome only as in SCM).
4.3.3. Inference
Inference can be carried over in a similar manner as in standard synthetic control
method. For example, one can run similar placebo tests as the one suggested in
Abadie, Diamond, et al. 2015, estimating the eects (in our case also the direct and
indirect) of the intervention either before its implementation or for units not exposed
to it. Abadie, Diamond, et al. 2015 criticize the former type of placebo tests (often
called in-time placebos) arguing that there may be other shocks in the past aecting
treated and control units dierently. They suggest to use the ratio between post-
and pre- intervention Root Mean Square Prediction Error (RMSPE) as test statistics
during inferential procedure. For unit i and synthetic Yˆd,d ′ the pre-intervention
RMSPE can be defined as
RMSPE
Yˆd,d
′
,pre
i =
∑T−1
t=1 (Yi,t − Yˆd,d
′
i,t )2
T − 1 .
The post RMSPE is defined similarly
RMSPE
Yˆd,d
′
,post
i =
∑t ′
t=T (Yi,t ′ − Yˆd,d
′
i,t ′ )2
t ′ −T − 1 .
The test-statistic can then be defined as
TestY
d,d ′
i =
RMSPE
Yˆd,d
′
,post
i
RMSPE
Yˆd,d
′
,pre
i
.
The choice to use the ratio between RMSPEYˆ
d,d ′ ,post
i and RMSPE
Yˆd,d
′
,pre
i rather than
the first measure alone is crucial to have a correct inference. Indeed, Ferman and
Pinto (2017) showed as using RMSPEYˆ
d,d ′ ,post
i only the test statistics may have dier-
ent marginal asymptotic distributions under dierent permutations. Moreover, they
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showed as the test statistics based on the ratio performs better and is less sensitive to
violations of the assumptions. They proposed as well another test statistics which is
robust to serial correlation in temporary shocks.
Firpo and Possebom 2017 generalized the procedure proposed in Abadie, Dia-
mond, et al. (2015) such that it could be used for other test statistics and for any sharp
null hypothesis. The authors also showed that the method proposed in Abadie, Di-
amond, et al. (2015) was more powerful than standard test statistics in presence of
a single treated unit. They also extended their method to frameworks with multi-
ple outcomes and multiple interventions in dierent regions. Chernozhukov et al.
(2018) proposed an inferential method which can be applied more generally to any
framework where a counterfactual outcome is generated. They use a test statistics
based on residuals and provides as well a formal justification of the inference proce-
dure proposed in Abadie, Diamond, et al. (2015). This methodology can be easily
extended to be used in our framework as well.
Yet another inference procedure is described in Gobillon and Magnac (2016).
This procedure is based on dierent steps. First of all, the outcome of the treated
units is reduced by treatment eect. In our framework, the mediator of treated
units should be reduced as well, using the estimation of the potential mediator in
absence of treatment. Later on, 10’000 samples without replacement of a number
of units equal to the number of treated units have to be selected from the group
containing all units. For each of the 10’000 samples the selected units should be used
as treated units and the rest of the group as control, to apply the synthetic control
method (the MASC in our framework). Finally, the estimated values should be used
as distributions to make inference on the estimated eects. In MASC, this method
would consist in the following steps:
1. Substitute Yit with Y ′it = Yit − αˆt for i = 1, ...,n and t ≥ T . Where αt is given
by the average among all the total eect estimated.
2. Substitute Mit with M′it = Mit − E(Mit − Mˆit (0)) for i = 1, ...,n and t ≥ T .
3. Iterate 10’000 times:
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• Select n units.
• Apply MASC on selected unit.
• Calculate the average total, direct and indirect eects
4. Use the calculated eects to determine the distribution of the real eects and
do inference.
We refer to Gobillon and Magnac (2016) for more details.
Note that this inference procedure, just as Abadie, Diamond, et al. 2015 ones, is
based on the strong assumption that the disturbances across units are exchangeable.
Indeed, the basic ideas behind these methods is that the noise of the placebos can be
used to approximate the noises of the treated units.
In SCM (and, consequently, in MASC) framework there is a second source of
uncertainty. Unfortunately, the choice of the control units (donor pool) can dra-
matically aect the results. To solve this issue Abadie, Diamond, et al. (2015) suggest
to make a sensitivity test excluding one by one each of the units in the donor pool
(if the donor pool is particularly big another possibility is to select a sample with
replacement from the donor pool). If the estimated eects do not change much, the
results are not sensitive to the chosen donor pool and can be considered robust.

5. PUT THE DREAM BACK TOGETHER
In this chapter, MASC is applied to investigate on the mechanism behind the
temporariness of European Structural Funds eect. The chapter starts with an overview
on European Structural Funds, followed by some information on the allocation of
transfers in our area and period of interest and some literature on their eectiveness.
The aim of the literature review is twofold. We want both to show the state of the
literature on the estimation and analysis of SF impact and to provide measures of it
for the years and regions of interest. Therefore, we focused on the literature includ-
ing at least one of the two programming periods between 1988-2000 in the time
of interest and Abruzzi region in the sample. After this overview, details on MASC
implementation and its results will be provided.
5.1. An Overview
5.1.1. European Structural Funds
European Structural Funds were introduced for the first time in 1975. Their
goal was (and it is) to reduce the wide regional disparities among European re-
gions. To use the words of the Commissioner for Regional Policy in 1971, Al-
bert Borschette, the convergence among european regions was essential because
“The monetary union is not possible if the current disparities and dierences present
among the community continues to exist”. In 1988, there was a fundamental re-
form, the funds took the form they have today and the reduction of economic and
social disparities became one of the three highest priorities for the Union. As a con-
sequence, today, Structural and Cohesion Funds account together for one-third of
Community policies budget. The Structural Funds include the European Regional
Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the European Agricultural Guidance
and Guarantee Fund and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance. ERDF
and ESF are the most relevant in terms of budget. The first accounted for 45% of
total structural funds during the period 1989-1999 (which, as we will see, is our
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period of interest). Its goal is to streghten the economic potential of the benefi-
ciary regions through support to productive investments (especially those involving
innovation or fostering sustainability), infrastructural projects (i.e. for transport,
telecommunications and energy) and co-financing operational programmes. It also
provides assistance to large projects implementation and during preparatory studies.
The ESF, instead, accounted for 30% of total structural funds during the same pe-
riod. Its goal is to fight long-term unemployment and improve the employability
of youths and other vulnerable categories of unemployed workers and to promote
adaptation to industrial change (i.e., contributing to human capital development).
The main target of SF are the regions lagging behind. In particular, most of the
Funds are used in regions having a GDP per capita in PPP terms lower than 75% of
EU average. The so-called Objective 1 regions. Most of the Countries belonging to
this group are largely agricoltural, with a low R&D level and a high level of unem-
ployment (Cappelen et al. 2003). In the programming period 1988-1993, 70% of
the programme budget was used for Objective 1 regions. In 1994-1999 program-
ming period 68%. The goal of Objective 1 transfers is not just to induce economic
development in the short term. Innovative investments, unemployment reduction
and improvements in trasportation, telecommunication and energetic infrastructures
should bring the lagging behind regions on a faster self-sustaining growing path
Barone et al. (2016). Programmes subsidized by the funds have to be co-financed
by the beneficiary Country or region.
5.1.2. European Structural Funds in Mezzogiorno
Italy has always been characterized by strong internal disparities. Immediatly
after unification, the northern area of the Country was characterized by an envi-
ronment more favorable for industrial development. Indeed, it was closer to Eu-
ropean markets and water resources. On the opposite, Mezzogiorno area (i.e. the
Southern area of Italy) was only specialized in industries that would have had low
relative growth rates in the following decades and lagged behind in terms of in-
frastructures and human and social capital (Iuzzolino et al. 2011). Over most of the
Country history dierent policies were implemented as an attempt to reduce those
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Figure 5.1: Dierent color intensity represents dierent GDP per capita levels in
1988. Source: Barone et al. (2016) database.
disparities. Nonetheless, as it is visible from figure 5.1, where dierent color intensi-
ties represent dierent GDP per capita levels in 1988, when the “modern” European
Structural Funds started, disparities were still very high. Consequently, in 1988,
as visible from figure 5.2, all regions of Mezzogiorno area belonged to Objective
1. During the period 1989-1999 the total transfers received in Mezzogiorno were
equivalent to 3% of the GDP of the area. According to the European Commis-
sion report, they had a strong role in sustaining investment levels in the area and
reducing unemployment. A big portion of the funds was used to extend the natural
gas distribution network, reaching 75% of the population of southern regions. The
transfers were used as well to improve communications and water supply in the area,
to do training courses, boost tourism and transfer innovative production methods to
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Figure 5.2: Regions belonging to Objective 1 group during the programming pe-
riods 1989-1993 and 1994-1999 are evidenced in red.
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local farms. Nonetheless, serious delays during the whole implementation period
reduced the eectiveness of Structural Funds transfers (Commission 1997).
In Abruzzi region, as it can be seen from table 5.1, most of the funds were used for
agricolture and tourism sectors. In the latter, they were especially used for restora-
tion of touristic attractions or touristic services (Abruzzo 2001).
Categories of use Funds Amount Share of the Total
Telecommunications 129311 0.12
Industry, artisan and service sectors 106752 0.099
Tourism 261468 0.243
Agricolture 373552 0.347
Infrastrucures in support of business activities 116322 0.108
Human capital promotion 86248 0.080
Technical assistance, monitoring 3866 0.004
Total 1077519
Table 5.1: European SF transfers allocation in Abruzzi over the programming pe-
riod 1994-1997 with respect to dierent mode of use.
In 1997, Abruzzi GDP per capita crossed the threshold of 75% of European
average and the region exited from Objective 1. It was the only EU region which
exited the program without a phasing out support. Due to delays in programmes
implementation the transfers were eectively reduced only starting from 2000. In
2000-2006 cycle Abruzzi was an objective 2 region. The transfers, and the co-
financing public resources were halved (Barone et al. 2016).
5.1.3. Literature Review
As soon as the European Structural Funds were introduced, a vibrant debate on
their eectiveness started. When data on the firsts programming periods became
available, several empirical analysis were conducted in support of this debate. To the
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best of our knowledge, the first empirical analysis was Boldrin and Canova (2001).
To verify the eectiveness of European SF the authors followed beta- and sigma-
convergence approaches and regressed the variation in the logarithm of GDP per
capita on its initial value. They repeated the regression separately before and during
policy implementation and compared the results. Given that there was no dierence
in the coecients between the two periods, they concluded the funds were not ef-
fective to foster convergence among regions. Nonetheless, as the authors themselves
underlined, convergence level before SF implementation may not be a good rep-
resentation of the potential convergence in absence of the policy in the following
years. Indeed, if in absence of SF the convergence had slowed down, a constant
convergence would reveal a positive eect of the funds.
The subsequent studies, based on beta- and sigma-convergence or on other the-
oretical growth models, took into account of this possibility, including the SF as a
covariate in the regression. Moreover, they included additional variables that could
influence the outcome. Among them, Cappelen et al. (2003) used a panel data model
with fixed eect to study the eect of SF at a regional level, over the period 1989-
1997. They chose the covariates and the structure of the regression according to
a theoretical model, based on the idea that development is mainly driven by tech-
nological innovation set in a proper environment. They wrote productivity as a
multiplicative function of the level of knowledge coming from outside the region,
those born inside it, the capacity of the region to exploit benefits of knowledge and
a constant. They assumed diusion of external knowledge follow a logistic curve.
In the regression model, they included measures of physical infrastructure, pop-
ulation density, industrial structure and long-term unemployment. To solve the
problem of possible correlation between structural funds and some of the covariates,
they exploited the fact that structural funds increased strongly from 1980-1988 pro-
gramming period to 1989-1997 programming period. In particular, they included a
dummy variable indicating the first programming period, interacted with the other
covariates. They concluded structural funds have a positive and significant impact
on economic growth of European regions, contributig to reach major equality in
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productivity and income. Moreover, they said that the increase in the funds amount
in 1988 had a positive impact on the eectiveness of the policies. The eects are
stronger in more developed environments.
In line with this result another Country-level evaluation showed that SF eect
was higher in Countries with high-quality institutions (Ederveen et al. 2006). The
authors based their regression on the theoretical convergence model introduced by
Mankiw et al. (1992). They used data on 13 EU Countries and 5-years observations
over the period from 1960-1965 to 1990-1995. They focused only on European Re-
gional Development Fund. Interacting SF variable with some proxies of institutions
quality the authors found a positive and significant impact of SF in countries with
high-quality institutions and a negative and significant impact in countries with
low-quality institutions.
Puigcerver-Penalver (2007) conduced her empirical analysis on data at a regional
level. Focusing on Objective 1 regions over the period 1989-1999, she applied a
panel data model with fixed eects. She regressed the GDP per capita in PPP terms
growth on dierent measures of SF amount and private and public expenditures.
As the previous authors, she based her regression on a theoretical model. In par-
ticular, she proposed a hybrid model where technological growth is a consequence
of both exogenous and endogenous forces. The author modeled production as a
Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function with constant returns to scale. She
combined themacroeconomic level with aminimization problem at household level.
From the empirical analysis, it emerged that SF had a positive and significant impact
on rates of growth of Objective 1 regions during the whole period under analysis.
As Puigcerver-Penalver (2007), Esposti and Bussoletti (2008) used panel data
at a regional level, on 200 european regions, and focused on Objective 1 trans-
fers over the period 1989-2000. The authors described convergence process with
a beta-convergence model, where average income per worker growth, conditional
on initial income, depended on total factor productivity growth rate, speed of con-
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vergence, initial total factor productivity, production (modeled as a Cobb-Douglas
production function), initial investment rate, initial population and capital depreci-
ation rate. The authors focused on the long-run eect of the policy on supply side,
claiming that SF should boost investments increasing in this way total factor pro-
ductivity and, consequently, it should induce growth in the labor market. A possible
issue employing this regression model was the endogeneity of the lagged value of
the outcome with respect to the other covariates. Hence, they employed, for the es-
timation, a GeneralizedMethod of Moments based on first dierences and one based
on system of equations (using the dierence between past and present outcome as
an instrument). They concluded there was convergence and the impact of SF was
negligible. Nevertheless, both these results were not robust to alternative specifica-
tions and estimators (i.e. the impact of SF was positive under some specifications).
Other authors used a GMM regression. Beugelsdijk and Eijnger (2005) used
it to regress the GDP growth on its lagged values and its initial level, a measure of
the structural funds received and some additional covariates. The authors wanted to
investigate whether the selection-into-treatment rule of SF induced moral hazard
in the most corrupt Countries. I.e. they wondered whether the most corrupt gov-
ernments decided not to use the funds properly to avoid threshold crossing or use
them for policies they would have done anyway (substitution eect). To corroborate
their hypothesis, they interacted, in the regression, SF levels with a corruption index.
They found a positive and significant eect of SF on GDP growth and concluded it
was not aected by corruption level of the Countries. With regard to endogeneity
they concluded there was no serious autocorrelation in the outcome.
The works summarized so far have two main limits. The first one is that most of
them do not take into account of a possible correlation between the variable mea-
suring SF and the other covariates (with the exception of Cappelen et al. (2003)).
The second is that none of them take into account of selection bias. Even though
some of them include other outcome determinants as covariates, they are not chosen
following the counterfactual approach and nothing guarantees CIA is satisfied. In
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particular, the accuracy of the estimation strongly depends on the right specifica-
tion of the theoretical model the analysis relied on. Dall’Erba and Fang (2017), in
their meta-analysis, underlined as more attention should be provided to approaches
dierent from the neoclassical beta-convergence model and looked favorably to a
second strand of the literature based on counterfactual models.
One study in-between the first and the second strands is Dall’erba and Le Gallo
(2008), where the authors applied a beta-convergence model and took into account
of SF endogeneity. They used data at a regional level over the period 1989-1999 and
GDP growth as an outcome. The authors took into account of possible spillover ef-
fects, determining the spatial correlation among regions in absence of SF and using
it inside the final model. Moreover, they took into account of spatial heterogene-
ity dividing the regions into a peripheric and a core groups through quantitative
analysis and including dummies for the two groups (interacted with all variables of
interest) in the final model. Finally, they took into account of endogeneity using
several instruments. To control for endogeneity of the spatial lag outcome, they used
the spatial lag of all explanatory variables. To control for the endogeneity of share of
agricolture and long-term unemployment they used two quasi-instrument. They
classified the regions in three dierent categories according to each variable and used
the new factor variables as instruments. Finally, to control for the endogeneity of SF
they used four dierent instruments: the distance by road to Bruxelles, travel time
from the most populated town of the region to Bruxelles, a quasi-instrument built as
before with respect to SF level and its spatial lag. Their Hausman tests suggested that
only the share of agricolture and the SF were endogenous. The regression results,
instead, suggested that SF had no impact on the outcome.
To the best of our knowledge, the first study relying only on counterfactual
methods is Hagen and Mohl (2008). The authors estimated SF eect on economic
growth rate applying a generalized propensity score matching on a sample of 122
European regions. They measured treatment as the actual regional SF payment
(rather than the initial commitment) and excluded all observations with zero pay-
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ment. They restricted the estimation of the dose-response function on a range of
treatment up to the 75% quantile given that there was a small number of observa-
tions in the upper tail of the distribution. According to the authors, covariates choice
was mostly driven by data availability. They included pre-treatment values of the
outcome variable, the ratio between GDP per capita in PPP terms and EU aver-
age, population density, employment structure and unemployment rate, the ratio
between long-term unemployment and total unemployment, lagged and squared
unemployment level and country dummies. From their analysis, it emerged SF
eect increased as their amount increased. Nonetheless, the confidece interval at
95% increased together with the estimated eect, making it always non-significant.
The peculiar divergence in confidence interval upper and lower bounds suggest the
non-significance may be due to the low amount of observations in correspondence
of higher SF amounts. Hence, we believe these results should be accompanied by
more reliable analysis to take conclusions on SF eectiveness.
Luckily for us, this is not the unique estimation based on counterfactual analysis.
S. O. Becker et al. (2010) used a fuzzy regression discontinuity design to estimate
the impact of Objective 1 transfers on average annual growth of GDP per capita
in PPP terms and employment. They exploited the 75% threshold on GDP per
capita defining Objective 1 regions (see 5.1.1). After the estimation, the authors did
several sensitivity checks, controlling, among the others, for spillover eects and dif-
ferent programming periods. The estimation was robust to all of them. The analysis
showed that eligibility for Objective 1 regions had a positive and significant eect on
GDP growth and a non-significant eect on employment growth. They concluded
transfers had an immediate impact on investments while it took them longer time
to aect employment.
Some other authors applied dierent versions of the regression discontinuity de-
sign. Pellegrini et al. (2013) used a sharp RDD to study the impact of Objective 1
eligibility on real GDP per capita growth over the period 1995-2006. The authors
used a sample of 190 regions and applied dierent non-parametric estimation proce-
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dures. They concluded eligibility had a positive and significant eect on the outcome
and this result was robust to the dierent procedures they used. Giua (2017), instead,
applied a spatial regression discontinuity design using regional border between mu-
nicipalities belonging to Objective 1 and non-Objective 1 regions as a threshold.
She used the total employment variation between 1991 and 2001 as outcome (the
results were nonetheless robust to the choice of 1981-2001 variation, suggesting the
eect of the policy was not yet visible in 1991) and repeated the analysis including
dummies for dierent economic sectors. She concluded the policy had a positive
and significant impact on employment growth, especially in the sectors most likely
to be influenced (manifacturing, construnction, retail and tourism). Cerqua and
Pellegrini (2018) started applying a standard RDD to estimate the impact of struc-
tural and cohesion funds on economic growth over the period 1994-2006. Later on,
they extended this method to estimate the local average treatment level eect. In
particular, to estimate the LATLE using an RDD, they exploited the fact that also
non-Objective 1 regions received some funds. They defined a first treatment as be-
ing highly treated (Objective 1 regions) or low treated (non-Objective 1 regions).
Later on, they defined a second measure of treatment, as the distance of one region
from the average reception of transfers in its group (i.e. for an Objective 1 region
the second treatment is measured as the distance of its reception of funds from Ob-
jective 1 average). They identified the LATLE under the assumption that treated
and untreated regions with the same value of the second treatment, were equal in
the unobservables dimensions relevant for the outcome. To make this assumption
more plausible, they controlled for some covariates. The authors measured funds
reception as the amount of EU payments, by operational program, per year, at re-
gional level. They used dierent specification tests as robustness checks. Among the
others, they used an IV approach to test for transfers level endogeneity and checked
for spatial error correlation. The estimation was robust to all checks. The authors
concluded the funds had a positive and significant eect on regional growth. They
found a concave conditional intensity-growth function, with the maximum eect
of the policy for 305-340 euros of per capita transfers.
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Another study, investigating the variability of the eect with respect to dierent
transfers level, is S. O. Becker et al. (2012). As Hagen and Mohl (2008), the authors
used a generalized propensity score matching to determine the dose-response func-
tion for European SF. They used data at NUTS 3 level. It emerged that treatment
eect was positive and significant and the optimal intensity level of treatment was
0.4% of GDP.
It is worth to mention a third strand of the literature on Structural Funds. The
main dierence between the last and the previous ones has been explained very well
by its pioneers, using the words of a World Bank lead economist: “ A treatment is
an instance of treating someone, say medically. A cure ends a problem. Sometimes,
the treatment is a cure. Other times it just keeps the problem under control with-
out curing it: if you remove the treatment, the problem comes back” (Ozler 2014).
While the first two strands of the literature focus on the impact of the treatment this
third strand of the literature investigates whether the treatment is the cure (Barone
et al. 2016). Knowledge about the longevity of SF eect is fundamental to assess
the validity of this tool and to understand whether and how it should be improved.
Indeed, the main goal of Objective 1 European Structural Funds is to reduce the gap
between the poor and the rich areas permanently, activating a self-sustaining faster
growing path in the poorer regions (Esposti and Bussoletti 2008, Barone et al. 2016).
To the best of our knowledge, the pioneers of this strand of literature are Barone et
al. (2016). To investigate whether the funds were the cure, the authors exploited
the fact that Abruzzi exited the SF Objective 1 program in 1997 without a phas-
ing out support. Consequently its SF, and the national public resources associated
to them, were more than halved in 2000. The authors, applied a Synthetic Control
Method using Abruzzi as the treated region and defining the treatment as the end of
transfers reception. They included the other regions belonging to the Mezzogiorno
area (namely Molise, Campania, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily, Sardinia, Puglia) in the
donor pool. They used the period 1980-2000 as pre-treatment period and calculated
the eects on the post-treatment period 2001-2008 (following years were excluded
because Abruzzi was hitten by a earthquake in 2009). To make inference they con-
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duced in-time and in-space placebo tests (the latter using all others italian regions).
The authors observed that there was, on average, a 5.5% statistically significant drop
in indexed GDP per capita (for further information on the outcome and the control
variables they have used see 5.2) due to the lost of Objective 1 support. Comparing
this result with those obtained in previous literature, the authors concluded most of
the eect of the transfers was temporary. Barone et al. (2016) did as well a series of
robustness check, i.e. they excluded the neighbouring regions from the donor pool
to check for spatial spillovers. The results were robust to them.
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one other work belonging to this
strand of the literature, S. O. Becker et al. (2018). The authors started estimating the
impact of Objective 1 treatment on average annual growth of GDP per capita in PPP
terms, average annual employment growth and total and public investment intensity
(as percentages of GDP). Later on, they estimated the impact of loosing an Objec-
tive 1 classification on a series of regions. To do it, they exploited the fact that the
inclusion of eastern european regions lowered significantly average GDP level, and,
consequently, policy eligibility threshold. In both estimations, the authors applied a
fuzzy RDD over the period 1989-2013. The authors found a significant and positive
eect of the policy on GDP per capita growth. They found a non-significant eect
on employment growth and general investments. Finally, they found a positive and
significant eect on public investment. From the two last results the authors con-
cluded the public capital stock crowded out some of the private investments. With
respect to the lost of Objective 1 classification, the authors started comparing re-
gions exiting from the treated group with those never-entered and found a positive
and significant eect of “temporary treatment” of 2.1-2.6% of GDP. Later on, they
compared the first group with regions treated the whole time and found a negative
and significant eect on GDP of exiting from treated group of 1.7%. They found
no significant impact on employment and suggested it is due to the slow response
of labour market. They concluded the eect of SF transfers is not permanent and it
seems to vanish when transfers are stopped.
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To summarize, there are three strands of literature on European Structural Funds.
The first one relies on theoretical models of growth. Among the works belonging
to this strand, some concluded European Structural Funds have a positive and sig-
nificant eect on GDP growth (Cappelen et al. 2003, Puigcerver-Penalver 2007,
Beugelsdijk and Eijnger 2005), some of them concluded their eect was negligi-
ble (Boldrin and Canova 2001, Esposti and Bussoletti 2008, Freitas et al. 2003) and
one of them concluded it depended on Country’s institutions (Ederveen et al. 2006).
One of them investigated on policy impact on employment and concluded it was
negligible (Boldrin and Canova 2001). Finally, none of them investigated on policy
impact on investments. As mentioned before, the results of this first strand should be
taken with caution given that they do not take into account of possible selection bias
and endogeneity issues. To the second strand belong analysis estimating the impact
of SF on growth through a counterfactual approach. Most of them identified a posi-
tive and significant eect (S. O. Becker et al. 2010, Pellegrini et al. 2013, Giua 2017,
Cerqua and Pellegrini 2018, S. O. Becker et al. 2012). Only two of them concluded
policy eect was negligible (Dall’erba and Le Gallo 2008, Hagen and Mohl 2008).
Nonetheless, the reliability of Dall’erba and Le Gallo (2008) results (independently
from how convincing their instruments are) is weakened by the inclusion of invest-
ments among the covariates. Given that SF should foster investments, the last is a
bad control. The fact that Hagen and Mohl (2008) result is in contrast with the rest
of the second strand of the literature may be due to the fact that the authors con-
duced the analysis only on units with a range of treatment up to the 75% quantile,
excluding the most treated areas. Hence, they may have estimated a lower bound of
the actual eect.
Fewworks focused on the estimation of treatment eect on unemployment. One
of them found a positive and significant eect (Giua 2017). Two of them found no
significant impact (S. O. Becker et al. 2010, S. O. Becker et al. 2018). This dierence
may be due to the fact that the second two works focused on a post-treatment period
too short to observe the slow response of labour market. Only one of the second
strand papers estimated treatment eect on investments-to-GDP ratio and public
investments-to-GDP ratio and found no significant eect on the first and a positive
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and significant eect on the second (S. O. Becker et al. 2018).
The third strand of the literature includes studies investigating on the longevity
of Objective 1 transfers eect. Both the works belonging to it concluded European
Structural Funds have a temporary eect (Barone et al. 2016, S. O. Becker et al.
2018). The first found a negative eect significantly higher than the second. This
may be due to the fact that it focused on a region which did not receive a phasing
out support, while the second included many units which benefitted from a more
gradual exit.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the works based on a counterfactual ap-
proach investigated on the causal channels between Objective 1 belonging and eco-
nomic growth. As we have seen (see 5.1.1 and 5.1.2), Objective 1 transfers can be
used in dierent frameworks, i.e. they can be used to boost investments or to re-
duce unemployment level. Consequently, their impact can travel through dierent
mediators. Focusing on the third strand of the literature, it is of high interest to
understand which are the causal channels guaranteeing more longevity and which
are the channels through which the transfers have only a temporary impact. This
information would be highly policy relevant. As an example, if the component of
transfers eect passing through investments is permanent while the component pass-
ing through employment is temporary, it could be useful to center SF eorts on the
first or to rethink the second. The contribution of this chapter goes in this direction.
5.2. MASC Implementation and Inference
The exit of Abruzzi from the group of Objective 1 regions, and the subsequent
reduction in structural funds transfers, caused a reduction of its GDP per capita, in-
dexed at 1995, of 5.5% in the following eight years (Barone et al. 2016). Our goal
is to understand to what extent the sudden reduction in SF transfers had an impact
through a reduction of investments and to what extent it had impact through a re-
duction in employment. To reach it, we appliedMASC to the case of Abruzzi region
and used investments and employment as mediators. The choice of the mediators
and the outcome is straightforward. Indeed, the policy itself is built to increase the
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GDP in the lagging behind regions acting on investments and employment.
Using investments and employment as mediators we need to assume that the
values of these variables one year is not influenced by the value of GDP in subsequent
years. This assumption may be violated if firms base their production choices on
expected values of GDP (as according to Keynesian theories) and the last coincide
with the actual future values of GDP. Nonetheless, firms will probably base their
expectations on the whole italian economy rather than on those of Abruzzi alone.
There is no reason for the italian economy to drop drammatically in 2001. Moreover,
the end of the policy aected directly the level of available resources for investments
and employment. Compared with a drop in the available resources the impact of
negative expectations is likely to be negligible.
Following Barone et al. (2016), we used as an outcome an index of GDP per-
capita in real terms, set equal to 100 in 1995. This choice allows to build a synthetic
unit for Abruzzi, notwithstanding the fact that its GDP is higher than those of any
other region of Mezzogiorno area. Meanwhile, it still holds all the needed informa-
tion on regions growth. Consistently with this choice of the outcome, we selected
measures of the two mediators relevant for GDP trend of growth. For employment
level, we used an index of the share of employed population, set equal to 100 in 1995.
For investments, instead, we used simply investments level. While it is the trend of
employment, rather than its level, that influence GDP trend we can’t say the same
for investments. Indeed, the level of investments directly influence GDP trend. This
is why we indexed only the first mediator. In addition, we used the same covariates
employed in Barone et al. (2016): the initial level of GDP per-capita, the past level of
GDP per capita growth, a measure of human capital (the share of graduates among
the population), population density, a measure of trade openness (export over GDP),
the sectorial composition of value added (measured as the share of agricolture, in-
dustry and market services). Following the authors, we imposed the costraints on
GDP per capita growth averaged for the 10 years before the intervention and on
all the other covariates (including pre-treatment outcomes) averaged 3 years before
the intervention. As for the pre-treatment constraints on the mediators, we imposed
them on all pre-treatment levels of investments from 1981 until 1999 and on all pre-
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treatment values of the indexed share of employment from 1980 to 1999 (with the
exclusion of the observation relative to 1995 since it takes value 100 for all units).
The inclusion of all pre-treatment mediators values allowed us not ot include ob-
servables determining the mediator in the estimation of Y 0,0 (Botosaru and Ferman
2017).With respect to post-treatment constraints, for the estimation of the direct
eect, we imposed them on all years from the last pre-treatment year until the last
year before the year of interest. I.e. for the year of interest t ′ the post-treatment
constraint were imposed on mediator value from 2000 until t ′ − 1.
Investments are unlikely to have a post-treatment confounder. Indeed, most of
the transfers were used directly for investments or in the fight against unemploy-
ment. It is hardly believable that employment has an eect on investments. It is
instead very likely the opposite. The reduction of investments may have an impact
on employment level. Hence, investments may be a post-treatment confounder for
employment. Unfortunately, we were not able to calculate the direct eect for em-
ployment in presence of post-treatment confounders as suggested in section 4.3.1.
There was not enough variability in the data to satisfy the required post-treatment
constraints on employment and on investments simultaneously. Nonetheless, as we
will see, the indirect eect passing through investments was null while those pass-
ing through employment was not. This ensure us that none of the indirect eect
through employment is due to investments. Indeed, if they were post-treatment
confounders they would have had an impact on the outcome through employment
and their estimated indirect eect would have not been null.
To determine the weigths to attribute to each constraint we used the cross-
validation method proposed in Abadie, Diamond, et al. (2015). Nonetheless, we
changed it to select the weigths that minimize the MSPE of both the outcome and
the mediators in pre-treatment periods. For the estimation of the direct eects, in-
stead, half of the weight was divided between pre-treatment constraints (following
the total eect division) and half of it was divided equally between post-treatment
constraints.
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Data were kindly provided by Barone, David and De Blasio. We therefore refer
to their work for details on their origin (Barone et al. 2016).
With regard to inference, the low number of control units do not allow us to use
in-space placebo. Indeed, if the number of units to use for in-space placebo is too
low it is likely to have under-rejection. Indeed, a single outlier is enough for the p-
value to be too high to reject the null hypothesis. We partially solved this issue using
in-time placebo. Even though the number of cases to use to build the distribution
was still low, observations in-time should present lower variability since they refer
to the same unit. Hence, the probability to have an outlier or a peculiar behaviour
is lower. Following Gobillon and Magnac (2016), in post-treatment period we sub-
tracted the estimated treatment impact from the outcome and from the mediators.
Later on, we applied the MASC multiple times using all the years over the period
1990-1994 and 1996-1999 as intervention thresholds. We derived p-values from the
estimated values as the rate of placebo estimations with a value of the treatment eect
higher than those of the treated.
All the estimations were conduced using, on the software R, the package “Synth”
(Abadie, Diamond, et al. 2011).
5.3. Results
5.3.1. Total Eect
In table 5.2 the average outcome, mediators and covariates over pre-treatment
period for the treated unit, the synthetic unit and the Mezzogiorno area (with the
exclusion of Abruzzi) are presented. It is possible to see that the synthetic unit is
more similar to Abruzzi than the Mezzogiorno area average with respect to all the
most relevant variables (i.e. the outcome and the mediators) and some of the less
relevant ones.
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Table 5.2: COMPARINGTHE PRE-TREATMENTAVERAGESOF TREATED
AND SYNTHETIC UNITS AND MEZZOGIORNO AREA
Variable Abruzzi Synthetic Control Mezzogiorno Average
Indexed GDP per capita 92.43 92.07 93.93
Investments 3626.6 3611.92 6591.65
Indexed Share of Employed 1.0102 1.0198 1.0413
GDP growth 0.0202 0.019 0.0174
Share of Graduates 0.0403 0.0359 0.0338
Population Density 116.01 105.88 165.66
Export over GDP 0.1053 0.0316 0.0494
VA share of Agricolture 0.0492 0.0602 0.0589
VA share of Industry 0.2914 0.2233 0.2375
VA share of Market Services 0.4379 0.4238 0.4229
NOTE: Average variables over the period 1980-2000. Mezzogiorno area include Molise, Puglia,
Calabria, Basilicata, Sardinia, Sicily, Campania. Population density is defined for Km2.
Theweights among the donor pool were distributed in the followingway: 0.2935
to Molise, 0.000001 to Campania, 0.000002 to Puglia, 0.000009 to Basilicata, 0.5169
to Calabria, 0.0000004 to Sicily and 0.1896 to Sardinia. In figures 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5
the comparison between the treated and the synthetic unit is presented with respect
to the outcome and the two mediators.
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Figure 5.3: In the figure, the outcome of the treated unit is compared with those of the
synthetic unit across years. The synthetic unit was built using constraints on pre-treatment
period only, as it is required to estimate the total eect.
With respect to the outcome, it is possible to see that there is a good pre-treatment
fit between the treated and the synthetic unit. After 2001 the two outcomes diverge,
suggesting a negative eect of the treatment (in linewith Barone et al. (2016) results).
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Figure 5.4: In the figure the investments level of the treated unit is compared with those
of the synthetic unit across years. The synthetic unit was built using constraints on pre-
treatment period only, as it is required to estimate the total eect.
The pre-treatment fit between treated and synthetic unit in terms of the two
mediators is slightly worst, nonetheless it is still satisfying. The lines of the treated
and the synthetic units diverge after the intervention for both mediators. The di-
vergence is nonetheless stronger with respect to the indexed share of employment
while it is more moderate for investments. In particular, the lines for the last con-
verge in 2008. The evident divergence in terms of indexed share of employment
starts with a little delay.
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Figure 5.5: In the figure the indexed ratio of employment of the treated unit is compared
with those of the synthetic unit across years. The synthetic unit was built using constraints
on pre-treatment period only, as it is required to estimate the total eect.
This suggest the intervention reduced strongly the employment level and midly
investments level. The quantitative results are represented in table 5.3.
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Table 5.3: ESTIMATIONOF THE TOTAL EFFECTOF EUROPEAN STRUC-
TURAL FUNDS ENDING IN ABRUZZI REGION
Year Eect on
Outcome Inv Index Empl Share
2001 -2.42 -187.90 -0.001
2002 -5.06 -16.09 -0.018
2003 -6.79 38.11 -0.027
2004 -11.32 -23.58 -0.076
2005 -9.11 -476.60 -0.060
2006 -9.52 -319.66 -0.072
2007 -9.30 -294.97 -0.072
2008 -7.19 -33 -0.060
Outcome: Indexed GDP per capita
Pre-Treatment Average of the Outcome: 92.43
NOTE: Eect of the intervention on the outcome and the two mediators for each post-treatment
year.
5.3.2. Direct and Indirect Eects
5.3.2.1. INVESTMENTS
In table 5.4 the average outcome and investments over pre-treatment period and
the average mediator over post-treatment period for the treated unit, the synthetic
unit and the Mezzogiorno area (with the exclusion of Abruzzi) are presented (the
weigths used to build these values for the synthetic unit are those obtained from the
estimation of last post-treatment year eect, where all post-treament constraints are
used). It is possible to see that the synthetic unit is more similar to the treated than
the Mezzogiorno area average with respect to all the values. Moreover, the synthetic
unit approximate very well the treated unit in both pre-treatment outcome and me-
diator and post-treatment mediator values.
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Table 5.4: COMPARING THE PRE- AND POST-TREATMENT AVERAGES
OF TREATED AND SYNTHETIC UNITS AND MEZZOGIORNO AREA
Variable Abruzzi Synthetic Control Mezzogiorno Average
Indexed GDP per capita 92.43 92.23 93.93
Inv pre-treat 3626.6 3503.46 6591.65
Inv post-treat 4311.65 4332.89 7150.55
NOTE: Average variables over the period 1980-2000 and 2001-2008. Mezzogiorno area include
Molise, Puglia, Calabria, Basilicata, Sardinia, Sicily, Campania.
The weigths given to the constraints were divided equally between pre- and
post-treatment period. In the estimation of last post-treatment year the weights
among the donor pool were distributed in the following way: 0.3303 to Molise,
0.000594 to Campania, 0.00474 to Puglia, 0.0000543 to Basilicata, 0.4435 to Cal-
abria, 0.0004825 to Sicily and 0.2203 to Sardinia. Table 5.4 is confirmed by figure
5.6 and 5.7, were outcome and investments of the treated unit are compared with
those of the synthetic. Pre-treatment fit is fairly good for both variables, just as the
post-treatment fit for the mediator.
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Figure 5.6: In the figure the outcome of the treated unit is compared with those of the
synthetic unit across years. The synthetic unit was built using constraints on pre-treatment
period and post-treatment constraints on investments. As it is required to estimate the direct
and indirect eects using investments as mediator.
For the outcome the two lines diverge after intervention similarly to how they
used to in the total eect estimation, suggesting a small portion of the eect on the
outcome pass through a variation in investments.
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Figure 5.7: In the figure investments of the treated unit are compared with those of the
synthetic unit across years. The synthetic unit was built using constraints on pre-treatment
period and post-treatment constraints on investments. As it is required to estimate the direct
and indirect eects using investments as mediator.
In figure 5.8 the total eect, the direct eect when mediator’s treatment is set
to 1 and the indirect eect when treatment is set to 0 are represented. The indirect
eect mediated by the investments is almost null. There are two possible explaina-
tions to this result: European SF may have a low impact on the outcome through
investments or their eect through investments may be durable.
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Figure 5.8: In the figure the total, direct and indirect eects are presented. Investment was
used as mediator.
To choose with certainty between the two possible explainations we would need
more information. Indeed, this result should be compared with mediation analysis
on European SF impact. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, such an anal-
ysis does not exist. We can nonetheless advance some hypothesis based on the liter-
ature (see 5.1.3) and the use of transfers in Abruzzi region (see 5.1.2). Past literature
based on counterfactual analysis suggests European Structural Funds have no impact
on Investments because they only induce a substitution of private investments with
public investments (S. O. Becker et al. 2018). This result would support the first
of our explainations. Nonetheless, this result relies on an analysis based on a huge
group of regions and the eects may be highly heterogeneous. Hence the results
for Abruzzi may be dierent. Moreover, transfers in Abruzzi region were mostly
used for restorations and touristic infrastructures which are mostly public expenses.
Hence, it is unlikely that in this context public investments substituted the private
ones. Moreover, the reduction, although small, in investments level after interven-
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tion, suggests European SF had a positive impact on them and the positive impact of
infrastructures (Di Giacinto et al. 2011) and in general investments on GDP growth
is by now commonly accepted as a matter of fact. Hence, the first explaination is
not satisfying. The fact that Structural Funds eect through investments is durable
instead, is likely to be true. Indeed, when the investments end it is still possible to
benefit from infrastructures and restorations, at least in a time period of 8 years (be-
fore other restorations are needed). In table 5.5 more detailed informations on the
portion of eect mediated by investments is presented.
Table 5.5: ESTIMATION OF THE TOTAL, DIRECT AND INDIRECT EF-
FECTS OF EUROPEAN STRUCTURAL FUNDS ENDING IN ABRUZZI RE-
GION
Year Total Direct Direct in % Indirect Indirect in %
2001 -2.42 -2.42 99.76 -0.0057 0.24
2002 -5.06 -5.03 99.34 -0.0334 0.66
2003 -6.79 -6.73 99.17 -0.0564 0.83
2004 -11.32 -11.19 98.89 -0.1261 1.11
2005 -9.11 -9.03 99.16 -0.0765 0.84
2006 -9.52 -9.32 97.97 -0.1932 2.03
2007 -9.30 -9.13 98.26 -0.1622 1.74
2008 -7.19 -6.96 96.80 -0.2303 3.20
NOTE: Total, direct and indirect eects. The last two are expressed as well as a share of the total.
Mediator: Investments.
5.3.2.2. INDEXED EMPLOYMENT SHARE
In table 5.6 the average outcome and indexed employment share in pre-treatment
and the same mediator in post-treatment periods are presented (again synthetic val-
ues are used exploiting the weigths from the last estimation where all post-treatment
weights were used). The averages both in pre- and post-treatment periods between
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the treated and the synthetic units are fairly similar. Again, the weights for the con-
straints were equally divided between pre- and post-treatment constraints. In the
last estimation, the weights were distributed in the following way among the donor
pool: 0.0008 to Molise, 0.0044 to Campania, 0.9718 to Puglia, 0.000098 to Basili-
cata, 0.0198 to Calabria, 0.0009 to Sicily and 0.0013 to Sardinia.
Table 5.6: COMPARING THE PRE- AND POST-TREATMENT AVERAGES
OF TREATED AND SYNTHETIC UNITS AND MEZZOGIORNO AREA
Variable Abruzzi Synthetic Control Mezzogiorno Average
GDP per capita 92.43 94.27 93.93
Employment Share pre-treat 1.010 1.036 1.0401
Employment Share post-treat 1.0379 1.0570 1.0794
NOTE: All variables are indexed with respect to 1995. Average variables over the period 1980-
2000 and 2001-2008. Mezzogiorno area include Molise, Puglia, Calabria, Basilicata, Sardinia, Sicily,
Campania.
In figure 5.9 and 5.10 the outcome and the mediator lines of the treated and
of the synthetic units are compared. From the first graph it is possible to see that
pre-treatment fit for the outcome is slightly worst than before and the divergence
between the two lines is significantly lower than when the total eect was esti-
mated. This suggests the indirect eect mediated by employment share is signifi-
cantly higher than those mediated by investments.
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Figure 5.9: In the figure the outcome of the treated unit is compared with those of the
synthetic unit across years. The synthetic unit was built using constraints on pre-treatment
period and post-treatment constraints on indexed employment share. As it is required to
estimate the direct and indirect eects using indexed employment share as mediator.
With regard to employment share, it is possible to see that we could not obtain
perfect post-treatment fit. Indeed, synthetic unit post-treatment mediator values are
slightly higher. This means the estimated direct eect is closer to the total ones than
how it is in reality. Hence, the estimated indirect eect can be seen as a lower bound
of the real one. Unfortunately, a better post-treatment fit was not possible because
we would have had to pay the price of a worst pre-treatment fit for both the outcome
and the mediator.
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Figure 5.10: In the figure the indexed employment share of the treated unit is compared
with those of the synthetic unit across years. The synthetic unit was built using constraints
on pre-treatment period and post-treatment constraints on indexed employment share. As
it is required to estimate the direct and indirect eects using indexed employment share as
mediator.
The high indirect eect mediated by employment share is confirmed by figure
5.11 were it is also possible to see that the indirect eect mediated by employment
arrives with a little delay after the intervention. This is probably due to the slow
reaction of labour market (S. O. Becker et al. 2010, S. O. Becker et al. 2018).
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Figure 5.11: In the figure the total, direct and indirect eects are presented. Indexed
employment share was used as mediator.
As mentioned before, the fact that the indirect eect through investment has no
significant impact allow us to attribute this impact entirely to the employment me-
diation channel. The indirect eect when treatment is set to 0 is reported in table 5.7
together with the total and the direct eects estimated and the direct and indirect
eects expressed as a portion of the total (obviously, we expect the negative indirect
eect to be non-significant).
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Table 5.7: ESTIMATION OF THE TOTAL AND DIRECT EFFECTS OF EU-
ROPEAN STRUCTURAL FUNDS ENDING IN ABRUZZI REGION
Year Total Direct Direct in % Indirect Indirect in %
2001 -2.42 -2.80 115.45 0.37 -15.45
2002 -5.06 -5.13 101.28 0.07 -1.28
2003 -6.79 -7.70 113.42 0.91 -13.42
2004 -11.32 -8.46 74.77 -2.85 25.23
2005 -9.11 -3.77 41.42 -5.34 58.58
2006 -9.52 -3.75 39.42 -5.76 60.58
2007 -9.30 -2.53 27.20 -6.77 72.80
2008 -7.19 -1.73 24.08 -5.46 75.92
NOTE: Total eect, direct and indirect eects. The last two are expressed as well as a share of the
total. The possible range of the share of indirect eect is built according to the indirect eect of the
treatment mediated by investments. Mediator: Indexed Employment Share.
We can conclude the portion of eect due to European SF ending mediated
by employment is significantly higher than those mediated by investments. This
suggests the transfers used for investments have a higher longevity than those used
to boost employment.
5.3.3. Inference and Robustness Checks
5.3.3.1. INFERENCE
As mentioned before, we conduced in-time placebo. In table 5.8 the estimated
eect for Abruzzi region over the years 2001-2008 is presented together with the
p-values derived from the placebo test.
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Table 5.8: TOTAL EFFECT OF EUROPEAN STRUCTURAL FUNDS END-
ING IN ABRUZZI REGION
Year Total Eect p-value
2001 -2.42 0.1
2002 -5.06 0
2003 -6.79 0
2004 -11.32 0
2005 -9.11 0
2006 -9.52 0.1
2007 -9.30 0.1
2008 -7.19 0.4
NOTE: P-values were built using in-time placebo.
It is possible to see that the total eect started to be significant, at a 95% level,
one year after treatment and it is significant until 2005.
In table 5.9, the direct eect and the indirect eect mediated by investments are
presented together with their p-values derived from in-time placebo.
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Table 5.9: DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF EUROPEAN STRUC-
TURAL FUNDS ENDING IN ABRUZZI REGION
Year Direct Eect p-value Indirect Eect p-value
2001 -2.42 0.1 -0.006 0.9
2002 -5.03 0 -0.033 0.3
2003 -6.73 0 -0.056 0.3
2004 -11.19 0 -0.126 0
2005 -9.03 0 -0.076 0.1
2006 -9.32 0.1 -0.193 0.1
2007 -9.13 0.1 -0.162 0
2008 -6.96 0.4 -0.23 0.4
NOTE: P-values were built using in-time placebo. Mediator: investments.
As the total eect, the direct eect is significant only from 2002 until 2005. The
indirect eect, instead, is non-significant for almost all years under study (and its
significance in some years is temporary). Hence, we can conclude the indirect eect
passing through investments is null.
Dierent results were found using the indexed share of employed population as
mediator. The direct eect non-mediated by employment share was non-significant
in the first year after the intervention and since 2005. On the other hand, the indi-
rect eect was strong and significant only since 2004 and non-significant in 2008.
The results of the in-time placebo for these two eects are presented in table 5.10.
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Table 5.10: DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF EUROPEAN STRUC-
TURAL FUNDS ENDING IN ABRUZZI REGION
Year Direct Eect p-value Indirect Eect p-value
2001 -2.8 0.1 0.37 0.4
2002 -5.13 0 0.07 0.9
2003 -7.7 0 0.91 0.3
2004 -8.46 0 -2.85 0
2005 -3.77 0.4 -5.34 0
2006 -3.75 0.6 -5.76 0
2007 -2.53 0.6 -6.77 0
2008 -1.73 0.9 -5.46 0.1
NOTE: P-values were built using in-time placebo. Mediator: indexed share of employed.
5.3.3.2. ROBUSTNESS CHECK: SPILLOVER EFFECTS
The studied intervention may have had spillover eects in the neighbouring re-
gions. As an example, the reduction of employment in the treated region may have
induced the population tomigrate in the neighbourings, aecting their employment
share. Equally, the reduction in investments in the treated region may have induced
firms to move in the neighbouring ones. If one of the neighbouring regions is used
in the donor pool the presence of spillover eects may under- or over-estimate the
real treatment eect. In our empirical application, the only region in the donor pool
having its border in common with Abruzzi is Molise. Hence, we tried to exclude
Molise from the donor pool, to verify whether the estimated eects changed, sug-
gesting the presence of spillover eects. In figure 5.12 the eects estimated including
and excluding Molise from the donor pool are presented. In the first two graphs we
compare the eects when investments is used as mediator.
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Figure 5.12: In the figure on the left the eects are estimated using the whole donor pool.
In the figure on the right the eects are estimated excluding Molise from the donor pool.
Mediator: Investments.
It is possible to see that the estimated eects slightly change when Molise region
is excluded. Nevertheless, the indirect eect is still negligible with respect to the
direct and total ones. As visible from figure 5.13, the direct and indirect eect when
employment share is used as a mediator are even more robust to Molise exclusion.
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Figure 5.13: In the figure on the left the eects are estimated using the whole donor pool.
In the figure on the right the eects are estimated excluding Molise from the donor pool.
Mediator: Indexed employment share.
We can therefore conclude there are no spillover eects, or their aggregate eect
is null.
5.3.3.3. ROBUSTNESS CHECK: CHANGEMENTS IN THE DONOR POOL
When Synthetic Control Method is implemented, there is the risk that a region
in the donor pool having a peculiar behaviour drags the synthetic unit towards values
of the outcome that are dierent from those treated unit would have had in absence
of treatment. The same can happen when the MASC is implemented. To verify this
is not the case, we repeated the estimations several times, excluding one by one all
the units in the donor pool. The results for total eect estimation are presented in
figure 5.14.
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Figure 5.14: Each line represents the total eect estimated excluding the corresponding
region from the donor pool.
It is possible to see that the estimation is fairly robust to the exclusion of all the
units in the donor pool with the exception of Puglia and Calabria. Nonetheless, for
those regions, the pre-treatment fit is very bad as well. Moreover, even though the
magnitude of the eect changes for the esclusion of those regions, the eect of the
intervention remains negative.
In figure 5.15 and 5.16 the same results for the direct eect with respect to the
two mediators are presented (we do not present the same graph for the indirect ef-
fects given that if the total and the direct eects are robust they will be robust by
dierence).
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Figure 5.15: Each line represents the direct eect estimated excluding the corresponding
region from the donor pool. Mediator: Investments.
It is possible to see that again, when investments level is used as mediator, the
estimation is robust for the exclusion of all regions in the donor pool with the ex-
ception of Puglia and Calabria for which the pre-treatment fit is nonetheless really
bad. When the indexed share of unemployment is used, the estimation is robust
to exclusion of all regions but Puglia. Nonetheless, as before, this region has a bad
pre-treatment fit as well. The estimation results when Calabria is excluded from the
donor pool as well are slighlty dierent. Nonetheless, the dierence is only in the
magnitude, while the trend of the eect does not change.
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Figure 5.16: Each line represents the direct eect estimated excluding the corresponding
region from the donor pool. Mediator: Indexed employment share.
5.3.3.4. ROBUSTNESS CHECK: DIFFERENT MEDIATOR LAGS
Asmentioned before, we imposed the constraints on themediators lagged by one
year. I.e. we imposed them until 1999 in pre-treatment period and until t ′ − 1 in
post-treatment period when estimating the eect at time t ′. This allows themediator
to have a delayed eect on the outcome. Nonetheless, we do not know exactly the
amount of time necessary for the mediator to have an impact on the outcome. The
one-year lag was an arbitrary choice led by common sense. Hence, as a further
robustness check, we repeated the estimation increasing the number of lags, to check
whether the results changed. In table 5.11 the estimated eects for one-, two- and
three-years lag are presented.
The estimation of the total eect is fairly robust to variations in the number of lags
on the mediator. This, and the fact that the direct eects get closer to the total ones
when the number of lags in the mediators constraints are augmented, suggests that
the reduction of post-treatment constraints (due to the higher number of lags) do
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Table 5.11: ESTIMATION OF THE TOTAL AND DIRECT EFFECTS OF
EUROPEAN STRUCTURAL FUNDS ENDING IN ABRUZZI REGIONWRT
DIFFERENT MEDIATORS LAGS
Year Total Eect Direct Eect Investments Direct Eect Employment
1-y lag 2-y lag 3-y lag 1-y lag 2-y lag 3-y lag 1-y lag 2-y lag 3-y lag
2001 -2.42 -2.18 -2.23 -2.42 -2.18 -2.24 -2.8 -2.83 -2.54
2002 -5.06 -4.84 -4.91 -5.03 -4.82 -4.88 -5.13 -5.68 -5.66
2003 -6.79 -6.16 -6.23 -6.73 -6.12 -6.18 -7.7 -7.43 -7.6
2004 -11.32 -10.3 -10.4 -11.19 -10.24 -10.26 -8.46 -12.75 -12.28
2005 -9.11 -8.44 -8.5 -9.03 -8.36 -8.4 -3.77 -6.49 -9.89
2006 -9.52 -8.95 -9.05 -9.32 -8.9 -8.88 -3.75 -4.95 -6.54
2007 -9.3 -8.72 -8.82 -9.13 -8.66 -8.64 -2.53 -3.15 -3.82
2008 -7.19 -6.48 -6.52 -6.96 -6.13 -6.21 -1.73 -1.77 -2.03
NOTE: Total and direct eects estimated with 1, 2 and 3 years lags in the mediators.
not allow to distinguish properly between the direct and the total eect. Hence, our
choice to use a one-year lag seems correct.

6. CONCLUSIONS
In this dissertation we showed that, in causal inference frameworks, it is possible
to go beyond the estimation of the total eect of a policy following two dierent
paths: exploiting the characteristics of the policy and the context it is set in, or in-
troducing new methodologies that can be applied to other empirical investigations.
We followed the first path to go beyond the estimation of Law 407/90 eect. We
started showing that the policy had a significant and strong intention-to-treatment
eect on eligible people with approximately 24 months of unemployment. Indeed,
its implementation increased their likelihood of being hired by 36%. Later on, we
exploited policy characteristics to show that it did not present negative side eects
such as displacement eect and post-poned hiring eect. This is probably due to
the fact that employers prefer to hire the chosen workers immediately and to Italian
firms’ characteristics.
Finally we exploited the context the policy was set in to show that a general-
ization of the incentives to all unemployed would strongly penalize the vulnerable
group of LTU. Indeed, the intention-to-treatment eect of Law 190, parcel out
of the component due to the limited implementation period of the policy, is in-
significant. This, and Centra and Gualtieri (2016) and Sestito and Viviano (2016)
results, suggest that the generalization of the policy re-allocates the benefits in favor
of others, more “desirable”, groups of unemployed people. Therefore, in order to be
eective, with respect to vulnerable groups of unemployed workers, a policy based
on hiring subsidies should lower their relative labor costs rather than their absolute
ones. This would avoid benefit redistribution.
We furthermore provided evidence that thanks to the peak in hiring of LTU in
December 2015, probably due to the limited duration of the policy, Law 190 incen-
tives had a positive and significant eect on LTU hiring.
We followed the second path introducing a new methodology called Media-
tion Analysis Synthetic Control (MASC). This method combines Synthetic Control
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Method (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003, Abadie, Diamond, et al. 2010, Abadie, Di-
amond, et al. 2015) with Mediation Analysis approach allowing to investigate on
direct and indirect eects in frameworks with selection on unobservables and a low
number of treated and control units. This method is very intuitive and easy to im-
plement (i.e. public available SCM algorithms can be employed) and it can be used
even in presence of post-treatment confounders. Even though introduced for the
procedure presented in Abadie, Diamond, et al. (2010) and Abadie, Diamond, et al.
(2015), it can be easily extended to new approaches such as Athey, Bayati, et al.
(2017), Xu (2017), Kreif et al. (2016) and Doudchenko and Imbens (2017). On the
other end, the estimation of some of the parameters requires the presence of multiple
treated and additional restrictions on direct eect functional form. Moreover, a low
variability in the data may not allow to estimate all the parameters properly.
We applied MASC to the case of European SF ending in Abruzzi region, to ver-
ify to what extent the impact of this intervention on indexed GDP per capita passed
through a variation of investments or through a variation of indexed employment
share. We showed that most of the eect passed through a reduction of employ-
ment share, even though with a small delay after intervention. No eect instead,
went through investments reduction. This may be due to the nature of the invest-
ments implemented in Abruzzi region. The results suggest more eort should be
committed to increase the longevity of European Structural Funds impact on em-
ployment and employment impact onGDP per capita growth. Moreover, it suggests
that, to reach a major longevity of SF eect using today tools, transfers should be
concentrated on investments rather than employment.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abadie, A., A. Diamond, and J. Hainmueller (2010). “Synthetic Control Methods for
Comparative Case Studies: Estimating the Eect of California’s Tobacco Control
Program”. In: Journal of the American Statistical Association 105.490, pp. 493–505.
— (2011). “Synth: An R Package for Synthetic Control Methods in Comparative
Case Studies”. In: Journal of Statistical Software 42.13, pp. 1–17.
— (2015). “Comparative Politics and the Synthetic Control Method”. In: American
Journal of Political Science 59.2, pp. 495–510.
Abadie, A. and J. Gardeazabal (2003). “The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case
Study of the Basque Country”. In: The American Economic Review 93.1, pp. 113–
132.
Abruzzo (2001). “DocumentoUnico di Programmazione. Obiettivo 2 (2000-2006)”.
In: Regione.
Adhikari, B. (2015). “When Does Introducing a Value-Added Tax Increase Eco-
nomic Eciency? Evidence from the Synthetic Control Method”. In: Tulane
University Working Paper 1524.
Anastasia, B., L. Bertazzon, M. Gambuzza, andM. Rasera (2016). “GRAMMATICA
DELLECOMUNICAZIONIOBBLIGATORIE /4: GUIDAAI CONFRONTI
CON LE ALTRE FONTI STATISTICHE SUL MERCATO DEL LAVORO”.
In: Veneto Lavoro: Osservatorio & Ricerca 206.
Anastasia, B., A. Giraldo, and A. Paggiaro (2012). “L’Eetto degli Incentivi alle As-
sunzioni e alle Trasformazioni. Prime Evidenze per il Veneto”. In: POLITICA
ECONOMICA XXVIII.2.
Athey, S., M. Bayati, N. Doudchenko, G. Imbens, and K. Khosravi (2017). “Matrix
CompletionMethods for Causal Panel DataModels”. In: https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.10251.
Athey, S. and G.W. Imbens (2017). “The State of Applied Econometrics - Causality
and Policy Evaluation”. In: Journal of Economic Perspectives 31.2, pp. 3–32.
Ayllòn, S. (2013). “Unemployment persistence: not only stigma but discouragement
too”. In: Applied Economics Letters 20.1, pp. 67–71.
159
Baert, S. and D. Verhaest (2014). “Unemployment or Overeducation: Which is a
Worse Signal to Employers?” In: IZA Discussion Paper 8312.
Baron, R. M. and D. A. Kenny (1986). “The Moderator-Mediator Variable Dis-
tinction in Social Psychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical
Considerations”. In: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51.6, pp. 1173–
1182.
Barone, G., F. David, andG. de Blasio (2016). “Boulevard of broken dreams. The end
of EU funding (1997: Abruzzi, Italy)”. In: Regional Science and Urban Economics
60, pp. 31–38.
Becker, M., S. Klobner, and G. Pfeifer (2018). “Cross-Validating Synthetic Con-
trols”. In: Economics Bulletin 38.1, pp. 603–609.
Becker, S. O., P. H. Egger, and M. von Ehrlich (2010). “Going NUTS: The eect
of EU Structural Funds on regional performance”. In: Journal of Public Economics
94.9-10, pp. 578–590.
— (2012). “Too much of a good thing? On the growth eects of the EU’s regional
policy”. In: European Economic Review 56.4, pp. 648–668.
— (2018). “Eects of EURegional Policy: 1989-2013”. In:Regional Science andUrban
Economics 69, pp. 143–152.
Berg, van den (2001). “Duration Models: Specification, Identification, and Multiple
Durations”. In: Handbook of Econometrics 5.5.
Bernhard, S., H. Gartner, and G. Stephan (2008). “Wage subsidies for needy job-
seekers and their eect on individual labour market outcomes after the German
reforms”. In: IAB Discussion Paper 21.
Beugelsdijk, M. and S. C. W. Eijnger (2005). “The Eectiveness of Structural
Policy in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis for the EU-15 in 1995-
2001”. In: Journal of Common Market Studies 43.1, pp. 37–51.
Biewen, M. and S. Stees (2010). “Unemployment Persistence: Is There Evidence
for Stigma Eects?” In: Economics Letters 106.3, pp. 188–190.
Blundell, R., M. C. Dias, C. Meghir, and J. Van Reenen (2004). “Evaluating the Em-
ployment Impact of aMandatory Job Search Program”. In: Journal of the European
Economic Association 2.4, pp. 569–606.
160
Boldrin, M. and F. Canova (2001). “Inequality and Convergence in Europe’s Re-
gions: Reconsidering European Regional Policies”. In: Economic Policy 16.32,
pp. 206–253.
Boockmann, B., A. Ammermueller, T. Zwick, and M. F. Maier (2007). “Do hiring
subsidies reduce unemployment among the elderly? Evidence from two natural
experiments”. In: ZEW Discussion Papers 001.
Boone, J. and J. C. van Ours (2004). “Eective active labor market policies”. In: IZA
Discussion Paper 1335.
Botosaru, I. and B. Ferman (2017). “On the Role of Covariates in the Synthetic
Control Method”. In:MPRA Working Paper 80796.
Brown, A. J. G. (2015). “Can Hiring Subsidies Benefit the Unemployed?” In: IZA
world of Labor 163.
Brown, A. J. G. and J. Koettl (2012). “Active Labor Market Programs: Employment
Gain or Fiscal Drain?” In: IZA Journal of Labor Economics 4.1, pp. 1–36.
Bucher, Anne (2010). “Impact of hiring subsidies targeted at the long-term unem-
ployed on the low-skilled labor market: The French experience”. In: Economic
Modelling 27.2, pp. 553–565.
Calmfors, L., A. Forslund, and M. Hemström (2002). “Does active labour market
policy work? Lessons from the Swedish experiences”. In: CESifo Working Paper
675.
Cappelen, A., F. Castellacci, J. Fagerberg, and B. Verspagen (2003). “The Impact of
EU Regional Support on Growth and Convergence in the European Union”. In:
Journal of Common Market Studies 41, pp. 621–644.
Carling, K. and K. Richardson (2004). “The relative eciency of labor market pro-
grams: Swedish experience from the 1990s”. In: Elsevier Labour Economics 11.3,
pp. 335–354.
Cattaneo, M. D., B. R. Frandsen, and R. Titiunik (2015). “Randomization Inference
in the Regression Discontinuity Design: An Application to Party Advantages in
the U.S. Senate”. In: Journal of Causal Inference 3.1, pp. 1–24.
Centra, M. and V. Gualtieri (2016). “Incentivi al lavoro permanente e contratto a
tutele crescenti: una stima dell’impatto sulle nuove assunzioni nel 2015”. In: Paper
161
per la IX Conferenza ESPAnet Italia "Modelli di welfare e modelli di capitalismo. Le
sfide per lo sviluppo socio-economico in Italia e in Europa".
Cerqua, A. and G. Pellegrini (2018). “Are we spending too much to grow? The case
of Structural Funds”. In: Journal of Regional Science 58.3, pp. 535–563.
Chernozhukov, V., K.Wüthrich, andY. Zhu (2018). “An Exact and Robust Confor-
mal InferenceMethod forCounterfactual and Synthetic Controls”. In: https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.09089.
Cochran, W. G. (1953). “Matching in Analytical Studies”. In: American Journal of
Public Health 43, pp. 684–691.
Cochran, W. G. and D. B. Rubin (1973). “Controlling bias in observational studies:
a review”. In: Sankhya: The Indian Journal of Statisics, Series A 35.4, pp. 417–446.
Cockx, B., B. Van der Linden, and A. Karaa (1998). “Active Labour Market Policies
and Job Tenure”. In: Oxford Economic Papers 50.4, pp. 685–708.
Commission, European (1997). “Regional Development Studies - The Impact of
Structural Policies on Economic and Social Cohesion in the Union 1989-99”. In:
Oce for Ocial Publications of the European Commission, Luxembourg.
Dall’Erba, S. and F. Fang (2017). “Meta-analysis of the impact of European Union
Structural Funds on regional growth”. In: Regional Studies 51.6, pp. 822–832.
Dall’erba, S. and J. Le Gallo (2008). “Regional Convergence and the Impact of Struc-
tural Funds over 1989-1999: a Spatial Econometric Analysis”. In: Papers in Re-
gional Science 87.2, pp. 219–244.
Deuchert, E., M. Huber, and M. Schelker (2018). “Direct and Indirect Eects Based
on Dierence-in-Dierences With an Application to Political Preferences Fol-
lowing the Vietnam Draft Lottery”. In: Journal of Business & Economic Statistics
0.0.
Di Giacinto, V., G. Micucci, and P. Montanaro (2011). “L’impatto macroeconomico
delle infrastrutture: una rassegna della letteratura ed un’analisi empirica per l’Italia”.
In: Le infrastrutture in Italia: dotazione, programmazione, realizzazione, Workshops
and Conferences 7.
Doudchenko, N. and G.W. Imbens (2017). “Balancing, Regression, Dierence-In-
Dierences and Synthetic ControlMethods: A Synthesis”. In: https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.07748.
162
Duell, N., L. Thurau, and T. Vetter (2016). “Long-term Unemployment in the EU:
Trends and Policies”. In: Bertelsmann Stiftung, Economix Research & Consulting.
Ederveen, S., H. L. F. de Groot, and R. Nahuis (2006). “Fertile Soil for Structural
Funds? A Panel Data Analysis of the Conditional Eectiveness of European Co-
hesion Policy”. In: Kyklos 59.1, pp. 17–42.
Eppel, R. and H. Mahringer (2013). “Do wage subsidies work in boosting economic
inclusion? Evidence on eect heterogeneity in Austria”. In:WIFOWorking Papers
456.
Esposti, R. and S. Bussoletti (2008). “Impact ofObjective 1 Funds onRegional Growth
Convergence in the EuropeanUnion: A Panel-data Approach”. In:Regional Stud-
ies 42.2, pp. 159–173.
Farooq, A. and A. D. Kugler (2015). “What factors contributed to changes in em-
ployment during and after Great Recession?” In: IZA Journal of Labor Policy 4.1,
pp. 1–28.
Ferman, B. and C. Pinto (2017). “Placebo Tests for Synthetic Controls”. In:MPRA
Working Paper 78079.
Firpo, S. and V. Possebom (2017). “Synthetic control method: Inference, sensitivity
analysis and confidence sets”. In:Working Paper.
Forslund, A., P. Johansson, and L. Lindqvist (2004). “Employment Subsidies - A Fast
Lane From Unemployment to Work?” In: IFAU Working Paper 18.
Freitas, M. L. de, F. Pereira, and F. Torres (2003). “Convergence ammong EU re-
gions, 1990-2001. Quality of national institutions and "Objective 1" status”. In:
Intereconomics 38.5, pp. 270–275.
Frölich,M. andM.Huber (2017). “Direct and indirect treatment eects–causal chains
and mediation analysis with instrumental variables”. In: Journal of the Royal Sta-
tistical Society Series B 79.5, pp. 1645–1666.
Gallop, R., D. Small, J. Y. Lin, M. R. Elliot, M. Joe, and T. Ten Have (2009).
“Mediation Analysis with Principal Stratification”. In: Statistics in Medicine 28.7,
pp. 1108–1130.
163
Gardeazabal, J. and A. Vega-Bayo (2017). “An Empirical Comparison Between the
Synthetic Control Method and HSIAO et al.’s Panel Data Approach to Program
Evaluation”. In: Journal of Applied Econometrics 32.5, pp. 983–1002.
Giua, M. (2017). “Spatial discontinuity for the impact assessment of the EU regional
policy. The case of Italian objective 1 regions”. In: Journal of Regional Science 57.1,
pp. 109–131.
Gobillon, L. and T. Magnac (2016). “Regional Policy Evaluation: Interactive Fixed
Eects and Synthetic Controls”. In:Reviews of Economics and Statistics 98.3, pp. 535–
551.
Hagen, T. and P. Mohl (2008). “Which is the right dose of EU Cohesion Policy for
economic growth?” In: ZEW-Centre for European Economic Research Discussion
Paper 08-104.
Ham, J. C., C. Swenson, I. Ayşe, and H. Song (2011). “Government programs can
improve local labor markets: Evidence from State Enterprise Zones, Federal Em-
powerment Zones and Federal Enterprise Community”. In: Journal of Public Eco-
nomics 95.7, pp. 779–797.
Hamersma, S. (2008). “The Eects of an Employer Subsidy on Employment Out-
comes: A Study of the Work Opportunity and Welfare-to-Work Tax Credits
Abstract”. In: Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 27.3, pp. 498–520.
Hanson, A. and S. Rohlin (2013). “Do Spatially Targeted Redevelopment Programs
Spillover?” In: Regional Science and Urban Economics 43.1, pp. 86–100.
Heckman, J. J. and G. Borjas (1980). “Does Unemployment Cause Future Unem-
ployment? Definitions, Questions and Answers from a Continuous Time Model
of Heterogeneity and State Dependence”. In: Economica 47.187, pp. 247–283.
Holland, P. W. (1986). “Statistics and Causal Inference”. In: Journal of the American
Statistical Association 81.396, pp. 945–960.
— (1988). “Causal inference, path analysis, and recursive structural equation mod-
els”. In: Sociology an Methodological 18, pp. 449–484.
Hsiao, C., H. Steve Ching, and S. Ki Wan (2012). “A panel data approach for pro-
gram evaluation: measuring the benefits of political and economic integration
164
of Hong Kong with mainland China”. In: Journal of Applied Econometrics 27.5,
pp. 705–740.
Hsu, Y. C., M. Huber, and T. C. Lai (2017). “Nonparametric estimation of natu-
ral direct and indirect eects based on inverse probability weighting”. In: FSES
Working Papers 482.
Huber, M. (2014). “Identifying causal mechanisms in experiments (primarily) based
on inverse probabilityweighting”. In: Journal of Applied Econometrics 29.6, pp. 920–
943.
— (2016). “Disentangling policy eects into causal channels”. In: IZA World of La-
bor.
Huber, M., M. Lechner, and G. Mellace (2017). “Why Do Tougher Caseworkers
Increase Employment? The Role of Program Assignment as a Causal Mecha-
nism”. In: Review of Economics and Statistics 99.1, pp. 180–183.
Huttunen, K., J. Pirttilä, and R. Uusitalo (2013). “The Employment Eects of Low-
Wage Subsidies”. In: Journal of Public Economics 97.C, pp. 49–60.
Imai, K., L. Keele, and D. Tingley (2010). “A general approach to causal mediation
analysis”. In: Psychological Methods 15.4, pp. 309–334.
Imai, K., L. Keele, and T. Yamamoto (2010). “Identification, Inference and Sensi-
tivity Analysis for Causal Mediation Eects”. In: Statistical Science 25.1, pp. 51–
71.
— (2011). “Unpacking the black box of causality: learning about causal mechanisms
from experimental and observational studies”. In:American Political Science Review
105.4, pp. 765–789.
Imai, K. and T. Yamamoto (2013). “Identification and Sensitivity Analysis for Mul-
tiple Causal Mechanisms: Revisiting Evidence from Framing Experiments”. In:
Political Analysis 21, pp. 141–171.
Iuzzolino, G., G. Pellegrini, and G. Viesti (2011). “Convergence among Italian Re-
gions, 1861-2011”. In: Economic Histoy Working Papers, Banca d’Italia 22.
Jaenichen, U. and G. Stephan (2011). “The Eectiveness of TargetedWage Subsidies
for Hard-to-place Workers”. In: Applied Economics 43.10, pp. 1209–1225.
165
Junankar, P. N. (2011). “The Global Economic Crisis: Long-Term Unemployment
in the OECD”. In: IZA Discussion Paper 6057.
Kaul, A., S. Klobner, G. Pfeifer, and M. Schieler (2018). “Synthetic Control Meth-
ods: Never Use All Pre-Intervention Outcomes Together With Covariates”. In:
MPRA Working Paper 83790.
Klößner, S., A. Kaul, G. Pfeifer, and M. Schieler (2018). “Comparative politics and
the Synthetic Control Method revisited: a note on Abadie et al (2015)”. In: Swiss
Journal of Economics and Statistics 154.11.
Kluve, J., H. Lehmann, andC.M. Schmidt (2008). “Disentangling Treatment Eects
of Active Labor Market Policies: The Role of Labor Force Status Sequences”. In:
Elsevier Labour Economics 15.6, pp. 1270–1295.
Kreif, N., R. Grieve, D.Hangartner, A. J. Turner, S. Nikolova, andM. Sutton (2016).
“EXAMINATIONOFTHESYNTHETICCONTROLMETHODFOREVAL-
UATING HEALTH POLICIES WITH MULTIPLE TREATED UNITS”. In:
Health Economics 25.12, pp. 1514–1528.
Kroft, K., F. Lange, and M. J. Notowidigdo (2013). “Duration Dependence and La-
bor Market Conditions: Evidence from a Field Experiment”. In:Quarterly Journal
of Economics 128.3, pp. 1123–1167.
Lechner, M. (2015). “Treatment Eects and Panel Data”. In: The Oxford Handbook
of Panel Data.
Lee, D. S. (2008). “Randomized experiments from non-random selection on U.S.
House elections”. In: Journal of Econometrics 142.2, pp. 675–697.
Li, F., A. Mattei, and F. Mealli (2015). “Evaluating The Causal Eect of University
Grants on Student Dropout: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity using
Principal Stratification”. In: The Annals of Applied Statistics 9.4, pp. 1906–1931.
M., Gerfin, M. Lechner, andH. Steiger (2005). “Does subsidised temporary employ-
ment get the unemployed back to work?” In: Labour Economics 12.6, pp. 807–835.
Mankiw, N. G., D. Romer, and D. N.Weil (1992). “A Contribution to the Empirics
of Economic Growth”. In: Quarterly Journal of Economics 107.2, pp. 407–437.
166
Martin, J. P. (2015). “Activation and active labour market policies in OECD coun-
tries: stylized facts and evidence of their eectiveness”. In: IZA Journal of Labor
Policy 4.4.
Martin, J. P. and D. Grubb (2001). “What works and for whom: A review of OECD
countries’ experiences with active labour market policies”. In: Swedish Economic
Policy Review 8.2, pp. 9–56.
Mortensen, D. T. and C. Pissarides (2001). “Taxes, subsidies and equilibrium labor
market outcomes”. In: CEPR Discussion Paper 2989.
Mussida, C. (2010). “Is Long-Term Unemployment Unaected by Flexible Labour
Market Legislation?” In:Rivista internazionale di Scienze Sociali 118.1, pp. 77–105.
Neubaumer, R. (2010). “Can Training Programs or Rather Wage Subsidies Bring
the Unemployed Back to Work? A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation for
Germany”. In: IZA Discussion Papers 4864.
Neyman, J. (1990). “On the Application of Probability Theory to Agricultural Ex-
periments. Essay on Principles. Section 9”. In: Statistical Science, 1990. Translated
and edited by Dabrowska, D. M. and Speed, T. P. originally apperead in Roczniki Nauk
Rolniczych Tom X (1923) 1-51 Annals of Agricultural Sciences 5.4, pp. 465–472.
Oberholzer-Gee, F. (2008). “Nonemployment stigma as rational herding: a field
experiment”. In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 65.1, pp. 30–40.
Obermeier, T. and M. Meier (2016). “Duration Dependence, Dynamic Selection
and the Optimal Timing of Unemployment Benefits”. In: Annual Conference
(Augsburg): Demographic Change 145503.
Omori, Y. (1997). “Stigma eects of nonemployment”. In: Economic Inquiry 35.2,
pp. 394–416.
Ozler, B. (2014). “Confusing a Treatment for a Cure”. In: The World Bank Blog.
Pearl, J. (2001). “Direct and Indirect Eects”. In: Proceedings of the Seventeenth Con-
ference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, San Francisco, CA: Morgan Kaufmann,
pp. 411–420.
— (2014). “Interpretation and identification of causal mediation”. In: Psychological
Methods 19.4, pp. 459–481.
167
Pellegrini, G., F. Terribile, O. Tarola, T. Muccigrosso, and F. Busillo (2013). “Mea-
suring the Eects of European Regional Policy on Economic Growth: A Re-
gression Discontinuity Approach”. In: Papers in Regional Science 92.1, pp. 217–
233.
Puigcerver-Penalver, M. C. (2007). “The impact of structural funds policy on Eu-
ropean regions’ growth. A theoretical and empirical approach.” In: The European
Journal of Comparative Economics 4.2, pp. 179–208.
Robins, J. M. and S. Greenland (1992). “Identifiability and exchangeability for direct
and indirect eects”. In: Epidemiology 3.2, pp. 143–155.
Rosenbaum, P. R. and D. B. Rubin (1983). “The Central Role of the Propensity
Score in Observational Studies for Causal Eects”. In: Biometrika 70.1, pp. 41–
55.
Rubin, D. B. (1974). “Estimating Causal Eects of Treatments in Randomized and
Nonrandomized Studies”. In: Journal of Educational Psychology 66.5, pp. 688–701.
— (1977). “Assignment of Treatment Group on the Basis of a Covariate”. In: Journal
of Educational Statistics 2.1, pp. 1–26.
— (1990). “[On the Application of Probability Theory to Agricultural Experiments.
Essay on Principles. Section 9.] Comment: Neyman (1923) and Causal Inference
in Experiments andObservational Studies”. In: Statistical Science 5.4, pp. 472–480.
Schünemann, B., M. Lechner, and C. Wunsch (2013). “Do Long-Term Unem-
ployed Workers Benefit from Targeted Wage Subsidies?” In: German Economic
Review 16.1, pp. 43–64.
Sestito, P. and E. Viviano (2016). “Hiring Incentives and/or firing cost reduction?
Evaluating the umpact of the 2015 policies on the Italian labourmarket”. In: Bank
of Italy Occasional Papers 325.
Shpitser, I. and T. J. VanderWeele (2011). “A complete graphical criterion for the
adjustment formula in mediation analysis”. In: International Journal of Biostatistics
7.1.
Sianesi, B. (2008). “Dierential eects of active labour market programs for the un-
employed”. In: Labour Economics 15.3, pp. 370–399.
168
Small, D. S. (2012). “Mediation analysis without sequential ignorability: using base-
line covariates interacted with random assignment as instrumental variables”. In:
https://arxiv.org/abs/1109.1070.
Smith (1982). “Beliefs, Attribution and Evaluations: Nonhierarchical Models of Me-
diation in Social Cognition”. In: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 43.2,
pp. 248–259.
Soumerai, S. and D. Ross-Degnan (2002). “Segmented Regression Analysis of In-
terrupted Time Series Studies inMedication Use Research”. In: Journal of Clinical
Pharmacy and Therapeutics 27, pp. 299–309.
Vanderweele, T. J. and Y. Chiba (2014). “Sensitivity analysis for direct and indi-
rect eects in presence of exposure-induced mediator-outcome confounders”.
In: Epidemiology, Biostatistics, and Public Health 11.2.
Vanderweele, T. J. and S. Vansteelandt (2009). “Conceptual issues concerning medi-
ation interventions and composition”. In: STATISTICS AND ITS INTERFACE
2, pp. 457–468.
Vansteelandt, S. and T. J. VanderWeele (2012). “Natural Direct and Indirect Eects
on the Exposed: Eect Decomposition under Weaker Assumptions”. In: Biomet-
rics 68.4, pp. 1019–1027.
Winship, C. and L. Radbill (1994). “Sampling Weights and Regression Analysis”.
In: SOCIOLOGICAL METHODS and RESEARCH 23, pp. 230–257.
Xu, Y. (2017). “Generalized Synthetic Control Method: Causal Inference with In-
teractive Fixed Eects Models”. In: Political Analysis 25.1, pp. 57–76.
Zheng, C. and X. H. Zhou (2017). “Causal mediation analysis on failure time out-
come without sequential ignorability”. In: Lifetima Data Analysis 23.4, pp. 533–
559.
169

.1.
Generalized Policy ITT Estimation Including Data on December 2015
In table E1 we present the results of the estimation of generalized incentives ITT
when observations about December 2015 are included.
.2. Derivation of “Synthetic” Y 011t
To easy the notation the subscript t is dropped from the weights. Following
Abadie, Diamond, et al. 2010, consider a generic vector ofweightsW = (wn+1, ...,w J )′
such that wj ≥ 0 for all j = n + 1, ..., J and wn+1 + ... +w J = 1. With these weights
(and considering the factor model introduced in the text) the synthetic value of Y 011t
is given by
J∑
j=n+1
wjYjt = ζt + ηt
J∑
j=n+1
wjX j + λt
J∑
j=n+1
wjµj + φt (0)
J∑
j=n+1
wjMjt (0) +
J∑
j=n+1
wjϵjt .
The dierence between the real potential outcome and the synthetic one is then
Y 0,11t −
J∑
j=n+1
wjYjt = ηt
(
X1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjX j
)
+ λt
(
µ1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjµj
)
+ φt (0)
(
M1t (I {t ≥ T }) −
J∑
j=n+1
wjMjt (0)
)
+
J∑
j=n+1
wj(ϵ1t − ϵjt ). (1)
Let Y Pi be the ((T −1)×1) vector with t th element equal to Yit , ϵPi the ((T −1)×1)
vector with t th element equal to ϵit , ηP the ((T − 1) × r ) matrix with t th row equal
to ηt and λP the ((T − 1) × F )matrix with t th row equal to λt . Moreover, let φP (0) be
the ((T − 1) × 1) vector with t th element equal to φt (0) and MPi (0) the ((T − 1) × 1)
vector with t th element equal to Mit (0). We can now write
Y P1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjY
P
j = η
P
(
X1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjX j
)
+ λP
(
µ1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjµj
)
+ φP (0)
(
MP1t (0) −
J∑
j=n+1
wjM
P
jt (0)
)
+
(
ϵP1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjϵ
P
j
)
.
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Table E1: ESTIMATION OF THE INTENTION TO TREATMENT EFFECT OF
GENERALIZED INCENTIVES WITH THE INCLUSION OF DECEMBER 2015 OB-
SERVATIONS
VARIABLES Coecients
Time -0.00498**
(0.00214)
Time2 0*
(0)
Treat 1430
(618)
Treat*Time -1.49
(0.687)
Treat*Time2 0.000387
(0.000174)
Constant 12.2***
(0.930)
Observations 2191
R-squared 0.112
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
NOTE: Generalized incentives ITT on vulnerable group is given by the coecient of vari-
able “Treat”. Observations about December 2015 included. We implemented a weighted
regression, using the total number of individuals corresponding to each unit as weights. All
monthly or daily variables were seasonally adjusted using a moving average method. For
easier reading, all coecients and standard errors were multiplied by 100,000.
Note that we have MP1t (0) as t < T . It is easy to see that:
λP
(
µ1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjµj
)
= Y P1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjY
P
j − ηP
(
X1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjX j
)
− φP (0)
(
MP1t (0) −
J∑
j=n+1
wjM
P
jt (0)
)
−
(
ϵP1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjϵ
P
j
)
(2)
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Similar to Abadie, Diamond, et al. 2010 assume that
Assumption 3.
∑T−1
t=1 λ
′
tλt is non-singular.
Assumption 3 is equivalent to assume no perfect-collinearity among unobserved
common factors and implies that (λP ′λP )−1 exists. We can then multiply both sides
of 2 by (λP ′λP )−1λP ′ to get
µ1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjµj = (λP ′λP )−1λP ′
{
Y P1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjY
P
j − ηP
(
X1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjX j
)
− φP (0)
(
MP1t (0) −
J∑
j=n+1
wjM
P
jt (0)
)
−
(
ϵP1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjϵ
P
j
)}
.
Substituting in 1 and considering a generic post-intervention period t ′ ≥ T , we
have
Y 0,11t ′ −
J∑
j=n+1
wjYjt ′ = λt ′(λP ′λP )−1λP ′
(
Y P1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjY
P
j
)
+
(
ηt ′ − λt ′(λP ′λP )−1λP ′ηP
) (
X1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjX j
)
− λt ′(λP ′λP )−1λP ′
[
φP (0)(MP1 (0) −
J∑
j=n+1
wjM
P
j (0))
]
+ φt ′(0)
(
M1t ′(1) −
J∑
j=n+1
wjMjt ′(0)
)
− λt ′(λP ′λP )−1λP ′
(
ϵP1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjϵ
P
j
)
+
J∑
j=n+1
wj(ϵ1t ′ − ϵjt ′).
If we now assume, as we did in the main text, that there exists a set of positive
and summing up to 1 weightsW ∗ that satisfies, ∀ t = 1, ...,T − 1
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j Yjt = Y1t ,
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j X j = X1,
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and ∀ t = 1, ...,T − 1, t ′, also satisfies
J∑
j=n+1
w∗jMjt = M1t ,
replacing in the post-intervention period, the generic weights withW ∗, we get
Y 0,11t ′ −
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j Yjt ′ = −λt ′(λP
′
λP )−1λP ′
(
ϵP1 −
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j ϵ
P
j
)
+
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j (ϵ1t ′ − ϵjt ′).
From here, the proof is identical to the one in Abadie, Diamond, et al. 2010. We
can write
Y 0,11t ′ −
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j Yjt ′ = R1t ′ + R2t ′ + R3t ′
where
R1t ′ = λt ′(λP ′λP )−1λP ′
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j ϵ
P
j (3)
R2t ′ = −λt ′(λP ′λP )−1λP ′ϵP1 (4)
R3t ′ =
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j (ϵjt ′ − ϵ1t ′) (5)
Following Abadie, Diamond, et al. 2010, we impose the following assumptions
Assumption 4. ϵit ⊥ ϵjt ∀i , j with i, j = 1, ..., J .
Assumption 5. ϵit ⊥ ϵit ′′ ∀t , t ′′ with t , t ′′ = 1, ..., t ′.
Assumption 6. E(ϵit |Xi , µi ,Mit (I {t ≥ T })) = E(ϵit ) = 0 for i ∈ {1,n + 1, ..., J } and for
t = 1, ..., t ′
Taking the expected value on both sides of 4 we get
E(R2t ′) = E(−λt ′(λP ′λP )−1λP ′ϵP1 )
= −λt ′(λP ′λP )−1λP ′E(ϵP1 )
= 0
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where the second equality follows from the fact that −λt ′(λP ′λP )−1λP ′ is non-
stochastic and the third equality follows from assumption 6. Taking the expectation
on both sides of 5
E(R3t ′) = E
(
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j (ϵjt ′ − ϵ1t ′)
)
=
J∑
j=n+1
[
E(w∗j ϵjt ′) − E(w∗j ϵ1t ′)
]
=
J∑
j=n+1
[
E(w∗j )E(ϵjt ′) − E(w∗j )E(ϵ1t ′)
]
= 0
where the third equality follows from the fact that weightsW ∗ = w∗n+1, ...,w
∗
J are
determined using constraints on covariates, pre-treatment period outcomes and the
mediator which under assumptions 4, 5 and 6 are independent from the error terms
at time t ′ ≥ T . The fourth equality follows from assumption 6. The remaining 3 can
be rewritten as:
R1t ′ =
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j
T−1∑
s=1
λt ′(
T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh)−1λ′sϵjs (6)
As in Abadie, Diamond, et al. 2010, we further assume that
Assumption 7. Let ς(M) be the smallest eigenvalue of
1
M
T−1∑
t=T−M+1
λ′tλt ,
ς(M) ≥ ς > 0 for each positive integer M.
Assumption 8.
∃ λs.t.|λt f | ≤ λ ∀t=1,...,t’ and f=1,...,F.
Assumption 7 guarantees that the matrix
∑T
t=1 λ
′
tλt and, consequently, its inverse,
are symmetric and positive definite. Thus, for the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we
have that
©­«λt
(
T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′s
ª®¬
2
= |〈λt ,Aλ′s〉|2 ≤ ||Aλt | |2 | |Aλs | |2 (7)
=
©­«λt
(
T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′t
ª®¬ ©­«λs
(
T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′s
ª®¬
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Where A =
(∑T−1
h=1 λ
′
h
λh
)−1
. Since A is a symmetric matrix B = (T − 1)A is sym-
metric as well. Thus, it can be decomposed as B = GOG−1. Where G is orthogonal
andG−1 = G′ andO is a diagonal matrix with the eigenvalues of B as elements. Thus,
λt
(
T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′t =
1
T − 1 (λtBλ
′
t ) =
1
T − 1 (λtGOG
′λ′t )
Defining bt = λtG we have
λt
(
T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′t =
1
T − 1 (btOb
′
t ) =
1
T − 1
(
b2t1
1
ς1
+ . . . + b2tF
1
ςF
)
where ςi are the eigenvalues of matrix B. From assumption 7, imposing M = T − 1,
we’ll have that 1ςi ≤ 1ς for i = 1, ..., F . Indeed the eigenvalues of the inverse of a
matrix are given by the inverse of the matrix eigenvalues, and B is the inverse of the
matrix in assumption 7. Consequently:
λt
(
T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′t =
1
T − 1
F∑
f =1
b2
t f
ς f
≤ 1(T − 1)ς
F∑
f =1
b2t f
=
1
(T − 1)ς | |bt | |
2 =
1
(T − 1)ς | |λtG | |
2
As we noticed before, G is an orthogonal and thus isometric matrix, hence | |λtG | | =
| |λt | |. Consequently,
λt
(
T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′t ≤
1
(T − 1)ς | |λt | |
2 =
∑F
f =1 λ
2
t f
(T − 1)ς ≤
∑F
f =1 λ
2
(T − 1)ς =
Fλ2
(T − 1)ς
where the last inequality follows from assumption 8. Applying the same idea to the
second part of 7 we get
©­«λt
(
T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′s
ª®¬
2
≤ ©­«λt
(
T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′t
ª®¬ ©­«λs
(
T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′s
ª®¬
≤
(
Fλ2
(T − 1)ς
)2
(8)
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Following Abadie, Diamond, et al. 2010 we define
ϵLj =
T−1∑
s=1
λT (
T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh)−1λ′sϵjs (9)
for j = n + 1, ..., J . Assume that
Assumption 9. The pth moment of |ϵjt | for some even p exists for j = 2, ..., J and t =
1, ...,T − 1
Using Hölder’s Inequality and taking into account that 0 ≤ w∗j ≤ 1 for j =
n + 1, ..., J we have that:
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j |ϵLj | =
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j |ϵLj ∗ 1| ≤
(
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j |ϵLj |p
)1/p ( J∑
j=n+1
w∗j |1|q
)1/q
=
(
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j |ϵLj |p
)1/p ( J∑
j=n+1
w∗j
)1/q
=
(
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j |ϵLj |p
)1/p
≤
(
J∑
j=n+1
|ϵLj |p
) (1/p)
where the last equality follow fromw∗n+1+ ...+w
∗
J = 1 and the last inequality follows
from the condition that w∗n+1 ≤ 1, ...,w∗J ≤ 1. Applying Hölder’s Inequality again
we get
E
[
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j |ϵLj |
]
≤
(
E
[
J∑
j=n+1
|ϵLj |p
])1/p
(10)
Applying Rosenthal’s Inequality we have
E
[
|ϵLj |p
]
= E

T−1∑s=1 λt
(
T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′sϵjs


≤ C (p)max ©­«
T−1∑
s=1
E

λt
(
T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′sϵjs

p
,
©­­«
T−1∑
s=1
E

λt
(
T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′sϵjs

2
ª®®¬
p/2ª®®®¬
where C(p) is the pth moment of −1 plus a Poisson random variable with mean 1
(see Abadie, Diamond, et al. 2010). Consider the two elements of max(.). For the
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first element, we have
T−1∑
s=1
E

λt
(
T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′sϵjs

p =
T−1∑
s=1
E

©­«λt
(
T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′s
ª®¬
2∗(p/2)
|ϵjs |p

≤
T−1∑
s=1
E

(
Fλ2
(T − 1) ς
)2∗(p/2)
|ϵjs |p

=
(
Fλ2
ς
)p
1
(T − 1)p
T−1∑
s=1
E
(|ϵjs |p )
where the first equality follows from the distributivity of the power and the in-
equality follows from 8. For the second element inmax (.), we have
©­­«
T−1∑
s=1
E

λt
(
T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′sϵjs

2
ª®®¬
p/2
≤

T−1∑
s=1
E
©­«
(
Fλ
2
(T − 1) ς
)2
ϵ2js
ª®¬

p/2
=
(
Fλ
2
ς
)p [T−1∑
s=1
1
(T − 1)2E
(
ϵ2js
)]p/2
where the first inequality follows from 8. Putting all these results together have
E
[
|ϵLj |p
]
≤ C (p)
(
Fλ
2
ς
)p
max ©­« 1(T − 1)p
T−1∑
s=1
E
( |ϵjs |p ) , [T−1∑
s=1
1
(T − 1)2E
(
ϵ2js
)]p/2ª®¬
As Abadie, Diamond, et al. 2010, we define σ 2js = E |ϵjs |2, σ 2j = (1/(T − 1)
∑T−1
s=1 σ
2
js),
σ 2 = maxj=n+1,...,Jσ
2
j and σ =
√
σ 2. Similarly, we define τp,jt = E |ϵjt |p , τp,j =
1
(T−1)
∑T−1
t=1 τp,jt , and τp =maxj=n+1,...,Jτp,j . We can write the first element ofmax(.) as
1
(T − 1)p
T−1∑
s=1
E(|ϵjs |p) = 1(T − 1)p−1
1
(T − 1)
T−1∑
t=1
τpjt =
1
(T − 1)p−1τpj
Similarly, the second element can be written as[
T−1∑
s=1
1
(T − 1)2E(ϵ
2
js)
]p/2
=
(
1
T − 1
1
T − 1
T−1∑
s=1
σ 2js
)p/2
=
(
1
T − 1σ
2
j
)p/2
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Thus , defining ϖ = C(p)(Fλ
2
ς )p , we have
E
[
|ϵLj |p
]
≤ ϖmax
(
1
(T − 1)p−1τpj ,
(
1
T − 1σ
2
j
)p/2)
J∑
j=n+1
E
[
|ϵLj |p
]
= E
[
J∑
j=n+1
|ϵLj |p
]
≤ ϖmax
(
1
(T − 1)p−1
J∑
j=n+1
τpj ,
J∑
j=n+1
(
1
T − 1σ
2
j
)p/2)
= ϖmax
(
J − n − 1
(T − 1)p−1
1
J − n − 1
J∑
j=n+1
τpj ,
1
(T − 1)p/2
J∑
j=n+1
σ
2∗p/2
j
)
(
E
[
J∑
j=n+1
|ϵLj |p
])1/p
≤ ϖ1/p max ©­­«
(
J−n−1
(T−1)p−1
)1/p
(J − n − 1)1/p
(
J∑
j=n+1
τpj
)1/p
,
(∑J
j=n+1 σ
2∗p/2
j
)1/p
(T − 1)(p/2)∗(1/p)
ª®®¬
= ϖ1/p max ©­«
(
J − n − 1
(T − 1)p−1
)1/p
τ
1/p
p ,
1
(T − 1)1/2
(
J∑
j=n+1
σ 2∗(p/2)
)1/pª®¬
where the last equality follows from 1J−n−1
∑J
j=n+1 τpj = E(τpj) ≤ maxj(τpj) = τp . Thus,
(
E
[
J∑
j=n+1
|ϵLj |p
])1/p
≤ ϖ1/pmax
( (J − n − 1)1/p τ 1/pp
(T − 1)1−1/p ,
(J − n − 1)σ 2∗(p/2)
(T − 1)1/2
)1/p
= ϖ1/p (J − n − 1)1/pmax
(
τ 1/p
(T − 1)1− 1p
,
√
σ 2
(T − 1)1/2
)
(11)
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this implies
E [|R1t ′ |] = E


J∑
j=n+1
w∗j ϵ
L
j


≤ E
[
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j |ϵLj |
]
≤
(
E
[
J∑
j=n+1
|ϵLj |p
])1/p
≤ ϖ1/p(J − n − 1)1/pmax
(
τ
1/p
p
(T − 1)1− 1p
,
σ
(T − 1)1/2
)
where, in the second equation, the first equality follows from 4 and 9, the first in-
equality follows from the triangular inequality, the second follows from 10 and the
third from 11. It follows that
E |R1t ′ | ≤ C(p)1/p λ
2F
ς
(J − n − 1)1/p max

τ
1/p
p
(T − 1)1−1/p ,
σ
(T − 1)1/2
 .
Thus, the dierence between the expected value of Y 0,11t and its synthetic counter-
part can be bounded by something that goes to zero when the number of pre-
intervention periods goes to infinity, namely
E
(
Y 0,11t ′ −
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j Yjt ′
)
= E(R1t ′) = o(T ).
.3. Extra assumptions on the mediator needed for Y 101t
To create a synthetic Y 101t we need to impose the standard SCM assumptions on
the mediator which are:
Assumption 10.
∑T−1
t=1 ϑ
′
tϑt is non-singular.
Assumption 11. νit ⊥ νjt ∀i , j with i, j ∈ {1,n + 1, ..., J }.
Assumption 12. νit ⊥ νit ′′ ∀t , t ′′ with t , t ′′ = 1, ..., t ′.
Assumption 13. E(νit |{Zi , ϱi}i∈{1,n+1,...,J }) = E(νit ) = 0 for i ∈ {1,n + 1, ..., J } and for
t = 1, ..., t ′
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Assumption 14. κ(M) ≥ κ > 0 for each positive integer M, where κ(M) is the smallest
eigenvalue of
1
M
T−1∑
t=T−M+1
ϑ ′tϑt . (12)
Assumption 15.
∃ ϑ s.t.|ϑtv | ≤ ϑ ∀t=1,...,t’ and v=1,...,V. (13)
Assumption 16. ∃ a pth moment of |νjt | for some even p and for j = n + 1, ..., J and
t = 1, ..., t ′
.4. Derivation of “Synthetic” Y 101t
As for Y 011t we drop the subscript t from the weight and we write
n∑
j=2
qjYjt = ζt + ηt
n∑
j=2
qjX j + λt
n∑
j=2
qjµj + φt (I {t ≥ T })
n∑
j=2
qjMjt (I {t ≥ T })
+
n∑
j=2
qjρt
(
Mjt (I {t ≥ T })
)
I {t ≥ T } +
n∑
j=2
qjϵjt .
Thus,
Y 1,01t −
n∑
j=2
qjYjt = ηt
(
X1 −
n∑
j=2
qjX j
)
+ λt
(
µ1 −
n∑
j=2
qjµj
)
+ φt (I {t ≥ T })
(
M1t (0) −
n∑
j=2
qjMjt (I {t ≥ T })
)
+
(
ρt (M1t (0)) −
n∑
j=2
qjρt
(
Mjt (I {t ≥ T })
))
I {t ≥ T }
+
n∑
j=2
qj
(
ϵ1t − ϵjt
)
Using the same notation as before in the pre-intervention period we have
Y P1 −
n∑
j=2
qjY
P
j = η
P
(
X1 −
n∑
j=2
qjX j
)
+ λP
(
µ1 −
n∑
j=2
qjµj
)
+ φP (0)
(
MP1 (0) −
n∑
j=2
qjM
P
j (0)
)
+
(
ϵP1 −
n∑
j=2
qjϵ
P
j
)
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Thus
λP
(
µ1 −
n∑
j=2
qjµj
)
= Y P1 −
n∑
j=2
qjY
P
j − ηP
(
X1 −
n∑
j=2
qjX j
)
− φP (0)
(
MP1 (0) −
n∑
j=2
qjM
P
j (0)
)
−
(
ϵP1 −
n∑
j=2
qjϵ
P
j
)
Multiplying both sides by (λP ′λP )−1λP ′ we get
µ1 −
n∑
j=2
qjµj =
(
λP
′
λP
)−1
λP
′
{(
Y P1 −
n∑
j=2
qjY
P
j
)
− ηP
(
X1 −
n∑
j=2
qjX j
)
− φP (0)
(
MP1 (0) −
n∑
j=2
qjM
P
j (0)
)
−
(
ϵP1 −
n∑
j=2
qjϵ
P
j
)}
.
Substituting in 14 and considering a generic post-intervention period t’, we have
Y 1,01t ′ −
n∑
j=2
qjYjt ′ =
(
λP
′
λP
)−1
λP
′
(
Y P1 −
n∑
j=2
qjY
P
j
)
+
(
ηt ′ −
(
λP
′
λP
)−1
λP
′
ηP
) (
X1 −
n∑
j=2
qjX j
)
−
(
λP
′
λP
)−1
λP
′
φP (0)
(
MP1 (0) −
n∑
j=2
qjM
P
j (0)
)
+ φt ′(1)
(
M1t ′(0) −
n∑
j=2
qjMjt ′(1)
)
+
(
ρt ′ (M1t ′ (0)) −
n∑
j=2
qjρt ′
(
Mjt (1)
))
−
(
λP
′
λP
)−1
λP
′
(
ϵP1 −
n∑
j=2
qjϵ
P
j
)
+
n∑
j=2
qj
(
ϵ1t ′ − ϵjt ′
)
Assume, as we did in the main text, that there exists weights q∗2, ...,q
∗
n that satisfy
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∀t = 1, ...,T − 1
n∑
j=2
q∗jYjt = Y1t ,
n∑
j=2
q∗jX j = X1,
n∑
j=2
q∗jMjt = M1t ,
and it also satisfies
n∑
j=2
q∗jMjt ′ = Mˆ1t ′(0).
Substituting the generic weights with q∗2, ...,q
∗
n in the post-intervention period t ′,
we get
Y 1,01t ′ −
n∑
j=2
q∗jYjt ′ =
(
ρt ′ (M1t ′ (0)) −
n∑
j=2
q∗j ρt ′
(
Mjt ′ (1)
))
−
(
λP
′
λP
)−1
λP
′
(
ϵP1 −
n∑
j=2
q∗j ϵ
P
j
)
+
n∑
j=2
q∗j
(
ϵ1t ′ − ϵjt ′
)
Note that, as by assumption
∑n
j=2 q
∗
jMt ′ = Mˆ1t ′(0) and Mˆ1t ′(0) is estimated using a
standard SCM
E
(
φt ′ (1)
(
M1t ′(0) −
n∑
j=2
q∗jMjt ′(1)
))
= o(T ).
As we mention in the main text, for identification we have to impose an extra
assumption, namely
Assumption 17. ρt ′(.) is a linear function
Under assumption 17 we have
E
[(
ρt ′ (M1t ′ (0)) −
n∑
j=2
q∗j ρt ′
(
Mjt ′ (1)
))]
= E
[(
ρt ′ (M1t ′ (0)) − ρt ′
(
n∑
j=2
q∗jMjt ′ (1)
))]
,
= E
[(
ρt ′ (M1t ′ (0)) − ρt ′
(
Mˆ1t ′(0)
))]
,
= ρt ′ (M1t ′ (0)) − ρt ′
(
E(Mˆ1t ′(0))
)
= o(T ).
183
Thus,
Y 1,01t ′ −
n∑
j=2
q∗jYjt ′ = −
(
λP
′
λP
)−1
λP
′
(
ϵP1 −
n∑
j=2
q∗j ϵ
P
j
)
+
n∑
j=2
q∗j
(
ϵ1t ′ − ϵjt ′
)
.
This, with an analogous as the one above therefore omitted proof, can be shown
to imply
E(Y 1,01t ′ −
n∑
j=2
q∗jYjt ′) = o(T ).
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